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On multinational corporations, human rights and international law 
 
 
“Multinational corporations have long outgrown the legal structures that govern 
them, reaching a level of transnationality and economic power that exceeds 
domestic law’s ability to impose basic human rights norms.” Stephens B “The 
amorality of profit: Transnational corporations and human rights” 2002 (46) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 54. 
“[C]orporations still remain clearly outside the mainstream of international law.” 
Duruigbo E “Corporate accountability and liability for international human rights 
abuses: Recent changes and recurring challenges” 2008 (6) Northwestern Journal 
of International Human Rights 228. 
“Traditional international law does not have much to say about MNCs. If it has 
shown any interest at all, it has been more concerned with protecting the rights of 
corporations than with enforcing their duties.” Kamminga MT “Holding 
Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A challenge for 
the EC” in Alston P, Bustelo M and Heenan J (eds) The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) 556. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
Key terms: 
Multinational Corporations; corporate accountability; human rights; non-state 
actors; international law; nationality; domestic law; host state; home state; 
international personality;  state responsibility; forum non conveniens; globalization; 
arbitration, corporate form; incorporated; extraterritorial; state-centric; international 
human rights; private sphere; public sphere; due diligence; jurisdiction 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION ................................................................ 1  
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
2 The quest for accountability in the era of globalisation ....................................... 5 
3 The concept of legal personality and its importance in both municipal and 
international law...................... .........................................................................  23 
4 The lack of accountability of MNCs in international law .................................... 29 
5 Factors contributing to the accountability deficit of MNCs ................................. 32 
5.1 Globalisation and its impact ...................................................................... 32 
5.2 The corporate form of MNCs .................................................................... 36 
5.3 Doctrinal challenges  ................................................................................ 37 
6 Purpose of the study ......................................................................................... 37 
 
CHAPTER 2: MNCs AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT...................................... 46 
1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 46 
2 The ability of MNCs to violate human rights ...................................................... 47 
3 Challenges posed by MNCs to the current human rights system of 
accountability .................................................................................................... 59 
3.1  Nature of MNCs ........................................................................................ 59 
3.2  Home and host state divide ...................................................................... 63 
3.2.1  The American jurisprudence on forum non conveniens ............... 66 
3.2.2  The Jurisprudence of the courts of the United Kingdom on  
  forum non conveniens.................................................................. 78 
  3.2.3 The doctrine of forum non conveniens in the European Union ........ 84 
4  International attempts to deal with the power and influence of MNCs .............. 87 
 4.1  The UN appoints a Group of Eminent Persons ........................................ 87 
 4.2  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines ................................................................................................ 91 
 4.3  Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 92 
 4.4  The UN Global Compact .......................................................................... 93 
 4.5   Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations  
  and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights ............... 94 
vi 
 
 4.6  UN Special Representative on Issues of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Businesses .................................. 96 
 5 Conclusion .............................................................................................. 101 
 
CHAPTER 3: INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY OF MNCs IN INTERNATIONAL  
LAW   ....................................................................................................... 102 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 102 
2 The different categories of corporations  ......................................................... 103 
3 International law as a rules based-system ...................................................... 110 
4 State responsibility in international law ........................................................... 114 
 4.1  An overview of the doctrine .................................................................... 114 
 4.2  Towards the codification of international law on state responsibility ...... 119 
 4.3  Invocation of state responsibility ............................................................ 125 
5 State responsibility in relation to private conduct  ........................................... 131  
 5.1  Jurisprudence on state responsibility in the private sphere .................... 134 
 5.2  The limitations of the doctrine of state responsibility .............................. 143 
6 Bridging the accountability gaps within the international legal system ............ 148 
7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 153 
 
CHAPTER 4:  THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW .............................................. 155 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 155 
2 The historical context of the use of international personality in international 
law  … ................................................................................................... 156 
3 Source based development of international law ............................................. 163 
3.1 Treaties .................................................................................................. 164 
3.2 Custom ................................................................................................... 167 
3.3 The general principles of law recognised by civilized nations ................. 169 
3.4 Judicial decisions or precedent and the teachings of the highly 
published publicists ................................................................................ 169 
4 Conceptualisation of international personality in international law .................. 173 
4.1 Philosophical foundations ....................................................................... 171 
4.2 Theoretical foundations of the concept of international personality ........ 174 
4.2.1 Realist theory ................................................................................. 175 
vii 
 
4.2.2 Fictional theory ............................................................................... 178 
4.2.3 Functional theory ........................................................................... 179 
5 The acquisition of international personality in international law....................... 180 
5.1  States as subjects of international law .................................................... 182 
5.1.1  The law of recognition ................................................................ 186 
    5.1.1.1 The constitutive theory  .................................................. 190 
    5.1.1.2 The declaratory theory ................................................... 191 
5.2 Legal personality of insurgents ............................................................... 193 
5.3  Legal personality of individuals in international law ................................ 196 
5.4  Legal personality of international organizations ...................................... 200 
5.4.1.1 The will theory ............................................................................ 205 
5.4.1.2 The objective theory ................................................................... 206 
5.4.1.3 The implied ................................................................................. 208 
5.4.1.4 Presumptive theory of personality .............................................. 209 
6 Towards the international legal personality of NGOs in international law? ....  212 
7 Conceptualising the international personality of MNCs in international law .... 218 
7.1  The basis for the international personality of MNCs in international law . 220 
7.1.1 Source-based analysis .......................................................... 220 
7.1.2 Duties of MNCs under international law ................................ 222 
7.1.3 Rights of MNCs under international law ................................ 223 
7.1.4 The capacity of MNCs to legally participate in international  
 law ........................................................................................... 225 
8 Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 225 
 
CHAPTER 5: TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM FOR MNC 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW   …..… .............................................................................................. 227 
1   Introduction ..................................................................................................... 227 
2   Legal responses to challenges brought by globalisation ................................. 228 
3 Towards a theory of accountability for human rights violations in  
 international law .............................................................................................. 235 
 3.1  The universality and primacy of human rights ........................................ 237 
 3.2  The obligatory nature of human rights .................................................... 240 
4 Towards an institutional mechanisms of accountability ................................... 242 
viii 
 
 4.1  An overview of the current status quo and the debates .......................... 242 
 4.2  Introducing the institutional model of accountability................................ 253 
 4.3  The proposed model and its possible pitfalls .......................................... 259 
5 Conclusion  ....................................................................................................... 262 
 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 264 
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 264 
2 The corporate form and the limits of domestic accountability ......................... 267 
3 Globalisation and the shifting patterns of power ............................................. 269 
4 Towards a conceptual model of accountability................................................ 271 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................... 273 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The question of human rights accountability of corporations in the course of their 
international operations raises a number of challenges which this study will 
address. The first challenge is conceptual. By their very nature, corporations are a 
business concept designed to facilitate business.1 Inevitably, to talk of corporate 
accountability for human rights violations, shifts the discussion to an area which 
has, until the period shortly after the Second World War, not been the concern of 
business. The second challenge relates to the nature and function of international 
law.2 Historically, international law has been understood to be a system of rules 
designed to govern inter-state relations.3 To this end, the very notion of arguing for 
corporate accountability in international law is seen by some scholars as being 
misplaced and is therefore contested.4 Part of the contest is due to the fact that 
international law is “an actor-centred law” which only operates through its 
subjects.5 Corporations, the argument goes, are not subjects of international law 
and therefore do not hold any obligations under the legal system.6 The subtext 
underlying this resistance is that since corporations do not have legal personality 
                                                          
1 See Friedman M Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press Chicago 1962) 133 
who states that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within 
the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud”.  
2  The use of the term “international law” in this study will be with reference to “public 
international law”. Private international law and its principles will only be discussed in as far 
as it is applicable to this study.  
3  See Hansen RF “The international legal personality of multinational enterprises: Treaty, 
custom and the governance gap” 2010 (10) Global Jurist 12-13; Vázquez CM “Direct vs 
indirect obligations for corporations under international law” 2005 (43) Columbia Journal of 
International Law 955; Klabbers J “(I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the 
Emergence of Non-State Actors” in Bianchi A (ed) Non-State Actors and International Law 
(Ashgate Publishing Limited Farnham 2009) 35 and Menon PK “The international personality 
of individuals in international law: A broadening of the traditional doctrine” 1992 (1) Journal of 
Transnational Law and Policy 155.  
4  See Ratner SR “Corporations and human rights: A theory of legal responsibility” 2001 (111) 
The Yale Law Journal 449 stating that: “Some traditional legal scholars might see corporate 
duties as unprecedented or even doctrinally prohibited, asserting that only states, and 
perhaps individuals, are holders of obligations.” See also Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of 
International Law 932-933.  
5  Walter C “Subjects of international law” 2007 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law para 28. 
6  Hansen 2010 Global Jurist 74. 
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in international law, it therefore follows that they cannot and should not be held to 
account directly under the legal system.  
The discussion above raises fundamental challenges about international law 
doctrines, its subjects and its scope. Throughout history, questions regarding the 
nature of international law, its subjects and its scope have been a subject of 
polarised philosophical and theoretical debates. At the heart of the debates lies the 
perennial tension between natural-law scholars and positivists. The importance of 
both these philosophical and theoretical positions cannot be underestimated. An 
international law scholar for instance, who adopts a positivistic view of 
international law, will not reach the same conclusion as the one who adopts a 
natural law inspired view. The philosophical approaches are intertwined with the 
vision, scope and nature of international law. Each approach has its own vision of 
international law. A positivistic approach to international law is narrow and 
restrictive, while the natural law approach adopts a wider application and 
interpretation of the rules of international law. In relation to corporations, a 
positivistic conception of international law would be dismissive of the very thought 
of accommodating them under the international legal system.7 On the other hand, 
in light of its wider approach to the rules of the legal system, a natural law inspired 
approach would adopt a more receptive approach to corporations. This study, 
though not discarding the positivistic conception of international law altogether, will 
adopt a natural law inspired approach. 
For reasons rooted in history, international law arose within a context whereby 
states wielded a lot of power.8 Because of its position, the nation state became 
both the primary subject and duty bearer to which all international law rules were 
addressed. Within this state-centric model, accountability in international law 
became limited to state responsibility. All other non-state 9  entities such as 
                                                          
7  Muchlinski PT “Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law: Creating ‘Soft Law’ 
Obligations and ‘Hard Law’ Rights” in Noortmann M and Ryngaert C (eds) Non-State Actors 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate Farnham 2010) 
10. 
8  Humphrey JP “On the foundations of international law” 1945 (39) American Journal of 
International Law 231-243. 
9 For the various categories of non-state actors see Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of 
Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press Oxford 2006) 271-316; Alston P “The ‘Not-a-Cat’ 
Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?” 
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liberation movements, insurgents, international organisations and the individual, 
among others, had an indirect relationship with international law through the nation 
state. Traditionally, these entities bore no direct duties and were only indirectly 
accountable in international law through states. In the last half a century, as this 
study will later demonstrate, the dawn of the era of human rights has marked a 
“major departure from the traditional character of international law”.10 As part of 
this shift, international law conferred limited international legal personality to a 
limited number of subjects such as the individual and international organisations.11 
Despite this shift, the state-centric nature of the legal system continued to be its 
defining feature.  
The phenomenon of globalisation has brought about new challenges in 
international relations. In the era of globalisation, non-state actors like 
multinational corporations (MNCs)12 have grown in numbers, stature and power. 
The emergence of these entities poses a challenge to the traditional methods of 
accountability in international law.13 Tzevelekos makes an apt point that had the 
activities of some of the non-state actors been those of states, they would have 
probably amounted to wrongful conduct under international law.14 But because 
they are non-state entities, there is no responsibility under international law. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                
in Alston P (ed) Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press Oxford 2005) 
3–36.  
10  Van Hoof F “International Human Rights Obligations for Companies and Domestic Courts: 
An unlikely Combination? in Castermans-Holleman M, Van Hoof  F and Smith J (eds) The 
Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century Human Rights, International Organisations and 
Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1998) 
47; Menon 1992 Journal of Transnational Law and  Policy 153. 
11  See Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 2011) 1; 
Higgins R “Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law” in Falk RA (ed) 
International Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Westview Press Boulder 1985) 478. 
12  Sometimes referred to as Transnational Corporations (TNCs) or Multinational Enterprises 
(MNEs). In essence there are no ideological or conceptual differences between the two. Both 
MNCs and TNCs are defined as corporations whose headquarters are in one country and 
operate in foreign jurisdictions either wholly or through subsidiaries. See Addo MK Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law 
International The Hague 1999) 3 including footnote 1; Vagts DF “The multinational 
enterprise: A challenge for transnational law” 1970 (83) Harvard Law Review 740; 
Kamminga and Zia-Zarifi (eds) Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law 
2-3; Donaldson T The Ethics of International Business (Oxford University Press Oxford 
1989) 30; Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 6. The concept of MNC will be 
discussed further in chapter 2 of this study. 
13  See Nijman JE The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into the History 
and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press The Hague 2004) 354. 
14  Tzevelekos V “In search of alternative solutions: Can the state of origin be held 
internationally accountable for investors’ human rights abuses that are not attributable to it?” 
2010 (35) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 157. 
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these non-state actors, a system designed to deal with the abuse of power by the 
state and its agents is confronted with power that emerges from private entities 
such as MNCs. Conceptually this is creating a mismatch between the system of 
accountability in international law and MNC power.15 To bridge the gap requires a 
paradigm shift. About this, Clapham writes that “trying to squeeze international 
actors into the state-like entities box is, at best, like trying to force a round peg into 
a square hole, and at worst, means overlooking powerful actors on the 
international stage”.16 In the last four decades, the international community has 
with marginal success tried to address the challenges raised by MNCs.  
This chapter seeks to set the context for the discussion of accountability of MNCs 
for human rights violations in international law. Flowing from this introduction, 
which constitutes the first part, the second part of the chapter will be general in 
tone in that it will give a brief overview of the quest for accountability in the era of 
globalisation. The third part will introduce the concept of legal personality and its 
importance for both municipal and international law. In the fourth part, the chapter 
will give a brief discussion of why there is an accountability vacuum for MNCs. 
This will be followed by the fifth part which will discuss factors that hamper the 
control and regulation of the international operations of MNCs under the traditional 
system of accountability. It will be argued that there is a need to hold MNCs 
accountable under international law as their international operations, particularly in 
relation to human rights, are currently not directly regulated by any rules of 
international law.17 The last section will present the purpose and outline of this 
study. 
 
                                                          
15  Shelton D “Protecting human rights in a globalized world” 2002 (25) Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 314. 
16  Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2006) 80. 
17  Kinley D and Tadaki J “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities for 
corporations at international law” 2004 (44) Virginia Journal of International Law 935 write as 
follows: “At international law, however, the corporate form is barely recognized, still less 
directly bound, whether with respect to human rights or any other field. There is no 
transnational regime of human rights law governing the transnational activities of 
corporations. TNCs [Transnational Corporations] have been able to operate in a legal 
vacuum because international human rights law imposes no direct legal obligations on 
TNCs” (emphasis added). 
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2 THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE ERA OF GLOBALISATION  
The notion that political power resides exclusively within the nation state is 
anachronistic.18 In recent years, the world has witnessed a proliferation of powerful 
non-state entities that operate on the international scene. Research has shown 
that some of these non-state entities have power that equals that of the nation 
state or even eclipses it. 19  Some of this power, if exercised, has serious 
implications for the nation-state.20 At the core of these modern day international 
developments, lies the multifaceted phenomenon of globalisation. Globalisation is 
a rather complex concept to define with precision. 21  It cuts across various 
academic disciplines and, as a result, the concept lends itself to definitions which 
are as varied as the various disciplines themselves. For Joyner,22 for instance, 
globalisation 
refers to an ongoing worldwide integration of capital, currency, goods, 
people, advanced technologies, and ideas that are moving across 
national borders at an accelerating pace. Globalisation makes the world 
ever interconnected and interdependent. 
                                                          
18  Jochnick C “Confronting the impunity of non-state actors: New fields for the promotion of 
human rights” 1999 (21) Human Rights Quarterly 63. 
19  Stephens B “The amorality of profit: Transnational corporations and human rights” 2002 (20) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 57 notes that “General Motors, for example, is larger 
than the national economies of all but seven countries. The largest fifteen corporations have 
revenues greater than all but thirteen nations”. Some individuals are also more powerful than 
some states. For example, Shelton 2002 Boston College International and Comparative Law 
Review 279 points out that the UNDP Development Report of 1999 reported that the assets 
of the three wealthiest individuals in the world exceeded the combined gross national 
product of all least developed countries. McCorquodale R and Fairbrother R “Globalisation 
and human rights” 1999 (21) Human Rights Quarterly 738 point out that corporations make 
up 51 of the world’s 100 biggest economies, while states take the balance of 49. See also 
the Oxfam Issue Briefing Report, Wealth: Having it all and wanting more (January 2015) 
available at: http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/ib-wealth-
having-all-wanting-more-190115-en.pdf (accessed on 30 January 2015). The report shows 
how global wealth is increasingly being concentrated in the hands of an elite few.  
20  See Thabane T “Weak extraterritorial remedies: The Achilles heel of Ruggie’s ‘Protect, 
Respect and Remedy’ Framework and Guiding Principles” (2014) 14 African Human Rights 
Law Journal 45 where he highlights the impact of the decisions of Standard and Poor, itself 
an MNC, which has the power to determine a country’s credit ratings, and through that 
determine the ability of a country to borrow money so as to discharge its obligations to its 
citizens. 
21  Kobrin SJ “Multinational Corporations, the Protest Movement, and the Future of Global 
Governance” in Chandler AD and Mazlish B (eds) Leviathans: Multinational Corporations 
and the New Global History (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2005) 219.  
22  Joyner CC International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Governance (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers Inc Oxford 2005) 288-295.  
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Similarly, Oloka-Anyango sees globalisation as characterised by the increased 
flow of capital around the world, information technology, the concentration of 
economic and political power at a supra-state level in multilateral trade, financial 
institutions and transnational corporations and a growing movement of people.23  
For Sham,24 globalisation has geographic and political dimensions to it. In the 
geographic sense, it describes “a change in the space within which we conduct 
our social relations” and in a political sense it “denotes a shift in the balance of 
power and the pre-eminence of actors away from the state to non-state actors.”25 
Globalisation so understood, is characterised by its omission of the state as the 
geographic scope of reference and the dominant actor.26 An asymmetry is created 
in that while international law is state-centric, globalisation flourishes where there 
is less state intervention. In economic debates, the omission of the state features 
prominently and is often referred to as the invisible hand of the market.27 The 
“invisible hand” phrase is usually employed to advocate for less state intervention 
and regulation of the market. A commonly held view by those with strong leanings 
to this ideological stance is that the economic market will prosper when there is 
less involvement by the state.28   
In the era of globalisation, the ordering of the international community is 
undergoing multiple processes, all unfolding at the same time.29 The power of the 
nation state in international politics is rivalled by the emergence of non-state 
powers like international organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
                                                          
23  Oloka-Onyango J “Reinforcing marginalized rights in an age of globalisation: International 
mechanisms, non-state actors, and the struggle for peoples’ rights in Africa” 2003 (18) 
American University International Law Review 885.  
24  Sham H Legal Globalisation: Money Laundering Law and other Cases (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law London 2004) 66. 
25  Sham Legal Globalisation 66; Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 354. 
26  Sham Legal Globalisation 66. See Joyner International Law in the 21st Century 289 for the 
view that “[t]he globalized market system is becoming less susceptible to regulation by any 
one state or group of states in particular, as most states are unable to retain control over 
these financial transactions. As the state’s ability to control its international financial activities 
continues to be undermined, the global market place is increasingly dominated by the power 
of private multinational corporations”. Also see Kobrin The Future of Global Governance 219.  
27  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 354. 
28  For a critique of the invisible hand see Kelly M “Waving goodbye to the invisible hand: What 
Enron teaches us about economic system design” 2002 (16) Business Ethics 4-5.   
29  Weiss BE “Invoking state responsibility in the twenty-first century” 2002 (96) American 
Journal of International Law 798 points out that: “At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
the international community is globalising, integrating, and fragmenting, all at the same time.”  
7 
 
corporations, transnational groups, and powerful individuals.30 Globalisation has 
facilitated a situation where the traditional institutions are changing, and the new 
ones are not yet in place.31 Because of globalisation, the traditional institutions and 
systems have been rendered inadequate to respond to new challenges. There is 
therefore a need to conceptualise new institutions or reconceptualise old ones so 
as to adjust to the new challenges.32 At the political level there is a need to revise 
the international law rules so as to respond to the challenges that political 
globalisation has brought. These challenges range inter alia from transnational 
crimes such as terrorism and illicit drugs to trafficking of weapons.33 For this study 
the challenges relate to the accountability of MNCs for their international human 
rights violations. 
As the world is fast becoming integrated and interdependent, a common 
vocabulary consisting of concepts like good governance, accountability, 
cooperation, transparency, democracy and human rights has emerged.34  Some of 
these concepts have become of importance in international relations. 35  The 
international community has also realised the need to rethink the scope of 
international relations in the era of globalisation. 36  The various aspects of 
globalisation, both positive and negative, are evolving not only fast, but beyond the 
scope of the existing international legal rules. Though itself not a legal concept, the 
                                                          
30  Weiss 2002 American Journal of International Law 798. 
31  Kobrin The Future of Global Governance 219. 
32  Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 2; Van den Herik L and Černič JL 
“Regulating corporations under international law: From human rights to international criminal 
law and back again” 2010 (8) Journal of International Criminal Justice 726. 
33  Joyner International Law in the 21st Century 291. 
34  See Ferreira-Snyman MP and Ferreira GM “Global good governance and good global 
governance” 2006 (31) South African Yearbook of International Law 52-94. 
35  Ferreira-Snyman and Ferreira 2006 South African Yearbook of International Law 93 
conclude that: “Global governance and good governance have become key concepts in 
public international law and no state can afford simply to ignore the political and legal 
consequences these notions might have for its position within the international community of 
states.” 
36  See Lemert C and Elliott A (eds) Globalisation: A Reader (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 
London 2010) 284 for the report titled Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the 
Commission on Global Governance (2002). The Commission on Global Good Governance 
was founded in 1991 with the purpose to conduct a survey of the state of global governance 
at the turn of the twenty first century. In its 1995 report  the Commission inter alia states that 
“[g]lobal governance, once viewed primarily as concerned with intergovernmental 
relationships, now involves not only governments and international institutions but also non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens’ movements, transnational corporations, 
academia, and the mass media. The emergence of a global civil society, with many 
movements reinforcing a sense of human solidarity, reflects a large increase in the capacity 
and will of the people to control their lives”.   
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effects of globalisation have legal ramifications.37 A readjustment of legal rules is 
needed if aspects of globalisation are to be effectively regulated.38 The challenges 
posed by globalisation, are not only limited to legal rules but extend also to 
democratic accountability. 
In the political realm, international human rights activists and civil society 
movements have made the demand for transparency, accountability and 
democratic decision-making processes from institutions that wield power globally, 
their rallying point. For instance, since Seattle in 1999,39 all subsequent World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) Ministerial meetings have been marked by “anti-
globalisation” street protests. Though called “anti-globalisation” protest, the 
protesters are not against globalisation per se, but are in actual fact demanding 
more accountability in the era of globalisation. As such, their protests always 
revolve around the demand for accountability, transparency and democratic 
participation. The demands have to a large degree been directed at, among 
others, the Bretten Wood Institutions (BWIs)40 and the United Nations (UN)41 to be 
more accountable in their international operations.42 As the world becomes more 
integrated and interrelated, the lines of accountability have also become blurred.43 
                                                          
37  See Booysen H Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System (Interlegal 
Pretoria 2003) 100. 
38 Joyner International Law in the 21st Century 288. 
39   The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is a multilateral international institution that deals with 
rules of trade between states.  The governing structure of the WTO is controlled by 
Ministerial Conferences consisting of all members that meet at least once every two years. 
These Ministerial meetings have the power to take decisions with far-reaching 
consequences. Both the 1996 Singapore and the 1998 Geneva meetings went without much 
protest by activists and civil society movements. However, the 1999 Seattle Ministerial 
meeting marked a turning point in the history of activism and the demand for accountability 
of multilateral institutions.  For further reading see Stephan H and Power M (eds) The 
Scramble for Africa in the 21st Century: A View from the South (Renaissance Press Cape 
Town 2006) 202–222 and also Joyner International Law in the 21st Century 256–261. 
Soederberg S “Taming corporations or buttressing market-led development? A critical 
assessment of the Global Compact” 2007 (4) Globalisations 507 refers to the Seattle 
demonstrations as the “pinnacle of anti-corporate resistance”. It is estimated that about 
50,000 people from all over the world attended the Seatle demonstrations. 
40  The Institutions founded at the Conference of Bretten Woods, New Hampshire in 1944. 
These are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
41  Hoffmann F and Megret F “Fostering human rights accountability: An ombudsperson for the 
United Nations” 2005 (11) Global Governance 43-63. 
42  Clarke DL “The World Bank and human rights: The need for greater accountability” 2002 
(15) Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 206-226; Skogly SI The Human Rights Obligations 
of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (Cavendish Publishing Limited 
London 2001). 
43  For instance, Narlikar A and Woods N “Governance and the limits of accountability: The 
WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank” 2002 (53) International Social Science Journal 569 are 
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Despite the latter being the case, the demand for accountability has intensified. 
The tide has also turned against non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
human rights advocates, as they too are subjects of the demand for 
accountability.44   
The private sphere has in the recent past also witnessed the demand for 
accountability. As Joseph45 points out, the demand for accountability in as far as it 
relates to corporations, has come in four waves. The first wave dealt with the 
rights of consumers to safe products and was mainly aimed at car manufacturers, 
tobacco companies and other companies, such as Nestlé, and has also moved to 
the marketing of genetically modified products. The second wave was mainly 
concentrated on the extractive industries in developing countries such as Shell in 
Ogoniland in Nigeria. Exploitive work practices in developing countries, especially 
in textile industries and toy industries, constituted the third wave. Issues related to 
the sweat labour by big brand companies such as Nike, were highlighted by the 
third wave. In the fourth wave, human rights activists focused their call for 
accountability on the ethics of pharmaceutical companies, especially in as far as it 
related to pricing of essential medicine.  
The 2008 financial crisis, as Bilchitz notes, has made the world aware of how bad 
financial decisions by private financial institutions can have an impact on the lives 
of ordinary citizens. While the faulty decisions were made by the financial 
institutions in pursuit of private profit, states have had to deal with the aftermath of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
on point in stating that: “International economic institutions now address issues, which were 
previously dealt with at the level of the national government. Put another way, decisions and 
policies taken at the international level are increasingly affecting groups and people within 
states. Where previously these people could hold their nations to account for policies, they 
must now look to international institutions where the decisions are being made. The question 
therefore arises; to whom are these institutions accountable and are they accountable to 
those whom they directly affect?”. 
44  Christensen J “Asking the do-gooders to prove they do good” The New York Times (3 
January 2004) available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/03ACC.html (accessed on 23 
February 2011); Sidel M “Guardians guarding themselves: A comparative perspective on 
non-profit self-regulation” 2005 (80) Chicago Kent Law Review 803-835.  
45  Joseph S “Pharmaceutical corporations and access to drugs: The ‘Fourth Wave’ of corporate 
human rights scrutiny” 2003 (25) Human Rights Quarterly 426. See also Stephens 2002 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 51-53. 
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the wrong decisions, which decisions had nothing to do with them in the first 
place.46  
Like globalisation, the concept of accountability has gained international currency 
in use and yet there is no clear definition of it. This is so because accountability 
covers a broad range of issues. Fisher47 lists the different kinds of accountability 
as legal, financial, democratic, political, administrative and electoral. She goes on 
to point out that accountability can be direct or indirect, vertical or horizontal, 
formal or informal, internal or external. Internally, accountability refers to how an 
organisation should adhere to its own objectives, while externally it refers to those 
objectives which, from a social perspective, an organisation should pursue. 48 
Mechanisms for accountability are varied, and so are the requirements for each of 
the modes of accounting.49 It therefore becomes important to qualify the kind of 
accountability one is referring to. The focus of this thesis will be on legal 
accountability which requires adherence to formal rules, and readiness to justify 
one’s actions in terms of those rules in a forum so designed to hear or adjudicate 
such matters in accordance with the set rules. The rules envisaged in this thesis 
are those of public international law.  
The term accountability has been enunciated in a number of ways. 
Bovens describes it as  
                                                          
46  Bilchitz D "Human Rights Beyond the State: Exploring the Challenges” in Vilhena O, Baxi U 
and Viljoen F (eds) Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, 
India and South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria 2013) 580. 
47  Fisher E “The European Union in the age of accountability” 2004 (24) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 497. 
48  Trebilcock MJ and Iacobucci EM “Privatization and accountability” 2003 (116) Harvard Law 
Review 1422-1423. 
49  See Grant R and Keohane RO “Accountability and abuses of power in world politics” 2005 
(99) American Political Science Review 35-37 for other forms of accountability such as 
hierarchical accountability, supervisory accountability, fiscal accountability, legal 
accountability, market accountability, peer accountability and public reputational 
accountability. 
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a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an 
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.50  
A more preferable approach, which will be adopted by this thesis, is that of Grant 
and Keohane for whom the concept  
implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of 
standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in 
light of the standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that 
these responsibilities have not been met.51  
The forum envisaged in this study is an international law one, and so are the 
standards, and the sanctions.52 The definition put forward by Grant and Keohane 
is preferred because it encapsulates accountability which establishes a three-fold 
relationship of the actor, the set standards and sanctions imposed in accordance 
with the set standards. The obvious limitation in this regard is a conceptual one in 
that international law does not have standards to directly hold MNCs to account. 
Corporations are creations of a domestic statute. In this regard domestic courts 
are empowered to hold them accountable under domestic laws. Since domestic 
legislation varies from one state to another, there are no uniform set standards 
against which corporations are held accountable. The challenge becomes more 
pronounced when corporations cluster together to form MNCs. The international 
operations of MNCs often operate beyond the reach of domestic legislation. Since 
international law does not apply to MNCs, a lacuna is created. In light of the fact 
that this study seeks to propose a theory to hold MNCs accountable under 
international law, the definition by Grant and Keohane becomes apt. The triad that 
                                                          
50  Bovens M “Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework” 2007 (13) 
European Law Journal 450. 
51  Grant and Keohane 2005 American Political Science Review 29. 
52  Some authors prefer to use the concept of effective regulation to that of accountability. See 
Deva S “Acting extraterritorially to tame multinational corporations for human rights: Who 
should ‘bell the cat’” 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 39; and also Van den 
Herik and Černič 2010 Journal of International Criminal Justice 725 -743. In other instances 
authors would prefer the use of obligations as opposed to accountability. See for example 
Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2006); Deva S and Bilchitz D Human Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond Corporate 
Responsibility to Respect? (Cambridge University Cambridge 2013); Vázquez 2005 
Columbia Journal of International Law 932- 947. 
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the definition proposes provides good pointers of the three areas that a theory of 
accountability in international law should take cognisance of.   
Since international law rules do not directly address themselves to corporations, 
this study will argue that there is a need for a paradigm shift so as to bring MNCs 
under the ambit of the legal system. The challenges posed by globalisation cut 
across the different established divisions of law including, public international law, 
private international law, comparative law, conflict of laws, international business 
law, international trade and international economic law.53 Each of these divisions 
can lay a legitimate claim towards advancing a solution for the challenges posed 
to the human rights accountability as a result of globalisation. 54  In the era of 
globalisation, as Buergenthal writes, “the traditional dividing line between public 
and private international law, including international law commercial and economic 
law, is becoming less pronounced and relevant”.55 Despite this blurring of the 
divide, this study will however focus on accountability of MNCs under public 
international law specifically.56  
As pointed out above, conventionally, international law rules were meant for 
states. Practically, this meant that within the state-centric system, states were to a 
large degree the main actors empowered to invoke international law rules against 
each other. This being the case, to talk of accountability outside this state-centric 
matrix becomes a challenge. The challenge is further compounded by the fact that 
the use of the concept of accountability in international law literature is fairly recent 
and still in the process of evolution. 57  As such, its clear legal meaning in 
                                                          
53  Muchlinski PT “Globalisation and legal research” 2003 (37) The International Lawyer 225; 
Ochoa C “Advancing the language of human rights in the global economic order: An analysis 
of discourse” 2003 (23) Boston Third World Law Journal 58. 
54  See Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 225-227. 
55  Buergenthal T “Proliferation of international courts and tribunals: Is it good or bad?” 2001 
(14) Leiden Journal of International Law 270. The blurring of this divide will be illustrated in 
Chapter 5 of this study. 
56  The use of public international law to respond to globalisation challenges does not 
necessarily have a universal appeal among scholars. Muchlinski 2003 The International 
Lawyer 238 is of the view that “so long as non-state actors operate across borders, and legal 
regimes continue to differ and occupy distinct political spaces, private international law will 
remain central to the regulation of such activities”. On public international law he goes on to 
write that “it is safe to say that public international law may not be a sufficient or a complete 
system for dealing with globalisation. The range of subjects it covers may be too narrow, it 
may exclude non-state actors from holding rights or duties and it may limit the range of 
dispute settlement options available to such actors”.  
57  Nollkaemper A and Curtin D “Conceptualizing accountability in international and European 
law” 2005 (XXXVI) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 4. 
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international law is yet to be developed.58 A much more developed concept with a 
longer history in international law is that of responsibility, which has mainly been 
used with reference to the state. 59  So understood, the doctrine of state 
responsibility became the tool through which the contours of states’ obligations in 
their relation to each other were outlined and enforced. 60  In this regard, a 
distinction is made between state responsibility and international liability. The 
difference between the two concepts as Sucharitkul asserts, lies in the fact that the 
former is about the responsibility of states under international law, while the latter 
may encompass the liability of a state not only under international law, but also 
under a municipal legal system.61 Evidently, the concept of liability is much wider 
than that of state responsibility, whose use is only confined to international law. 
International legal relationships do not exist in a vacuum. The legal system is 
intertwined with other discourses that take place internationally.62 The link between 
international politics and international law has become a reality which both political 
scientists and international lawyers can no longer ignore.63 Both international law 
and international politics, as Slaughter points out, “cohabit the same conceptual 
space”.64 The relevance of international law is to some degree assessed on the 
basis of how it responds to modern day challenges.65 The relationship between the 
two is even more evident in the international discourse on the threat posed by 
terrorist organisations. Some of the international challenges like terrorism for 
instance, require a uniform approach from nation-states. The fact that the 
international community is so interdependent requires states in their responses to 
modern day challenges, such as terrorism, to adopt a uniform approach.  Failure 
by one state to cooperate for instance, especially on issues of terrorism may have 
                                                          
58  Brunnѐe J “International legal accountability through the lens of the law of state 
responsibility” 2005 (XXXVI) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 22.  
59  State responsibility will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this study. 
60  Sucharitkul S “State responsibility and international law liability under international law” 1996 
(18) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 823. 
61  Sucharitkul 1996 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 822. 
This study will also maintain the distinction between the two concepts. 
62  Tiunov OI “The International legal personality of states: Problems and solutions” 1993 (37) 
Saint Louis University Law Journal 324. 
63  Okeke CN Controversial Subjects of International Law (Rotterdam University Press 1973) 
217. 
64  Slaughter A-M “International law in a world of liberal states” 1996 (6) European Journal of 
International Law 503. 
65  Charney JI “Transnational corporations and developing public international law” 1983 (32) 
Duke Law Journal 769. 
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devastating consequences for other nation-states.66  An analogy may be drawn 
that, in as far as the human rights challenges posed by MNCs are concerned, 
states may need to have the same unified approach in their response.  
International law is not static and as such the widening in scope of the legal 
system is not a novel phenomenon. 67  According to the Oellers-Frahm, 
“international law is in permanent development”.68  Even within its state-centric 
matrix, international law has had to undergo some adjustments. As Okeke writes, 
international law has changed from the law of a family of nations based on 
Western Christendom into the law of a universal world community.69 Before this 
change, international law was confined to a limited number of states to the 
exclusion of a vast majority of other states that make up the modern day 
international community.70 The shift to accommodate the non-Western and non-
Christian states was itself not based on any of the rules of international law. If 
anything, it was just a political decision necessitated by the needs of the 
international community. The impact of the international community on the 
developments of international law was affirmed by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Reparations case that “[t]hroughout its history, the 
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of 
international life”. 71  It can therefore be argued that the evolution of the legal 
system is inevitable if international law is to remain relevant to the challenges 
facing the international community. 
Following the atrocities of the Second World War, international law has developed 
rules regarding individual responsibility particularly in relation to criminal 
responsibility. The use of the concept of individual responsibility was used within 
                                                          
66  See Charney JI “Universal international law” 1993 (87) American Journal of International 
Law 529-533. 
67  See Kennedy D “International law and the nineteenth century: History of an illusion” 1997 
(17) Quarterly Law Review 99–136. 
68  Oellers-Frahm K “Multiplication of international courts and tribunals and conflicting 
jurisdiction – Problems and solutions” 2001 (5) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 
71. 
69  Okeke Controversial Subjects 1. 
70  Duruigbo E “Corporate accountability and liability for international human rights abuses: 
Recent changes and recurring challenges” 2008 (6) Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 232. 
71  Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion 1949 
ICJ Reports 178 (hereinafter the Reparation for Injuries case). 
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the context of holding individuals to account for their violations of human rights. 
While there is a tendency to use the two concepts of accountability and 
responsibility interchangeably, the two are not necessarily the same in scope and 
field of application.72 In terms of international law usage, the difference lies in the 
fact that state responsibility is important to establish legal accountability. It is 
generally accepted that the concept of state responsibility is limited in scope and 
can only be applied within a restricted context, while accountability is a much 
broader term.73 This, as it will be discussed in chapter three, means that state 
responsibility only arises within a limited scope prescribed by the rules of 
international law. Outside the rules of international law, state responsibility does 
not arise, whereas, as pointed out above, accountability has many facets to it.  
A further differentiation to make is that accountability is not necessarily the same 
as corporate social responsibility. The difference lies in the fact that social 
responsibility is voluntary, while accountability is a legal imperative. 74 
Accountability is more effective when there is an element of control. Control 
empowers the holder of power to act proactively to direct the course of events, 
whereas accountability in most cases takes place after the fact.75 The relationship 
between control and accountability, in as far as human rights protection is 
concerned, is crucial. Where the holder of power has control over an entity, there 
is a better chance of proactively being involved to avert an impending catastrophic 
situation, whereas, in as far as accountability is concerned, harm may in certain 
circumstances happen first, as it is the case in criminal matters and only then 
would the accountability mechanisms be invoked, that is, when the harm has 
already happened. It may however be accepted that the threat of an impending 
                                                          
72  Yarwood L State Accountability for Breaching Jus Cogens Norms (LLD thesis University of 
Exeter 2009) 41–42; Ratner SR, Abrams JS and Bischoff JL Accountability for Human Rights 
Atrocities in International Law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1997) 13; Deva S Regulating 
Corporate Human Rights Violations: Humanizing Business (Routledge London 2012) 22-23. 
73  See Brunnѐe 2005 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 25; and Nollkaemper and 
Curtin “Conceptualizing accountability in international and European law” 2005 (36) 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 4. 
74  Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2006) 195-199; Parker C “Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social 
Responsibility” in Kinley D (ed) Human Rights and Corporations (Ashgate Farnham 2009) 
335-365. 
75  Scott C “Accountability in the regulatory state” 2000 (27) Journal of Law and Society 39. 
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sanction, especially where such sanctions are severe, may have a deterrent effect 
on those intending to inflict harm on others.76   
At the level of municipal legal systems, the idea of holding individuals to account, 
either through the law of delict or criminal law, is well established. It is in 
international law, which is a legal system that is based on consent of states, that 
the concept of accountability is yet to evolve, especially in relation to non-state 
actors. But as pointed out above, international law is not static. Over the years, the 
legal system has responded to the challenges of the international community, 
albeit at its own slow pace.77 The needs of the international political system have 
historically played a major role in shaping the content and character of 
international law. 78  Even in modern times, it is argued, the needs of the 
international community will continue to have an impact on the evolution of 
international law and its development. 
Throughout history, the relationship between power and international law has not 
been incidental.79 For instance, as a legal system, international law came into 
being in response to the aftermath of the ravages of the Thirty Years War which 
ended with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. With the signing 
of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia the locus of political power shifted. The idea of 
a universal power either in the hands of the Pope in spiritual matters or the 
Emperor in temporal matters, was done away with.80 Instead, a new powerful 
entity, the state, was created. Unlike the hierarchical system of old, the new states 
enjoyed equality among themselves and each had sovereign powers within their 
territory with no supreme power above them.81 Both the Pope or the Emperor 
could not interfere in the affairs of the sovereign state, thus state sovereignty was 
                                                          
76  Grant and Keohane 2005 American Political Science Review 29. 
77  Gamble JK and Ku C “International law - new actors and new technologies: Center stage 
NGOs?” 2002 (31) Law and Policy in International Business 221.  
78  Shaw MN International Law 7th ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014) 39. 
79  Charney 1983 Duke Law Journal 759. 
80  Gamble and Ku 2002 Law and Policy in International Business 221.  
81  Gross L “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948” 1948 (42) American Journal of International 
Law 29; Ferreira-Snyman MP “The evolution of state sovereignty: A historical overview” 
2006 (12-2) Fundamina: A Journal of Legal History 9-17. 
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born.82 The sovereign nation states were to play a pivotal role in the creation and 
enforcement of international law.83   
The period immediately after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was 
characterised by a great deal of uncertainty.84 In religious matters, the Reformation 
had weakened the power of the Pope. The Roman Empire was in a state of crisis 
as it was fragmented into sovereign nation states.85  Following the Thirty Years 
War, Europe was in need of reconstruction, both intellectually and politically.86 
With the universal appeal of both the Emperor and the Pope on a decline, a void 
was created.87 Humphrey88 points out that in as far as the international relations of 
the states were concerned, the world had returned to a complete state of anarchy. 
The eruption of another war could therefore not be ruled out. As Murphy notes:  
The rising power of separate nation-states impressed upon the 
minds of thoughtful Europeans the necessity of creating a new 
form of general order that would encompass both Europe and the 
expanse of the newly discovered worlds beyond. The rising spirit 
of adventure and commerce meant that the degree of interaction 
among sovereigns would be intensified. There was fear that the 
relations between states would be uncontrolled and uninspired by 
any unifying ideals.89  
In international relations, the nation-state became the main player with no other 
entity to rival its power. The international law language addressed itself to issues 
related to states such as territory, state duties, recognition, and treaties. The 
powerful state not only became the preoccupation of international law but also the 
premise upon which it was built. The international community of sovereign states, 
                                                          
82  See further Ferreira-Snyman 2006 Fundamina 1-28; Kreijen G (ed) State, Sovereignty and 
International Governance (Oxford University Press Oxford 2002).  
83   Brus M “Bridging the Gap between State Sovereignty and International Governance: The 
Authority of Law” in Kreijen G (ed) State, Sovereignty, and International Governance 3.  
84  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 31. 
85  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 32. 
86  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 32. 
87  Gross 1948 American Journal of International Law 26-27. 
88  Humphrey 1945 American Journal of International Law 231.  
89  Murphy CF “The Grotian vision of world order” 1982 (76) American Journal of International 
Law 479.  
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as Kunz points out, became the sociological foundations of international law.90 
Classically defined, international law became a body of law that regulates inter-
state relations.91 So understood, and given the context within which it arose, the 
core function of international law was to preserve peace among nations. 92 
International law doctrines, language and concepts evolved around the state-
centred character of world politics.93  
As part of its evolution, the subject matter of the legal system has also changed.94 
Though still state-centric, the scope of international law has widened to cover, 
among others, issues such as human rights, development, democracy and 
international financial systems. 95  The state-centric model of international law, 
which was premised on the assumption that only states had the power to violate 
rights of individuals, has had a great influence on the nature and structure of 
international human rights law. While the raison d’etre of international law was the 
regulation of matters pertinent to nation states, international human rights law, on 
the other hand, preoccupied itself with the need to constrain the state in its use of 
power against the individual.96 This state-centric system created, what Viljoen97 
calls, a fundamental paradox in that the individual depends on the state to 
guarantee their rights, but they also need to defend their rights against the same 
state.  
The post Second World War experience has revealed that it is not only states that 
can engage in gross violation of human rights of individuals, communities and 
                                                          
90  Kunz JL “The changing law of nations” 1957 (51) American Journal of International Law 78. 
91  Dugard  International Law 1.   
92  Shaw International Law 22. 
93  Shaw International Law 32. 
94  Menon 1992 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 152. 
95  See Shaw International Law 33 - 39; Ferreira-Snyman MP The Erosion of State Sovereignty 
in Public International Law: Towards a World Law? (LLD thesis University of Johannesburg 
2009) 1 and Menon 1992 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 152.  
96  Joseph S “An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises” in 
Kamminga MT and Zia-Zarifi S (eds) Liability of Multinational Corporations under 
International Law (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2000) 75 writes that: “In traditional 
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continued State-centric focus of international law.”   
97  Viljoen F International Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 5-
6. See also Mutua M “Hope and despair for New South Africa: The limits of rights discourse” 
1997 (10) Harvard Human Rights Law Journal 67. 
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minorities. The atrocities of the Second World War not only showed the world the 
negative impact that non-state actors could have on the society, but has 
highlighted the need to ensure that power in non-state hands is regulated and 
brought under control through the use of the law.98 In the era of globalisation, the 
international ordering of politics has once again experienced a shift in power. The 
state is no longer the only centre of power. The world is now replete with what 
Anderson99 calls “significant sites of private power”, some of which fall under the 
regulation of international law and some of which escape it. Globalisation, which 
according to Browne and Nmehielle, has become the co-ordinating principle of the 
international economic order, 100  has facilitated a growing number of non-state 
actors whose power can potentially impede or hamper the enjoyment of human 
rights. Andrew Clapham101 aptly writes that:   
 [T]he emergence of new fragmented centres of power, such as 
associations, pressure groups, political parties, trade unions, 
corporations, multinationals, universities, churches, interest groups, 
and quasi-official bodies has meant that the individual now perceives 
authority, repression, and alienation in a variety of new bodies, 
whereas once it was only the apparatus of the state which was 
perceived in the doctrine to exhibit these characteristics. This 
societal development has meant that the definition of the public 
sphere has had to be adapted to include these new bodies and 
activities.  
The proliferation of non-state actors and the challenges they pose to the protection 
of human rights has shifted the focus back to the state-centric model of 
international law. Given the vast number of non-state actors and the different roles 
they play in both the national and international sphere, it would be beyond the 
                                                          
98 For an account of the huge profits made by corporations during the Second World War see 
Stephens 2002 Berkeley Journal of International Law 49-51.  
99  Anderson GW Constitutional Rights after Globalisation (Hart Publishing Oregon 2005) 18. 
100  Browne SD and Nmehielle V “Credit with a conscience: Liability of banks for complicity in 
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scope of this study to cover all the operations of the multitudes of non-state actors. 
The one category of non-state actors that provides a good case study for analysis 
is MNCs. According to Ruggie, MNCs are the most visible embodiment of 
globalisation. 102  MNCs occupy a rather curious position in the international 
community. On the one hand, they bring the much needed employment and 
development to a country while, on the other hand, they have the potential to pose 
a threat to human rights.103 Their international operations could make it difficult for 
national laws under which they have been incorporated, to reach them. In this 
regard Kinley and Tadaki observe that  
the extraterritorial operations of MNCs – the very feature that 
defines them – are substantially regulated neither by international 
nor domestic (home state) laws with respect to their impact on 
human rights.104  
The inadequacy of national laws to hold MNCs accountable and the lack of 
accountability in the international legal system have the potential of providing a 
haven to those MNCs which fail to respect human rights. Conversely, as Deva 
points out, even if an MNC was keen to respect and follow human rights 
standards, there are no concrete universal international standards to be 
followed.105 This is mainly because conceptually the current available international 
law standards106 of accountability are aimed at states and not MNCs. For reasons 
that will become clear as this study unfolds, it will be argued that there is a need to 
construct enforceable international law standards against which MNCs too can be 
held accountable in international law.  
While the nation state continues to be the main principal actor in international law, 
it is increasingly becoming evident that the emergence of non-state actors has 
implications for the state-centric model for the protection of human rights.107 The 
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once upon a time centre of power, the state, is now “being viewed as increasingly 
vulnerable, even on its way out” by some scholars.108 The decline of the state has 
ramifications for the state-centric model for the protection of rights. As the power of 
the state declines, the individual is left exposed to other powerful entities. 
Notwithstanding this decline, as a discipline, international law continues to have a 
pivotal role to play in international relations. As a matter of fact, the use of 
international law in international relations is on the rise.109 International standards 
in, among others, development, human rights, the protection of the environment, 
and international trade are set with reference to international law. International law 
has become the international normative system as opposed to just rules designed 
to maintain peace for nation states.110 Though states are no longer the exclusive 
subjects of international law, in as far as international law is concerned, they 
continue to be the dramatis personae of the legal system.111  
Because international law is actor-centred, accountability in the legal system is 
determined with reference to its main actors. An inquiry into whether an entity 
bears rights and duties under the legal system must start with an inquiry into 
whether such an entity is a subject or object of international law. Subjects occupy 
a prominent place in the legal system.112 Entities can either account directly or 
indirectly under the legal system. Subjects of international law are addressed 
directly by the rules of the legal system, while objects are addressed indirectly. 
The subject-object dichotomy is however not universally accepted among 
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scholars. Higgins113 for instance, argues that this view, which is premised on the 
assumption that specific rules are needed to permit an entity to become a subject 
of international law, should be rejected. Instead, she is of the view that 
international law should be seen as a decision-making process consisting of a 
variety of participants, in which no subjects and objects distinction should be 
made. Such a view of international law, she argues, will have individuals as 
participants along with states, international organizations, multinational 
corporations and private non-governmental groups. On this basis she dismisses 
the subject-object dichotomy as having no functional purpose. 114  For 
McCorquodale115  the subject-object dichotomy is an exclusionary fiction which 
silences alternative voices. The exclusionary fiction, he argues, privileges and 
reifies the voices of states in that all potential participants are compared to states 
and states alone decide the outcome. He proposes a view that sees international 
law as part of social relations that change over time. States, in this matrix of social 
relations, will not be the sole participants. Like Higgins, he finds the notion of 
participation to be more in sync with the realities of the international legal system, 
as opposed to the subject-object dichotomy. The conceptualisation of non-state 
actors as participants in the international legal system is gradually gaining 
momentum in academic circles.116 Appealing as the concept of participation may 
be, it has also been criticised as coming at a high price – the loss of legal 
precision.117   
The concept of participation also has its own limitations in that it does not seem to 
take the argument beyond the subject-object debate. Not all entities that 
participate within international law have the ability to incur legal consequences 
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according to the rules of the legal system.118 In terms of participation in the legal 
system, only subjects of the legal system participate directly, and objects may or 
do participate, albeit indirectly.119 Scholars make a distinction between the concept 
of participation and that of legal personality.120 The crux of the distinction between 
the two concepts lies in the fact that ordinary participation may not necessarily 
have legal consequences, while legal participation entails participation that is 
envisaged by the rules of the given legal system. This being the case, it seems 
that the subject-object distinction is not opposed to the fact that entities, other than 
states, do participate in the international sphere. What it does instead, is that it 
sets the boundaries between entities that participate in the international sphere but 
do not have legal personality and those that do.121   
3 THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL PERSONALITY AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN 
BOTH MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concept of legal personality is a legal fiction which is used to determine who 
the main actors in a legal system are.122 Most municipal legal systems have rules 
that regulate how legal personality is conferred. The application of such rules, 
“constitute a kind of a precondition to the operation of all other substantive and 
procedural norms.”123  The concept person is an important one for the law of 
private persons. Principal participants in a legal system are determined with 
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reference to it. The use of this concept determines who those persons in the legal 
system are, how they come into being and cease to exist, what their rights, duties 
and capabilities are and what capacities and factors determine their legal status.124 
For instance, in most municipal legal systems, an individual becomes a legal 
person at birth, while an entity becomes a legal person after having met the 
prescribed requirements as stipulated by the law concerned.125 The individual or 
entity with legal personality under a legal system has the competence to make a 
claim before judicial or quasi-judicial institutions of that system and can also be 
held accountable for their actions under that legal system.126  
The notion of attributing personality to a corporation under municipal law has been 
conceptually problematic. Over the years, questions were raised as to whether 
attributing legal personality to a corporation makes an entity a real person, a 
fictitious person, a juristic person, a moral person or no person.127 To address 
these questions, three theories emerged with regard to the nature of a corporation: 
the fiction theory, the concession theory and the reality theory. 128  The fiction 
theory conceptualises a corporation as an artificial creation which has been 
granted legal personality so that individuals can pursue their business interests.129 
The concession theory, on the other hand, views a corporation as a legal entity 
which has been delegated by the state to perform certain functions.130 The reality 
theory conceptualises a corporation as a real entity whose existence is an 
expression of its own personality.131 According to Černič, the reality theory brings 
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forth two advantages. Firstly, it recognizes the existence of a corporate will, and 
thus makes it possible to talk of corporate criminal liability. Secondly, it makes it 
possible to engage in the debate on corporate accountability for fundamental 
human rights.132  There is a sense that each of the three theories has an element 
that links one to the other. As such, a theoretical approach which is rooted only in 
one theory to the exclusion of other theories will only paint an incomplete picture of 
the legal personality of a corporation. On this basis, Černič proposes an integrated 
theory of personality which can draw different attributes from each of the different 
theories.133  
On its own, the concept of legal personality does not have much meaning. It is the 
law that imputes meaning into it. 134  This means that the concept of legal 
personality derives its meaning from the provisions of the enabling legal system. 
As Radin135 asserts, personality so understood refers not to anything in nature but 
“a group of rights and capacities or at any rate a group of legal relations, and this 
group owes its existence entirely to the recognition of it by the legal and 
institutional organization of the community”. The concept of personality was 
applied to a corporation as a matter of necessity and convenience.136 To claim the 
corporate form or legal personality, an entity had to be incorporated in accordance 
with the laws of a state.137  
In modern times, the nature of the personality of a corporation in domestic law is 
no longer contested. It is trite that once a company is incorporated, it becomes a 
legal person with the capacity to bear rights and duties under the municipal legal 
system concerned. In most legal systems, to say that a corporation has personality 
has been accepted as a legal fiction. This however does not rule out the fact that 
factually an entity called a corporation exists in reality with its own infrastructure, 
and a physical address. Through this legal fiction, a veil is created between the 
individuals behind the corporation and the entity itself. Because of this fiction, the 
law does not take interest in the individuals or persons who constitute the 
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corporation, but in the corporation in its own right.138 In certain instances however 
the interest of justice may require the law to pierce through the veil and pursue the 
individuals behind the corporation.139  
The legal fiction has afforded scholars and the courts an opportunity to be able to 
treat corporations as persons with their own set of rights and duties under the 
domestic legal system. Like individuals, corporations get named, can commit 
crimes,140 can become good citizens,141 have a reputation that can be harmed,142 
are moral agents 143  and can be held accountable for their actions. 144  Legal 
personality is also a business concept which facilitates the business motif of a 
corporation. Profit maximisation has always been the core of the very existence of 
corporations. Courts have in the past made bold statements affirming this point. As 
late as the twentieth century, for instance, a court in the United States of America 
(USA) emphatically stated that: 
A business corporation is organised and carried on primarily for 
the profit of the stakeholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be 
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exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not 
extend to a change in the end itself.145 
Like individuals coming together to form a corporation, corporations can also 
cluster themselves into a group to form an even bigger entity called MNCs.146 By 
definition, as it is with corporations in general, MNCs are a business concept not a 
legal one.147 The coming together is in most cases driven by business imperatives 
and not legal concerns. While there is a tendency to collectively refer to this cluster 
of entities as MNCs, the reality is that collectively the position of these clustered 
entities is not clearly articulated in law.148 Notwithstanding their non-existence in 
law, MNC operations continue to grow.149 The interplay between these clustered 
corporations, which in essence is a coming together of entities with different 
nationalities, becomes important. The fact that corporations have legal personality 
in municipal law does not automatically grant them international personality under 
international law as the two legal systems are not the same.150 Conversely, not 
having international legal personality in international law does not stop MNCs from 
having their activities in multiple jurisdictions. As juristic persons of municipal law, 
MNCs are more and more becoming participants in international relations. In a 
similar manner that it does with individuals within a state, international law 
conceptualises corporations as nationals of a state. Given the fact that MNCs are 
a cluster of corporations of different nationalities, the inherent weakness of how 
international law conceptualises corporations becomes apparent. In this regard, it 
is argued, there is a need for a conceptual paradigm shift in international law. 
As a national of a state, a corporation enjoys privileges that accrue to individuals in 
international law, such as diplomatic protection.151 A precondition for a corporation 
to enjoy this privilege is that legally there should be a connection between the 
                                                          
145  Dodge v Ford Motor Co. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich.1919) 668 as quoted in Backer 2006 Columbia 
Human Rights Law Review 296 footnote 32. 
146  See Vagts 1970 Harvard Law Review 740.  
147  Vagts 1970 Harvard Law Review 746; Rigaux F “Transnational Corporations” in Bedjaoui M 
(ed) International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff Dordrecht 1991) 122; 
Gatto Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights: Obligations under EU Law and 
International Law (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2011) 38 and 48. 
148  Gatto Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights 38. 
149  Muchlinski PT “Holding multinationals to account: recent developments in English litigation 
and the company law review I” 2002 (39) Amicus Curiae 4. 
150  Lauterpacht H “The subjects of the law of nations” 1947 (63) The Law Quarterly Review 444, 
Walter 2007 Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law para 27. 
151  The role of the individual in international law will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this study. 
28 
 
corporation and the state seeking to extend diplomatic protection to it. 152  The 
nationality of a corporation is established in one of two ways: The traditional 
Anglo-American approach attributes to a corporation the nationality of the place of 
its incorporation, while the continental system attributes to it the nationality where 
the principal office of the corporation is located. 153  The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona case, for example, has stated that: “The traditional 
rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the state 
under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its registered 
office”.154 On the face of it, insistence on territory creates a misalignment between 
MNCs and international law, as international law operates on the basis of 
nationality which is geographic in definition, while MNCs are international in the 
sense that their operations traverse a number of geographic locations.155 Flowing 
from the principle of nationality of a corporation are, according to Vagts, two 
consequences: Firstly, through the principle of nationality the state of incorporation 
claims competence to govern and regulate the internal affairs of a corporation. 
Secondly, it affords the state of incorporation the right to command allegiance of 
its corporation.156 According to Vagts there has also been a move towards defining 
the nationality of a corporation in terms of stock ownership and management or 
control.157  
From the foregoing, it follows that corporations participate in international law as 
nationals of the state of their incorporation. Even though international law 
conceptualises corporations in a similar manner that it does individuals, there is a 
nuanced difference between the two. Corporations, as Alvarez asserts, require the 
recognition of national law before they can be accorded some participation in the 
international legal system.158 Such recognition is conferred upon them through the 
municipal law requirements of incorporation. Once that is conferred, such a 
corporation would be deemed to have legal personality under the given legal 
system, meaning, it would have legal existence in as far as that legal system is 
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concerned. Individuals, on the other hand, do not require any recognition. By virtue 
of being human they are afforded some level of participation in the international 
legal system without any intervention of the municipal legal system. The only 
requirement though, is that there should be a connection between the individual 
and the particular state seeking to extend diplomatic protection to the individual.159 
In summary, legal personality of corporations in municipal law is granted by the 
state. Through their own laws, individual states set the requirements that entities 
seeking legal personality as corporations should comply with, the contours of the 
legal personality so conferred and the circumstances under which such personality 
can be terminated. The process of incorporation plays a pivotal role in establishing 
the nexus between the corporation and the state of incorporation and by extension 
it gives the corporation some identity under international law, albeit indirectly 
through the state of incorporation. 
4 THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY OF MNCS IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
The debate on the need to hold corporations accountable has a long history.160 
The role of corporations in relation to the state and religion has gone through 
various phases over time.161 Corporate activities have always been conducted in 
line with the political vicissitudes of the time. At the height of papal domination of 
the state in the West, it was imperative for corporations to keep their operations in 
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line with the dictates of religion and morality. It was therefore not out of the 
ordinary for corporations to engage the services of spiritual advisors so as to get 
counsel on the moral soundness of their activities.162 This all came to an end when 
the Peace Treaty of Westphalia was signed, thus ushering in an era of 
secularisation. Free from the confines of religion, corporations no longer needed to 
keep their activities in line with the dictates of morality. 163  In their voyage of 
discovery searching for profit, corporations had the power and freedom to embark 
on a wide range of activities.  Jägers164 points out that in the seventeenth century 
large corporations like the English East Indian Company (EIC) and the Dutch East 
Indian Company (VOC) could occupy land, wage wars and conclude treaties. 
Recounting the power of these entities, Donaldson writes that:  
We are reminded of the British East Indian Company, which 
hundreds of years ago deployed over forty warships, possessed the 
largest standing army in the world, was lord and master of an entire 
subcontinent, had dominion over 250 million people, and even hired 
its own bishops.165  
Historically, corporations were of two kinds. There were those that were wholly 
private and had no connection to the state and those that were controlled by the 
state.166 Those with a close connection to the state were chartered companies 
incorporated for the sole benefit of the sovereign and the state.167 Some of the 
chartered companies played a role in the colonial administration of colonial 
territories in places such as India, Canada, Indonesia and Southern Africa.168 The 
state had control and power over the activities of such corporations and could also 
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determine their scope and size. 169  The nineteenth century marked a radical 
change in the relationship as both the state and the corporation obtained legal 
personality – the state in the international sphere and corporations in the private 
sphere.170 Corporations were therefore no longer accountable to states, but to 
their shareholders. 171  This change, it is argued, marked the genesis of the 
conceptual accountability challenges dealt with in this study. 
Foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in the economy of developing 
countries. 172  As such, developing countries are constantly competing among 
themselves to attract foreign direct investment. The geo-political economic world 
order is structured in such a way that most corporate investors are located in 
developed countries. In most cases a host state is a developing country in need of 
foreign direct investment. Ordinarily most corporations are economically more 
powerful than the host states themselves. Given their weak economic position, 
even where host states are willing to regulate the activities of corporations, host 
states as Joseph aptly points out, may lack both the technical expertise to do so 
and the legal machinery to hold them to account. 173  Corporations have also 
become strategic in their approach. Some corporations prefer to invest in countries 
whose human rights record is poor.174 Considering how mobile corporations are in 
search of a place to invest, the imbalances of power and the need for foreign 
direct investment by developing countries, it becomes inevitable that the host state 
would not be the proper institution to regulate the activities of corporations. Thus, 
between the home state of incorporation and the host state where corporations ply 
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their trade through their subsidiaries, there is an accountability vacuum created, 
which can leave the international operations of corporations without a proper 
regulating authority.  
5 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCOUNTABILITY DEFICIT OF 
MNCS 
In the literature on the accountability of MNCs for human rights, the lack of 
accountability can be attributed to a number of factors. This study will limit its focus 
to the challenges caused by globalisation, the corporate form of MNCs and the 
doctrinal limitations. 
5.1 Globalisation and its impact 
On 20 April 2005, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a 
resolution requesting that the UN Secretary-General appoint a Representative on 
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises (SRSG).175 Pursuant to this mandate, the then Secretary-General of 
the UN, Kofi Anan appointed Professor John Ruggie on 28 July 2005 with a 
mandate to, among others, identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility 
and accountability with regard to human rights.176 Ruggie, a Kirkpatric Professor of 
International Affairs and Director of the Centre for Business and Government at 
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, brought a wealth of 
experience to the mandate. 177  In executing his mandate, Ruggie conducted 
research and held consultations and workshops. 178  He consulted widely with 
states, non-governmental organizations, international business associations and 
individual companies, international labour federations, the UN and other 
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international agencies, and legal experts. By the time he presented his second 
report, he had held meetings in Geneva, New York, London, Paris and 
Washington.179 In 2011 when he rounded off his mandate, he had held fourty 
seven consultations in all continents and had visited more than twenty 
countries.180 In the introduction to his 7 April 2008 report, Ruggie pointed out that 
“the root causes of the business and human rights predicament lies in the 
governance gaps created by globalisation”.181   
Law has played a role in the facilitation of the process of globalisation.182 The 
challenge however is that globalisation itself has facilitated the rise of entities such 
as MNCs which have grown beyond the reach of the same domestic laws that 
have helped to create them. Conceptually, globalisation has blurred the traditional 
legal divide between public and private law. 183  Corporations, for instance, are 
subjects of private law.184 Anderson185 has noted two fundamental challenges that 
globalisation poses to constitutionalism. The first one relates to the fact that 
globalisation challenges the liberal political theory that asserts that the state is the 
exclusive or even primary location of politics. Secondly, globalisation challenges 
the liberal theory that the state is the exclusive or even primary source of law. 
These challenges have vast implications, especially in as far as they impact on 
how constitutionalism is understood. Anderson asserts that: 
If Constitutional law is concerned with how political power is 
constituted, and if Constitutional rights are concerned with 
protecting the autonomy of the individual, then the fact of 
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significant sites of private power questions the relevance of an 
approach that focuses on the state alone.186  
Also Shelton187 explores the impact of globalisation on the law by asking whether 
globalisation is good for human rights or whether human rights are good for 
globalisation. Different scholars hold different views on the benefits of 
globalisation. On the one hand, there are those who view globalisation as 
enhancing rights, leading to economic benefit and ultimately to political freedom. 
These benefits have led scholars like Pendleton188 to argue for a human right to 
globalisation. Pendleton189 locates the globalisation debate within the context of 
the tension between national allegiance and global identity and allegiance. His 
view is that nationalism has failed. National allegiance, he argues, is anachronistic 
and wrong. Among others, it threatens survival and makes war possible, and is not 
different from racism, in that it fails to make nationals to take non-nationals 
seriously as people and is contrary to Christian and other religious teachings. He 
views globalisation as offering an escape from nationalism to an expanded 
concept of global rights and duties.190 Pendleton sees globalisation as being both 
a right and a vehicle for what he calls globalisation rights.191 Globalisation rights 
are rights such as a right to international security, to trade across national borders, 
to have non-partisan dispute settlement, free movement of persons across borders 
and the right to hold multiple nationalities.192 These globalisation rights, he argues, 
are the newest category of individual rights similar to natural rights from which 
human rights developed.193 There is therefore a connection between a human 
right to globalisation on the one hand, and globalisation rights on the other, in that 
the former provides access to the latter.   
It can be argued along the same line of Pendleton’s reasoning that the world has 
made strides in moving towards internationally agreed and accepted standards in 
politics, human rights and culture. People can no longer be deprived of 
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international standards simply because they belong to a state under a despotic 
government or belong to a particular culture. It is these international standards that 
can be viewed as rights flowing from globalisation. Even more important for this 
thesis is that in legal matters, people regardless of where in the world they may be 
located, are entitled to remedies that are internationally acceptable in a globalised 
world.  It is globalisation that has opened these possibilities which the international 
community has agreed to, and it can therefore be argued that the global 
community is entitled to the benefits that flow from globalisation. In the era of 
globalisation, the very notion that human rights are universal is contested by 
scholars.194 This is so because equally, a case can be made that human rights are 
relative. Notwithstanding the debates, the view adopted in this study is that the 
universality of rights derives from the fact that human rights are common to all 
human beings simply because they are human.195 
On the other hand, there are scholars who see globalisation as posing a threat to 
human rights protection. Shelton outlines their argument as follows:  
First, local decision-making and democratic participation are 
undermined when multinational companies, the World Bank, and 
the IMF set national economic and social policies. Second, 
unrestricted market forces threaten economic, social, and cultural 
rights such as the right to health, especially when structural 
adjustment policies reduce public expenditures for health and 
education. Third, accumulations of power and wealth in the hands 
of foreign multinational companies increase unemployment, 
poverty, and the marginalisation of vulnerable groups.196  
As a result of globalisation, the traditional powers of the state have been severely 
affected. At the policy level, the nation state has to comply with international 
demands and imperatives some of which may even go against its national 
priorities. The traditional notion of the state as the sole provider of services to the 
public is no longer applicable. More and more services such as social security, law 
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and order and air traffic control are now delivered by corporations.197 Even where 
the delivery of public services is still in the hands of a state, such delivery is no 
longer delivered on the basis of public interest, but based on principles of 
effectiveness and efficiency. 198  The emergence of the concept of the global 
economy has meant that the nation state remains vulnerable to economic events 
not necessarily linked to its policies or political decisions. In this regard, Anderson 
notes that:   
In the context of significant sites of non-state authority in the global 
economy, the state is no longer able to command, while the 
commands of other bodies are at times more authoritative.199  
The shifting of power from the state to the market has meant that the authority of 
the state is less felt where powerful entities such as MNCs operate. This already 
creates a problem with regard to accountability as the state, especially in 
developing countries, even though willing, may not necessarily be able to ensure 
effective protection of human rights.  
5.2 The corporate form of MNCs 
The Greeks and the Romans were familiar with the notion of the legal existence of 
a corporation as a legal person distinct from the actual persons who compose it.200 
In this regard the corporate form becomes the vehicle through which the entity 
engages in its business activities. Historically there has been a chasm between 
issues of international human rights and commercial law.201 The public and private 
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divide in law meant that issues of human rights are of a public nature and 
therefore addressed to states in their dealings with the individual, whereas issues 
of the corporate profit are of a private nature and therefore left to commercial or 
corporate law. Commercial law addresses issues related to commerce such as the 
corporate form, shareholders, tax and competition. It hardly addresses human 
rights issues. Where issues of human rights are regarded to be of importance, 
they are addressed through voluntary measures such as codes of conduct and 
corporate social responsibility clauses, but not out of any legal obligation.  
5.3  Doctrinal challenges 
Once a company is incorporated, it becomes a legal person with the capacity to 
bear rights and duties under the municipal legal system concerned. As a juristic 
person, it can incur debts, sue and be sued and incur liabilities in its name, that is, 
it becomes subject to the rules of the municipal law concerned in its own right. As 
indicated above, having legal personality in municipal law, though, does not 
automatically grant an MNCs international personality under international law as 
the two legal systems are not the same. While this is the case, the international 
operations of MNCs straddle the divide between the two legal systems sometimes 
evading accountability due to some doctrinal limitations202 of both municipal and 
international law.  
6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The rise in power of MNCs on the international scene over the last half a century 
has become a point of great concern. That MNCs have the potential to bring forth 
the much needed foreign direct investment and development is not contested. 
However, their increased power on the international scene may give rise to an 
increased potential to violate human rights. Macklem203 aptly points out that: 
The global reach of multinational corporations means that they 
often operate in jurisdictions in which human rights violations 
                                                                                                                                                                                
necessary interrelationship between them. The whole economic enterprise of the modern 
world seem thus to be on the way to escaping from societal control, and sometimes even 
from the grip of the law.” 
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occur, obtain and benefit from subsidized arrangements with 
governments that commit human rights violations, provide goods 
and services that result in human rights violations, or organize 
production in ways that violate human rights of workers. 
Despite these potential dangers to human rights, there is still no international 
mechanism to hold MNCs accountable for their international operations. As 
pointed out earlier, this study sees public international law as offering a potential 
tool through which to regulate the activities of MNCs. The setback however is that 
currently international law rules and norms are silent on the activities of MNCs. 
Notwithstanding the many developments that have taken place over the years with 
regard to the international activities of MNCs, states continue to be the direct 
addressees of international law rules and norms. In as far as activities of MNCs 
are concerned, international law “says little, and does less, about human rights 
violations associated with multilateral corporate activity”.204    
The topic of MNCs and human rights has been part of the international research 
agenda for the last half a century. Volumes of manuscripts and research articles 
have been churned out over the same period.205 Unsurprisingly, there is even a 
concern that perhaps the subject of MNCs and human rights is a topic whose era 
has come and gone.206 On the contrary, this study is of the view that the discourse 
on this subject is far from over. Clear recent evidence of this lies in what emerged 
from the mandate of Ruggie. Arguably, the appointment of Ruggie in 2005 
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constitutes one of the most recent international initiatives by the UN to investigate 
legal issues relating to corporations and human rights.207 In his 2011 report to the 
Human Rights Council, Ruggie observed that 
there were many initiatives, public and private, which touched on 
business and human rights. But none had reached sufficient scale 
to truly move markets; they existed as separate fragments that did 
not add up to a coherent or complementary system. One major 
reason has been the lack of an authoritative focal point around 
which the expectations and actions of relevant stakeholders could 
converge.208 
The Ruggie mandate has succeeded in providing a point of convergence for the 
stakeholders. This for a legal system that is based on consensus is an 
achievement to be lauded. What the framework did not succeed in doing though, 
is to bridge the conceptual divide between states and corporations. Instead the 
framework has perpetuated the divide between the private and the public spheres, 
the state and non-state entities, the direct and indirect mode of accountability. To 
date, international law has not as yet devised a conceptual tool to bridge the gap. 
Because of these inherent conceptual gaps, the international legal system is still 
struggling to effectively hold MNCs to account for their international operations. 
Further, the gaps have created a distance between the legal system and the 
people it seeks to protect. In 2013 Blichitz, addressing the same question of 
accountability of corporations for human rights, wrote that, “[l]egal principles and 
rules need to be brought in line with the reality facing many on the ground. How 
can a system of accountability for human rights violations be developed?”209 The 
question posed by Bilchitz, though asked differently by different scholars over the 
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years, has been the focus of most studies on the subject of MNCs and human 
rights in the recent past, and to date there is still no satisfactory solution under 
both municipal and international law. At a domestic level, new frontiers continue to 
be explored. For instance, in South Africa, history may be made if the High Court 
in Johannesburg can agree to a class action lawsuit by hundreds of former mine 
employees who have contracted silicosis and tuberculosis while in the employ of a 
number of mining houses.210  
What has emerged as a common thread running through most studies to date is 
that they all lament the inadequacy of enforcement mechanisms and lack of 
redress for victims.211 There however seems to be disagreement among scholars 
on how exactly to remedy the inadequacies inherent within both the international 
and domestic legal systems in relation to MNC human rights violations.   
In 2014 the question of the accountability of MNCs was once again brought before 
the UN when a group of developing states called upon the institution to explore the 
“elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights.”212 It is 
anticipated that in subsequent years, the UN will once again pay attention to what 
has by now become a perennial question for the multilateral institution. Evidently, 
the relationship between MNCs and human rights continues to be of importance 
not only to scholars, but the international community as a whole. Until an effective 
mechanism to hold MNCs is found, this matter will continue to be a subject of 
research and deliberations. It is in this context, it is proposed, that this study 
should be viewed and understood. 
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The foregoing debate on corporate accountability for human rights violations has 
underscored the need to impose obligations on MNCs for their extraterritorial 
operations. There seems to be a general consensus among scholars on the need 
to hold MNCs accountable for human rights violations.213  As for what the locus of 
that accountability should be is a subject of great debate. Potentially, international 
law itself offers various avenues for holding MNCs accountable, but there is still no 
agreement among scholars as to the most efficient and effective approach.214 In 
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international law, a theory of accountability can either be direct or indirect. In the 
case of the direct theory of accountability the subject-object debate becomes the 
starting point of the inquiry. In the case of the indirect theory of accountability, the 
doctrine of state responsibility becomes important to the inquiry. An argument 
advanced in this study is that a solution to the accountability deficit lies in bridging 
the conceptual divide between the private and the public, the state and the non-
state and the direct and indirect modes of accountability.  
As illustrated above, international law no longer only concerns rules for the 
regulation of nation states, but has evolved in scope and content to be a normative 
system for the international community, covering a wide variety of topics, including 
human rights. Since 1948, international human rights have become important to 
the extent that even business has had to ensure their respect. In their international 
operations MNCs sometimes find themselves beyond the reach of national laws 
while at the same time they are not accountable in international law. This study is 
of the view that there is a need to create a theory of accountability for MNCs for 
their international operations and that international law, as a normative system, is 
better placed to provide that.215 According to Higgins,216 a normative system has 
two components to it. Firstly, there must be a standard of conduct which is 
regarded by each actor and by the group as a whole as being obligatory, and, 
secondly, the violation of that obligatory and binding standard of conduct must 
carry a sanction. A third component this study will argue for is that the efficacy of 
the second component is dependent on the existence of some institutional 
mechanism with rules and procedures to deal with recalcitrant actors. 
Over the years, international law has responded to world challenges based on “a 
small handful of its basic principles”.217  Two of such principles revolve around the 
concept of international legal personality and the doctrine of state responsibility. 
The concept of international personality will be of importance to establish whether 
MNCs can be held directly accountable in international law. This however is not to 
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negate the equally important indirect relationship through which MNCs can be held 
to account indirectly through the doctrine of state responsibility in international law. 
Between the possible direct accountability and the indirect method of holding 
MNCs to account in international law, it will be argued, lies the solution towards 
effectively holding MNCs to account. The research question therefore is:   
How can MNCs be held accountable for human rights violations under 
international law? 
The research question will be dealt with in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 sets the context to this study by discussing the rise of MNCs in relation 
to human rights. The rising power of MNCs in international relations, it will be 
argued, increases their potential to both enhance and harm human rights. For 
almost half a century, the international community has struggled to construct a 
mechanism to hold MNCs accountable for their human rights violations. The 
debate has over these years been conducted within a matrix of opposites between 
scholars who want the accountability mechanisms to be international versus those 
who prefer the mechanisms to be national, those who want the mechanisms to be 
located within the public sphere versus those who prefer to locate the mechanisms 
in the private sphere, and finally those who prefer to have voluntary mechanisms 
for MNCs, as opposed to those who want to have involuntary mechanisms that 
can be enforced in law. The chapter will also discuss the rising power of MNCs 
and the challenges posed by such a rise to the traditional methods of 
accountability. To illustrate the challenges, three jurisdictions will be sampled, the 
United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union.  The 
United States of America was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it was chosen 
because of the extraterritorial reach of the Alien Tort Act218 which has been the 
basis for most of the cases before American courts. Secondly, a number of cases 
that have appeared before the United States courts provide a good illustration of 
the challenges arising from the private international law doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.219 The United Kingdom which is a member of the European Union 
has been chosen because English courts in particular have adopted an 
                                                          
218  Alien Tort Act 23 U.S.C of 1789 will form part of the discussion in Chapter 2 of this study. 
219  The doctrine will be discussed further in Chapter 2 of this study. 
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interpretation that seems to leave the door open for victims of corporate human 
rights violations. The European Union has been added to the discussion because 
of its rather radical and innovative approach to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 
Chapter 3 discusses the doctrine of state responsibility and accountability in 
international law. Statehood is the organising principle in international law. The 
traditional conception of international law asserts that mainly states have duties 
and obligations under international law. The need to construct a theory of direct 
accountability for MNCs in international law is not aimed at replacing or negating 
the law of state responsibility. Indirect accountability in international law continues 
to be of great importance. As Jäger220 points out, the law of state responsibility 
offers an interesting and yet underutilised tool for the protection of human rights. 
This chapter seeks to discuss the doctrine of state responsibility as a tool for the 
protection of human rights in as far as MNCs are concerned. In international law, 
states have duties and responsibilities that they owe to each other. These will, 
among others, be discussed with reference to the Draft Articles for State 
Responsibility,221 jus cogens and obligations erga omnes. 
Chapter 4 discusses the evolution of the concept of legal personality in 
international law. International law has already conferred limited legal personality 
on non-state actors like the individual and international organisations. International 
legal personality to these non-state actors was conferred at different times for 
different reasons. The chapter will look at factors which were considered in 
extending legal personality to all those non-state entities enjoying limited legal 
personality. Since not all subjects of international law are the same, the chapter 
will further explore the parameters of legal personality so conferred.  
Chapter 5 generally, corporations owe their allegiance and existence to national 
laws. Ordinarily issues of corporate accountability should be addressed through 
national laws. The international operations of MNCs however have put 
corporations beyond the reach of municipal legal systems. To date, none of the 
                                                          
220   Jägers Corporate Human Rights Obligations 175; Chirwa 2004 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 3. 
221  Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, “Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” UN GAOR 56th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/56/589 (26 November 2001). 
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attempts to hold MNCs accountable have been effective. This is mainly because 
some of these initiatives are voluntary and therefore non-binding, and those that 
have attempted to impose binding obligations such as the Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights222 (the Draft Norms) have not been adopted, and 
therefore have no legal effect. The indirect state-centric mechanisms have also 
proven to be inadequate. The situation is further compounded by the fact that the 
absence of an international normative standard against which to measure the 
protection of human rights has led to uneven and unequal standards of human 
rights enforcement. This chapter seeks to propose an institutional enforcement 
mechanism that can effectively hold MNCs to account. 
Chapter 6 will present the findings of the study and conclude.  
                                                          
222  Commission on Human Rights, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(26 August 2003). 
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CHAPTER 2 
MNCs AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT  
1  INTRODUCTION 
Corporations are powerful global players of great political and economic 
significance. For almost half a century, the international community has struggled 
to construct a mechanism to hold them accountable for their extraterritorial 
operations. The debate on MNCs and human rights has over these years been 
conducted within a matrix of opposites. Whether accountability mechanisms 
should be located at an international or national level, in the public or private 
sphere or whether such mechanisms should be voluntary or involuntary has been 
at the core of the debates. As it will become evident in this chapter, MNCs are a 
complex phenomenon and therefore no single method of accountability will be 
adequate to address the accountability challenges they pose. This chapter seeks 
to situate the discussion of the debate by first giving an overview of the rising 
power of MNCs and then give an illustration of the challenges posed by such a 
rise to the state-centric methods of accountability.  
The chapter will be presented in five sections. That the power of MNCs is 
internationally on the rise is no longer a matter of mere speculation. This power 
has in the course of history manifested itself in a myriad of ways. In the first 
section, the chapter will discuss the power and ability of MNCs to violate rights. 
The phenomenon of MNCs has brought with it challenges to both the national and 
international traditional methods of accountability. The second section of the 
chapter will discuss some of the challenges that MNCs pose to the traditional 
methods of accountability. In the third section, the chapter will give a snapshot 
illustration of the jurisprudence that has emerged from the courts in the United 
States, the United Kingdom and the European Union. This illustration is aimed at 
highlighting the weaknesses of the state-centric system of accountability and the 
hurdles these weaknesses create for plaintiffs seeking to hold MNCs to account. 
Over the last four decades there have been international attempts to create 
international norms and standards against which MNCs can be measured in as far 
as human rights are concerned. The fourth part of this chapter will present the 
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different international initiatives that have been put forward over the four decades. 
The fifth section will be a conclusion to the chapter. 
2 THE ABILITY OF MNCS TO VIOLATE HUMAN RIGHTS 
MNCs are not just potential violators of human rights; they have a positive social 
role to play too.1 They are a major source of investment and job creation; they 
generate economic growth and reduce poverty and also contribute to the 
realisation of rights.2  In the course of history MNCs have positioned themselves 
as major drivers of development in society. Since the Second World War, the 
number of corporations has been on the increase. According to Gatto3 there are 
about 82000 parent companies worldwide with 810000 foreign affiliates. Most of 
the parent companies are located in the United States of America, within the 
European Union and Japan.4 This being the case, the world is divided between the 
global North and the global South. The North is developed while the South is still 
underdeveloped.5 Typically, to say that a country is developing refers also to its 
levels of education, its legal and regulatory institutions and its economy.6 A pattern 
of investment that has emerged is that parent companies are located in the 
developed world, while their subsidiaries are mainly in developing countries.7 On 
                                                          
1  See Subedi S “Multinational Corporations and Human Rights” in Arts K and Mihyo P (eds) 
Responding to the Human Rights Deficit: Essays in Honour of Bas de Gaay Fortman (Kluwer 
Law International The Hague 2003) 172, Gatto A Multinational Enterprises and Human 
Rights: Obligations under EU Law and International Law (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2011) 
12; Kamminga MT “Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights 
Abuses: A Challenge for the EC” in Alston P, Bustelo M and Heenan J (eds) The EU and 
Human Rights (Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) 554; Tzevelekos V “In search of 
alternative solutions: Can the state of origin be held internationally accountable for investors’ 
human rights abuses that are not attributable to it?” 2010 (35) Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 157. 
2  Commission on Human Rights, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights”, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 2. 
3  Gatto Multinational Enterprises and Human Rights 3. See also Human Rights Council, 
“Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations 
'Respect, Protect and Remedy’ Framework” A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) para 15 
(Introduction to the Guiding Principles). 
4  See Branson DM “Holding multinational corporations accountable? Achilles' Heels in Alien 
Tort Claims Act litigation” 2011 (9) Santa Clara Journal of International Law 227. 
5  See Milkias P Developing the Global South: A United Nations prescription of the Third 
Millennium (Algora Publishing New York 2010) 5-8; Soomin L and Shirley S “Eco-
imperialism: The global North’s weapon of mass intervention” 2009 (1) Journal of Alternative 
Perspectives in the Social Sciences 846-860. 
6  Deva S “Human rights violations by multinational corporations and international law: Where 
from here?” 2003 (19) Connecticut Journal of International Law 9. 
7  Bilchitz D “Human Rights Beyond the State: Exploring the Challenges” in Vilhena O, Baxi U 
and Viljoen F (eds) Transformative Constitutionalism: Comparing the Apex Courts of Brazil, 
India and South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press Pretoria 2013) 584. 
48 
 
the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the fact that MNCs are powerful and also 
increasing in number. In actual fact, given the divisions between developed and 
developing nations, corporations can become agents of development through 
foreign direct investment and therefore raise the standard of living of the people in 
the developing world.8 To this end Redmond writes that:  
Business has a unique capacity to advance human rights goals. It 
is a powerful vehicle for economic, social, and cultural 
amelioration, particularly in developing countries via job creation 
and diffusion of technology, scientific advances, and management 
skills. Foreign direct investment may both promote economic 
development in the host country and powerfully affect the 
enjoyment of a wide range of human rights, from health, food, and 
improved living standards to rights of free expression and access 
to information through new technologies.9  
In the era of globalisation, corporations are generators of international trade and 
therefore the main actors in foreign investment.10 Developing countries are all 
competing to attract foreign direct investment. This contest, as Kamminga 
observes, is more visible at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos where 
state presidents and prime ministers all scramble to attract captains of industry to 
invest in their respective countries.11 A point of concern, however, is that the area 
of foreign direct investment is not adequately regulated by law.12 States in their 
bilateral treaties are free to design their regulatory environment in a way that can 
be as appealing as possible to the investors. As a result, some scholars have 
raised legitimate concerns that in their attempt to attract foreign direct investment, 
states may be tempted to relax their regulatory environment.13 This process of 
relaxing the regulatory environment purely to attract investment has come to be 
                                                          
8  Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses 554.   
9  Redmond P “Transnational enterprises and human rights: Options for standard setting 
compliance” 2003 (37) The International Lawyer 70 -71. 
10  Van den Herik L and Černič JL “Regulating corporations under international law: From 
human rights to international criminal law and back again” (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 725-726.  
11  Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses 554. 
12  Avi-Yonah RS “National regulation of multinational enterprises: An essay on comity, 
extraterritoriality, and harmonisation” 2003 (42) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 7. 
13  Vázquez CM “Direct vs indirect obligations for corporations under international law” 2005 
(43) Columbia Journal of International Law 931. 
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known as “a race to the bottom”.14 A corollary to the concept of the race to the 
bottom is the “run-away shop concept” where corporations deliberately shop 
around for countries with lower human rights standards.15 
The ability of corporations to abuse power is no longer mere speculation; it is a 
reality that is well documented.16 These abuses are not limited to a particular 
category of rights, but cut across all categories of rights from the first generation to 
the third generation rights.17 Even where corporations are themselves not directly 
involved in the violation of human rights, their complicity in human rights violations 
can take many forms.18 In March 2006, the question of corporate complicity led the 
International Commission of Jurists to appoint a panel on Corporate Complicity in 
International Crimes. The panel consisted of leading lawyers from five continents, 
representing both the civil and common law traditions. The appointed panel was 
given the mandate to explore circumstances under which companies and their 
officials could be held responsible under criminal and/or civil law when they are 
involved with other actors in gross human rights abuses. In the introduction to their 
report, the panel noted that:  
                                                          
14  See Kinley D and Tadaki J “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights 
responsibilities for corporations at international law” 2004 (44) Virginia Journal of 
International Law 938 footnote 12;  Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of International Law 
931-932; Fauchald OK and Stigen J “Corporate responsibility before international 
institutions” 2009 (40) George Washington International Law Review 1027-1028; Deva S 
“Acting Extraterritorially to tame multinational corporations for human rights violations: Who 
should ‘bell the cat’?” 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 49-51; Deva S 
“Human rights violations by multination corporations and international law: Where from 
here?” 2003 (19) Connecticut Journal of International Law 49. 
15  Eliasoph IH “A Missing link: International arbitration and the ability of private actors to 
enforce human rights norms” 2004 (10) New England Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 87. 
16  See Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses  
554-556; Kinley and Tadaki 2004 Virginia Journal of International Law 933-934; Joseph S 
“An Overview of the Human Rights Accountability of Multinational Enterprises” in Kamminga 
MT and Zia-Zarifi S (eds) Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 2000) 78-79, Jägers N “The legal Status of the 
Multinational Corporations under International Law” in Addo MK (ed) Human Rights 
Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law International 
The Hague 1999) 260-261; Bilchitz Human Rights Beyond the State: Exploring the 
Challenges 582 -584. 
17  See Commission on Human Rights, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for 
Business and Human Rights”, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) para 52; and also Deva 2003 
Connecticut Journal of International Law 7-8. 
18  Clapham A and Jerbi S “Categories of corporate complicity in human rights abuses” 2001 
(24) Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 339-349. 
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The international community has been shocked at reports from all 
continents that companies have knowingly assisted governments, 
armed rebel groups or others to commit gross human rights 
abuses. Oil and mining companies that seek concessions and 
security have been accused of giving money, weapons, vehicles 
and air support that government military forces or rebel groups use 
to attack, kill or “disappear” civilians. Private air service operators 
have reportedly been an essential part of the government 
programmes of extraordinary and illegal renditions of terrorist 
suspects across frontiers. Private security companies have been 
accused of colluding with government security agencies to inflict 
torture in detention centres they jointly operate. Companies have 
reportedly given information that has enabled a government to 
detain and torture trade unionists or other perceived political 
opponents. Companies have allegedly sold both tailor-made 
computer equipment that enables a government to track and 
discriminate against minorities, and earth-moving equipment used 
to demolish houses in violation of international law. Others are 
accused of propping up rebel groups that commit gross human 
rights abuses, by buying conflict diamonds, while some have 
allegedly encouraged child labour and sweatshops conditions by 
demanding that suppliers deliver goods at ever cheaper prices. 
Although these abuses are, unfortunately, not new, what has 
changed is the renewed insistence by victims and their 
representatives on accountability when companies are involved in 
gross human rights abuses.19 
It is clear that the power of corporations to get involved in activities that have a 
bearing on human rights does not have limits. Just as international human rights 
law is premised on the need to protect the individual against state power, scholars 
concerned with the impact of activities of corporations on human rights protection 
                                                          
19  The report of the International Commission of Jurists Expert Legal Panel on Corporate 
Complicity in International Crimes titled: Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability 1. 
Available at: http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/Corporate-
complicity-legal-accountability-vol1-publication-2009-eng.pdf (emphasis added) (accessed 
on 10 July 2012). 
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have argued that the power of corporations must also be regulated. The rise of the 
power of MNCs forms the basis for arguing for the need to have a regulatory 
structure for corporate power.20 After all, Bilchitz argues, the very logic of human 
rights is premised on the fact that obligations must be imposed on those agents 
who constitute a threat to human rights.21 This is so because the need to protect 
human rights of individuals does not become less important because the violator is 
a state or a corporation.22  
While the power of MNCs is on the rise, state power is on a decline in certain 
respects. 23  As Kamminga points out, through privatisation, deregulation and 
liberalisation of their international trade, states have reduced their influence on the 
daily activities of their own citizens.24 In certain instances, states have outsourced 
some of their functions to MNCs.25 In other instances, as Chirwa observes, state 
action alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee the enjoyment of rights. About this 
he writes that 
access to essential medicine is not only dependent on the 
decisions and actions of the state but also on the decisions and 
policies of pharmaceutical corporations. Banks and other financial 
institutions play a critical role in ensuring access to housing. With 
increasing privatisation, access to basic services as water, health, 
                                                          
20  See Nolan J “With power comes responsibility: Human rights and corporate accountability” 
2005 (28) University of New South Wales Law Journal 581-613; Weissbrodt D and Kruger M 
“Norms on the responsibility of transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with regard to human rights” 2003 (97) American Journal of International Law 901. 
21  Bilchitz D “A Chasm Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’? A Critique of the Normative Foundations of 
the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles” in Deva S and Bilchits D (eds) Human 
Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2013) 127. 
22  McBeth A “Privatising human rights: What happens to the state’s human rights duties when 
services are privatised?” 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 143 and also 
Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of International Law 941.  
23  See McGinnis JO “The decline of the Western nation state and the rise of the regime of 
international federalism” 1996 (18) Cardozo Law Review 903 where he argues that: “The 
nation state is in decline, at least among the Western industrialised nations. Decline is a 
relative term. It does not suggest that the nation state has disappeared, but rather, that it is 
no longer as defining a feature of geopolitics as it once was, and will likely remain a less 
controlling feature.”  
24  Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses 553.  
25  See Dickinson LA “Government for hire: Privatising foreign affairs and the problem of 
accountability under international law” 2005 (47) William and Mary Law Review 137-235.  
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education and electricity is also dependent on the actions and 
policies of private service providers.26   
Inevitably questions of accountability would arise because even though an MNC 
may have taken over state functions, such MNCs are not held to account by the 
same standards that states are expected to account to in international law.27 This 
is where the irony about the concept of international personality becomes stark. 
Given the subject-object dichotomy, entities need to be subjects of international 
law so as to be directly accountable under the legal system. Interestingly though, 
the same entities without legal personality do not need personality to breach the 
rules of international law.28   
People’s daily activities have also not been spared from the power and influence 
of MNCs. As Subedi notes, directly or indirectly, MNCs have become so powerful 
that they dictate the type of food people eat, the medicine they take and the 
clothes they wear.29 Through their aggressive marketing strategies, corporations 
are capable of inducing people into vices which are foreign to what would 
ordinarily not be part of their lives. Weeramantry 30  recounts how trading 
companies disrupted the idyllic lifestyle of the people of the South Pacific islands 
by distributing firearms and inducing them to smoke. To this end, smoking schools 
were established where free cigarettes were distributed and the youth were 
enticed into smoking as a source of pleasure and a status symbol. Once the youth 
were addicted, they were then introduced to the idea of having to pay for the 
cigarettes. The same strategy was used in relation to firearms. A selected group of 
young people were introduced to the power of firearms, and were then given some 
for free. These youth would then go back to the villages to demonstrate the power 
of their newly found gadgets. Once a want had been created, local people were 
                                                          
26  Chirwa DM “The doctrine of state responsibility as a potential means of holding private 
actors accountable for human rights” 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 2. 
27  Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses 555. 
28   Duruigbo E “Corporate accountability and liability for international human rights abuses: 
Recent changes and recurring challenges” 2008 (6) Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 226. 
29  Subedi Multinational Corporations and Human Rights 175; Mostajelean B “Foreign 
alternatives to the Alien Tort Claims Act: The success (or is it failure?) of bringing civil suits 
against multinational corporations that commit human rights violations” 2008 (40) George  
Washington International Law Review 499. 
30  Weeramantry CG “Human rights and the global market place” 1999 (XXV) Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law 42-43. 
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then introduced to the idea of trading with these corporations using produce from 
their countries in exchange for guns and cigarettes. Driven by the desire to satisfy 
their newly acquired wants the people of the South Pacific islands entered into 
trading deals with corporations from a weakened bargaining position.31 
The horrors of the Second World War intensified the need to protect human rights 
internationally.32 What became clear already then was that states were not the 
only locus of power. It became apparent that other entities, including MNCs, were 
equally capable of abusing human rights. As discussed above, the notion that 
corporations can abuse human rights goes as far back into history. The abuse of 
power by corporations reached its zenith during the Second World War. The full 
extent of the participation of corporations during the Holocaust is yet to be 
revealed. The bit that has already emerged, points to the fact that corporations of 
all types all participated to their own benefit in the Holocaust. Some corporations 
benefited directly, while others only benefited indirectly. As Stephens points out, 
banks and insurance companies made profits from the deposits of the people who 
were killed during the Holocaust or whose heirs were not aware that their relatives 
had accounts, or whose family members were unable to supply documentation for 
their claims.33 In addition, he contends that other companies exploited the slave 
labour provided to them by the German army, while pharmaceutical companies 
supplied medication and chemicals used in the Nazi medical experiments.34  
During the transition from an apartheid-led government to a constitutional 
democracy in South Africa, the democratically elected government established the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission which sought to establish the truth of what 
happened under apartheid.  The preamble to the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act35 which established the Commission, sought to, among others, 
“establish the truth in relation to past events as well as the motives for and 
circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have occurred, and to 
make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in future”. 
                                                          
31  Weeramantry 1999 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 44. 
32  Stephens B “The amorality of profit: Transnational corporations and human rights” 2002 (20) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 46-48; Ratner SR “Corporations and human rights: A 
theory of legal responsibility” 2001 (111) The Yale Law Journal 477-478. 
33  Stephens 2002 Berkeley Journal of International Law 49. 
34  Stephens 2002 Berkeley Journal of International Law 50. 
35   34 of 1995.   
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Pursuant to this mandate, the Commission held special hearings which included 
political parties, armed forces, the legal profession and the media. The 
Commission set aside three days to hear the submissions of business and 
labour. 36  Inevitably, the various submissions covered the different facets and 
involvement of business in shoring up apartheid. Attendance at the Commission 
was by invitation and most sectors responded to the call. Of interest to note is that 
among those who did not heed the call to appear before the Commission, were the 
multinational oil companies, the biggest investors in South Africa.37  
The submission by Major Craig Williamson, a former police spy just about sums up 
not only the role of business but of the broader society thus: 
Our weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, radios and other 
equipment were all developed and provided by industry. Our 
finances and banking were done by bankers who even gave us 
covert credit cards for covert operations. Our chaplains prayed for 
our victory and our universities educated us in war. Our propaganda 
was carried by the media and our political masters were voted back 
into power time after time with ever increasing majorities.38 
The Commission was alert to the fact that not all businesses were involved with 
the apartheid government to the same degree. As a result, its analysis of the 
various submissions was categorized under three headings: the first order 
involvement, the second order involvement and the third order involvement39. The 
Commission was of the view that all those businesses who were centrally involved 
in helping with the design and implementation of apartheid policies should be held 
accountable.40  
The rising power of MNCs poses another challenge. It is axiomatic that there is a 
thin line between economic power and political power. History is replete with 
examples of how MNCs have managed to align their activities with the powerful 
                                                          
36  11 – 13 November 1997, Johannesburg. 
37  See Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Volume 4) para 5. 
Available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%204.pdf (accessed on 
08 February 2015).  
38  As quoted in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Volume 4) 
para 22. 
39  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Volume 4) para 23-36. 
40  Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Volume 4) para 23. 
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political forces of the time.  From the colonial period through to the modern era, 
the activities of corporations have always reflected the imbalance of power 
between the home state, which in most cases is a developed state and the host 
state, which in most cases is developing. In their international operations, MNCs 
have always relied on the support of their powerful home states.41 In the absence 
of international rules and standards to guide them, corporations have been at 
liberty to be as aggressive as they can in pursuit of profit in the host states. 
Kamminga42 makes a distinction between abuses committed by MNCs in collusion 
with the home state and those committed in collusion with the host state. In the 
category of corporations colluding with the home states he cites the examples of 
the overthrow of the governments of Guatemala (1954), Chile (1973) and Congo 
Brazzaville (1997).43 For examples of the collusion with the host state, he cites the 
activities of Shell in Nigeria, British Petroleum in Columbia and the Dabhol Power 
Company in India. In Nigeria, Shell was allowed to enlist the services of the Mobile 
Police Force, a paramilitary force, to guard its installations and personnel. The 
Mobile Police Force was implicated in the massacre of about eighty people in the 
Umuechem riots of 1990. In Columbia, British Petroleum admitted in 1996 that it 
had employed the services of the Columbian army at a fee to protect its 
installations. This was done despite the fact that the army had a poor human rights 
record. In India, the Dabhol Power Company also paid the local state police to 
protect it against demonstrators who were demonstrating against the 
establishment of the plant in their midst. In carrying out their mandate, the police 
often used excessive force against peaceful local demonstrators.   
Typically, most of the violations by MNCs affect huge numbers of people, often 
leaving a permanent impact on the victims and their families. For instance, 
overnight, the Bhopal disaster 44  in India reduced Bhopal to a wasteland as 
livestock and crops were decimated. An estimated 200 000 people were injured 
and about 2100 lost their lives following a lethal gas leak from one of the plants 
run by a corporation. The United States Southern District Court was to refer to this 
                                                          
41  See Ratner 2001 The Yale Law Journal 452-457. 
42  Kamminga Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses 554-
555. 
43  United Fruit assisted in the coup in Guatemala, International Telegraph and Telephone 
Corporation (ITT) in Chile and Elf Aquitaine in Congo Brazzaville. See also Ratner 2001 The 
Yale Law Journal 457. 
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as “the most tragic industrial disaster in history”. 45  Commenting on this case, 
Muchlinski writes that, the “long-term after-effects are expected in persons who 
were exposed to the gas, and deformities are likely in babies whose mothers were 
pregnant when exposed to the gas”. 46  In Bangladesh more than a thousand 
people died when a building with five garment factories collapsed.47 To date, the 
cases that have come before the courts in the United Kingdom are of victims, who 
as a result of their exposure to the activities of corporations, now suffer from 
illnesses such as throat cancer, mercury poisoning, and silicosis.48 Others have 
had their environment damaged by oil spills from plants owned by corporations. 
The numbers of the victims in the different cases range from one victim to about 
30 000.49 In South Africa, in what may be a ground breaking case, civil society 
groups have joined hands to launch a class action on behalf of former mine 
employees who suffer from silicosis.50 The case commenced on 12 October 2015 
in the Gauteng South High Court.51 The class action is brought on behalf of up to 
17 000 former miners who contracted silicosis and tuberculosis while employed by 
the different mine houses in South Africa. If the class action lawsuit is allowed, it is 
projected that up to 100 000 litigants may end up litigating against more than 30 
mining houses.52 The sheer numbers and the nature of the ailments mean that the 
disruptive effect of some of these human rights violations by corporations will be 
felt by generations to come. 
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In comparison to its neighbours in the region, South Africa has a relatively 
advanced economy. The mining industry has for over the last hundred years been 
the mainstay of the South African economic might. Men from neighbouring states 
left their homes and flocked to these mines to eke out a living for themselves and 
their families back home. Underground, they were exposed to harrowing working 
conditions, which involved travelling for long distances and being exposed to 
temperatures of up to 60 degrees centigrade and working for long hours. About 
this Schneider and Rawoot write that “it can take up to an hour to reach the bottom 
of the mines, followed by eight hours of crawling through narrow shafts to drill, dig 
and dredge. Miners often only see the light of day on their way to and from their 
shacks”.53 The full scale of the impact of the mining activities on the health of 
these miners is still not known. What is known now is that the hazardous 
conditions the miners were exposed to have left them with diseases such as 
phthisis, silicosis, pneumoconiosis and tuberculosis. The tragedy is that when 
these miners begin to show signs of ill health, they are just sent home to die, often 
without any compensation.54 This is not counting those who have perished in mine 
accidents over the years.55 Granted, strides have been made to address the issue 
of health and safety in the mines, but there are still some challenges.56 The irony 
of the situation is that while it was the mines alone that have made profits over the 
years, it is now the state that has to bear the cost of the miners who have 
contracted diseases such as silicosis.57  
The environment too has been affected by the activities of MNCs. In what has 
been dubbed the largest oil spill in US waters, BP PLC settled the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster by paying $18.7 billion. The disaster occurred on 20 April 2010 
when the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded spilling approximately 210 million 
gallons of oil in the Gulf of Mexico. Transocean was the owner of the Deepwater 
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rig which was at the time of the disaster on lease to BP. Eleven people died. The 
payment by BP constituted the largest ever settlement to have been reached by 
the US state and federal governments with a corporation.58 Because of the impact 
the oil spill has had, it would take years for the environment to be properly 
rehabilitated.59  
The Shell settlement in Nigeria of $84 million pales into insignificance when 
compared with the compensation paid by BP for the Deepwater Horizon oil 
disaster in the United States of America. The activities of Shell in Nigeria date 
back to 1958. Already in the early seventies, there were signs of discontent among 
the Ogoni people, the people directly affected by the operations of Shell. The oil 
spill of 2008 and 2009 in Bodo, a town in the Ogoniland region, brought the 
activities of Shell in Nigeria under the international spotlight. According to the 
United Nations Environment Programme, it will take up to 30 years to rehabilitate 
the environment once all leakages have stopped.60  
The foregoing are but examples of the impact of the activities of corporations on 
the environment and human rights as a whole. That the international community is 
witnessing a rise of MNCs in power, stature and influence is beyond contest. Most 
scholars are in agreement that the rise of MNCs should be matched by a greater 
degree of accountability, especially in the realm of human rights protection. What 
is contested though is how in the light of such rising power should MNCs be held 
to account?61 Whether the locus of accountability should only rest with municipal 
law or also with international law is still a subject of great debate among scholars. 
Macklem is of the view that the polycentric nature of MNC activities provides 
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multiple opportunities to hold them accountable under municipal laws. 62  As 
indicated earlier, the view adopted in this study is that public international law 
provides a potential tool to hold MNCs to account for their international operations, 
and this is proposal does not negate the role of municipal law. Such a proposal is 
bolstered by the challenges that are prevalent in the current system of 
accountability, to which this study now turns.  
3 CHALLENGES POSED BY MNCS TO THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
3.1  Nature of MNCs 
For business purposes, a corporation can replicate itself and have a wide range of 
subsidiaries. The interplay between these clustered corporations, which in 
essence is a coming together of entities with different nationalities, marks the 
genesis of a challenge for international law. As discussed in chapter one, the fact 
that MNCs have legal personality in municipal law does not automatically grant 
them international personality under international law, as the two legal systems are 
not the same. Conversely, not having international legal personality in international 
law does not prevent MNCs from having their activities in multiple jurisdictions. As 
juristic persons of municipal law, MNCs are more and more becoming participants 
on the international plane. An added challenge to this is that international law 
conceptualizes of corporations as nationals of a state and yet MNCs, by both 
definition and operation, straddle territorial divides.  
The very nature of a corporation and how it relates to its own shareholders and 
subsidiaries is legally complex. As indicated in chapter one, once incorporated a 
company becomes an entity separate from its shareholders with its own rights and 
duties. In a situation where a parent company decides to have a subsidiary, 
corporate law makes provision for the concept of limited liability. According to 
Blumberg,63 the purpose of the concept of limited liability is two-fold. Firstly, it is 
designed to protect investors from the debts of the corporation. Secondly, it is 
                                                          
62  Macklem P “Corporate accountability under international law: The misguided quest for 
universal jurisdiction” 2005 (7) International Law Forum du droit international 289. 
63 Blumberg P “Accountability of multinational corporations: The barriers presented by concepts 
of the corporate juridical entity” 2001 (24) Hastings International and Comparative Law 
Review 302-303. 
60 
 
meant to protect the parent company from incurring the debts of the subsidiary 
company. It can therefore be said that while the concept of legal personality 
separates the corporate entity from the individuals who compose it, the concept of 
limited liability, conversely, separates investors from the debts of the corporation 
and further protects the parent company from the debts of the subsidiary. The net 
effect of this is that as the MNC creates subsidiaries, legally it becomes 
fragmented into little independent units.64  
For accountability purposes, the very nature of a corporation is itself inherently 
flawed. A corporation as an abstract entity can only act through the individuals 
who compose it. The corporate form allows the individuals behind the legal façade 
of a corporation to pursue profit without being held to account directly for the 
decisions they make for the corporation.65 In the event that there are violations of 
rights, the corporate façade shields the individuals behind a corporation from being 
held fully accountable. The shield that the façade of the corporate form provides, 
can have some benefits for those involved in illicit activities.  For instance, a 2015 
study has found that between the years 1970 and 2008, the African continent has 
lost $854 billion in illicit financial flows, which amounts to a yearly average of $22 
billion.66 Multinational corporations were found to account for the greatest portion 
of these illicit financial flows.67 Further, the same study found that the use of shell 
companies provided individuals with the opportunity to hide their illicit wealth or 
launder money.68 
The international operation of MNCs through their subsidiaries often straddles a 
number of legal systems with different norms and standards.69 Choosing a place of 
business by MNCs for its subsidiary is often determined by the benefits that may 
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be derived from the weaknesses of a legal or political system of the host state.70  
Studies have shown that human rights violations by corporations are often 
prevalent in low income countries with weak political systems and poor adherence 
to the rule of law.71 Typically, such countries are those that have experienced 
governance breakdown due to conflicts.72 The reception of subsidiaries as legal 
persons in the different jurisdictions varies from state to state.73 Some states, for 
example, may choose to recognize the legal personality conferred on the entity by 
its home state, while others may require the entity to go through some additional 
formal requirements peculiar to the host state’s municipal laws. 74  What is 
interesting to note though, is that for business purposes, an MNC with subsidiaries 
has a single brand and reputation.75 On issues that affect the reputation of the 
MNC as a whole, a distinction is usually not made between the parent company 
and the subsidiary. The 2015 Volkswagen (VW) US pollution scandal provides a 
good illustration of this point.76 A VW company in the United States of America 
was exposed for fraudulently falsifying the pollution levels of a particular brand of 
its diesel cars. It was found that the company manipulated the gas emission levels 
of about eleven million diesel cars. Software was installed on the eleven million 
cars so that when the cars were tested for emission levels the system would 
register lower levels which were not a true reflection of the emission levels of the 
cars. The CEO of VW in Germany resigned over the scandal and a new one was 
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swiftly appointed. Though the scandal unfolded in the United States of America, its 
impact was felt more in Germany than anywhere else.77  
Despite sharing the same name and reputation as a brand, each of the 
subsidiaries of an MNC is legally considered to be a separate entity with its own 
liabilities separate and distinct from its parent corporation.78 To impose liability on 
the parent company is not entirely impossible, but is an onerous process. Such 
vicarious liability can be imposed by either piercing the corporate veil or proving 
that there was an agency relationship between the subsidiary and the parent 
company. In this regard three requirements have to be met which Blumberg79 
outlines as follows: Firstly, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary lacked 
independence and was under the excessive control of the parent company. 
Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary was used by the parent 
company for fraudulent or unjust means for the benefit of the parent company or 
its shareholders. Thirdly, the plaintiff must show that the subsidiary is insolvent or 
unable to satisfy a judgment.  
In as far as the law of agency is concerned, the plaintiff needs to prove that there 
was an agency relationship between the subsidiary and the parent company. Only 
then would the law view the subsidiary as an agent of the parent company and, 
therefore, hold it liable. Other than vicarious liability being onerous to prove, it also 
raises doctrinal and procedural issues especially given the fact that MNCs operate 
in more than one jurisdiction at the same time.80 Using the corporate form, MNCs 
have been able to manage risk by spreading their operations internationally 
beyond the reach of both the home and host states. 81  To some MNCs, risk 
management has become part of the strategy to minimize exposure to liability. As 
Magaisa writes:        
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The wave of globalization has increased the conduct of business 
on a transnational basis. As competition in the market place gets 
stiff, firms are frantically seeking to exploit new opportunities in 
different parts of the world. Firms are adopting various strategies 
in attempts to maximize efficiency and minimize exposure to 
liability. Indeed, managing liability is now an important part of 
business strategy. The growth of multinational corporate groups is 
one response to the potential liability problems that come with 
operating in multiple jurisdictions.82  
Conventionally, the plaintiff may sue the MNC in the host country, but as pointed 
out above, often host countries are weaker in terms of resources to litigate against 
such powerful companies. A further challenge is that even if the plaintiff were to 
litigate in the host country, it may be difficult to enforce such a judgment against 
the subsidiary, which may threaten to discontinue business with the host county. In 
light of the fierce competition among developing states to attract business, the 
host state may opt to have the MNC continue business, rather than assisting the 
individual litigant to litigate against the MNC. As it has become evident earlier in 
the discussion, MNCs have the potential to translate their economic power into de 
facto political power.83 This, it is argued, is a constant reality which developing 
countries are faced with in dealing with MNCs. 
3.2  Home and host state divide 
The primacy of the role of the state in the protection of human rights is well 
established.84 With regard to the activities of MNCs though, it is not clear as to 
whether this responsibility lies with the home state of incorporation or the host 
state. By definition, MNCs operate in multiple jurisdictions. 85  The debates on 
MNCs and their accountability for human rights violations have vacillated between 
the home and host state. The difficulty in holding MNCs to account is further 
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compounded by the structure through which they operate. For instance, the link 
between the parent company and the subsidiary is not always easy to determine. 
As Deva points out, “[t]he organizational structure, modus operandi and sheer 
influence make them [MNCs] practically immune to conventional methods of 
regulation”.86  
The divide between the parent company and its subsidiary raises its own 
problems. Parent companies are fairly immobile and it is relatively easy to point 
out the seat of the corporation. For instance, despite having subsidiaries all over 
the world, Ford is an American company, Volkswagen a German one, Toyota a 
Japanese one and Nokia a Finish corporation. Ideally, the home state countries 
should be the hub of accountability.87 Meeran has argued that at a policy level, it is 
only fair that a country from which an MNC launches its international activities and 
which also benefits from the profits made throughout the world should have an 
interest in the regulation of the activities of MCNs.88 In reality though, this is not 
always the case. Alternatively, the regulation can be left to the host states. 
Arguments for this view are hinged on the fact that MNCs do not just plant their 
operations within the territory of the host state without negotiating the terms and 
conditions with the host state. Deva is of the view that pre-entry negotiations that 
take place between an MNC and the host state “are fundamental to whether or not 
MNCs operate as responsible corporate citizens”.89 While the view by Deva may 
be appealing, in reality the business activities of MNCs operate within a matrix of 
political, economic and legal considerations. A combination of these factors point 
to the fact that already at this early stage, host states are negotiating with MNCs 
from a weakened position of power. Leaving the MNCs to account to a host state 
can therefore be problematic. For developing countries the challenges are even 
more pronounced. As most of the host states are developing countries which in 
most cases are not as powerful as the MNCs, such states may not have the 
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necessary resources to deal with MNCs.90 A further compounding factor may be 
the fact that the host state may not have the political will to deal with such MNCs 
given the economic benefits that may flow from the very presence of such a 
corporation in the particular host state. As discussed earlier, the challenges are so 
pronounced to an extent that a state may even be more willing to lower the 
applicable standards so as to attract foreign direct investment.91  
The foregoing discussion has raised a number of complexities regarding the 
regulation of the activities of MNCs. It has become evident that as MNCs’ 
operations become international, they also become independent of government 
control. 92  For a legal system that is state-centric, the independence from 
government control should be of great concern. To this end, Bilchitz warns that, “a 
growing concern in our world is the way in which our societies have set up 
structures that, in many ways, have taken on a life of their own and become ends 
in themselves”.93   
The divide between the home state of incorporation and the host state provides a 
vacuum which has the potential to serve as a haven for MNCs which are not too 
keen to be regulated by states. Further, litigating against MNCs raises both 
procedural and doctrinal issues which may be frustrating to plaintiffs. Above all, 
suing MNCs in a foreign country depends on a number of political, economic and 
legal variables. Home states’ judicial systems may adopt a lenient approach to 
forum non conveniens,94 in which case the goodwill of the home state may play a 
role in facilitating access to justice for the plaintiffs. Conversely, some host states 
may be opposed to their own citizens litigating against corporations in a foreign 
land. 95  All these complexities point to the hurdles that a plaintiff has to go 
through.96 Different common law jurisdictions97 have different approaches to the 
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doctrine of forum non conveniens. The following is a snapshot overview of the 
approaches in the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.  
3.2.1 The American jurisprudence on forum non conveniens 
Generally, a court in the United States will not hear a matter before it unless it has 
both the subject matter jurisdiction of the claim and personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.98  Jurisdiction provides the basis for the involvement of a particular 
court in the matter before it. If the court has no subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction, the matter will be dismissed. The doctrine of forums non 
conveniens affords the presiding judge the discretion to dismiss a case, if an 
appropriate alternative forum exists. 99  The discretion is exercised within set 
parameters as outlined by the court in the Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert case.100  The 
doctrine is based on a principle that there “exists at least two forums in which the 
defendant is amenable to the process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice 
between them”.101  The discretion lies with the court in which the plaintiff has 
instituted a claim.102 In exercising this discretion, the court must take heed of the 
following: Firstly, the court must, inter alia, weigh issues such as convenience for 
witnesses and the ends of justice.103 In principle, the court may dismiss a claim 
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where the plaintiff has chosen a forum not because it is convenient, but because 
the plaintiff wants to harass the defendant or take advantage of favourable law. 
Secondly, the court must consider the private interest of the litigating parties 
before it. Private interests would therefore entail a consideration of availability of 
evidence, such as, evidence material, witnesses, site inspection, cost-effective 
measures and issues related to the enforceability of the judgment. Meaning that it 
would be futile to proceed with a case within a jurisdiction where the judgment will 
not be enforced. Thirdly, the court has to consider also issues of public interest 
related to the chosen forum, such as the case load of the court which the plaintiff 
has chosen. In addition, the court should also consider the fact that the jury 
system is a service which members of the community render to the judiciary. In 
relation to the jury, the rationale is that the jury should not be burdened with issues 
to which members of the local community have no connection to.104 The test was 
later crystallised in the Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno,105 which affirmed the view that 
the application for forum non conveniens by the defendant would still succeed, 
even where the claimant alleges that the substantive law that would be applied in 
the alternative forum is less favourable to the one in the chosen forum.  
Corporations in the United States of America have not shied away from invoking 
the doctrine as “a first in the line of defence”. 106  The In Re: Union Carbide 
Corporation Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984 case provides 
a good illustration of this fact.107 About 2 100 people died and a further 200 000 
were injured in Bhopal, when methyl isocyanate, a lethal gas, was released from a 
chemical plant operated by Union Carbide India Ltd (UCIL). Overnight, the winds 
blew the deadly gas into an impoverished and densely populated area of Bhopal. 
The plaintiffs were both the citizens and the Government of India. The defendants 
were UCIL,  a company incorporated in terms of the laws of India and its parent 
company, Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), which was based in New York, the 
United States. UCC owned 50.9% of the stock of UCIL, 22% of the shares were 
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owned and controlled by the Indian government and the balance was owned by 
citizens of India.  
Following the disaster, numerous cases were filed both in India and different 
federal courts in the United States. The magnitude of the disaster was such that 
on 29 March 1985 the Indian government enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster 
(Processing of Claims) Act 21 of 1985, which granted it the exclusive right to 
represent the victims in India or elsewhere. 108  On 8 April 1985 the Indian 
government filed a complaint in the Southern District Court of New York on behalf 
of all victims of the Bhopal disaster. The rationale for bringing the matter to a US 
court was based on the fact that the Indian courts were not adequately equipped 
to handle the Bhopal litigation.109 UCC applied for a motion to dismiss the action 
on the basis of forum non conveniens. The court embarked upon a detailed and 
thematic analysis of the doctrine of forum non conveniens and found India to be 
the appropriate forum. 
The analysis of forum non conveniens inevitably has an impact on political issues 
and the court was alert not to perpetuate the imperial mentality of one sovereign 
nation imposing its views on a developing nation. Of interest to note is what the 
court said in relation to the regulation of UCC: 
The Indian government, which regulated the Bhopal facility, has an 
extensive and deep interest in ensuring that its standards for 
safety are complied with. As regulators, the Indian government 
and individual citizens even have an interest in knowing whether 
extant regulations are adequate. This court, sitting in a foreign 
country, has considered the extent of regulation by Indian 
agencies of the Bhopal plant. It finds that this is not the 
appropriate tribunal to determine whether the Indian regulations 
were breached, or whether the laws themselves were sufficient to 
protect Indian citizens from harm. It would be sadly paternalistic, if 
                                                          
108  Bhopal case (1986) at 844. 
109  Bhopal case (1986) at 847. 
69 
 
not misguided, of this court to attempt to evaluate the regulations 
and standards imposed in a foreign country.110  
On appeal,111 the court of appeal also approved of the court a quo’s decision on 
the adequacy of the Indian judicial system which was found to be “developed, 
independent and progressive”. 112  A further consideration was that the “Indian 
courts would be in a superior position to construe and apply applicable laws and 
standards, than would courts of the United States”. 113  Further, the majority of 
witnesses and documentary proof bearing on causation were located in India. 
On weighing the public and private interest factors, the court considered the fact 
that most of the documentary evidence was entirely in Hindi or other Indian 
languages and most of the witnesses could not speak English.114 Should there be 
a need to do inspection in loco, the court opined, the Indian court would be better 
placed to do that.115 The court further took into consideration the fact that at the 
time of the accident there was not even one American who was employed by the 
plant, all employees were Indian. The private and public interest enquiry was 
summed up by the Appeal Court as follows: 
After a thorough review, the district court concluded that the public 
interest concerns, like private ones, also weigh heavily in favour of 
India as the situs for trial and disposition of the case. The accident 
and all the relevant events occurred in India. The victims, over 200 
000 in number, are citizens of India and located there. The 
witnesses are entirely Indian citizens. The Union of India has a 
greater interest than the United State in facilitating the trial and the 
victims’ claim.116 
The question of choosing the correct forum constitutes one of the greatest hurdles 
a plaintiff seeking to sue in the American courts would face. The challenge is such 
that even if the plaintiffs were to qualify under the provisions of some statute, that 
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alone would not deter the defendant from objecting to the jurisdiction of the 
proceedings based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.117 In theory, courts in 
the United States of America are accessible to foreign plaintiffs, but this does not 
translate into justice itself being accessible. As the discussion above illustrates, 
the litigants may still find themselves entangled in protracted court processes 
relating to procedural issues. This is the case even where there is a statute in 
place granting the plaintiff access to American courts. For instance, a foreign 
plaintiff may have access to American courts based on the provisions of the Alien 
Tort Act.118 For almost 200 years the ATCA was not often applied. It was only in 
1980 that it was once again invoked in the Filártiga v Peña-Irala case.119 The case 
involved citizens of the Republic of Paraguay. Americo Peña-Irala a former 
Paraguayan official was charged in the United States of America with the wrongful 
death of Joelito Filártiga by torture, a crime which is prohibited under international 
law. All the material facts of the case occurred in Paraguay and there was nothing 
that connected the parties to a court in the United States of America, except that 
Peña-Irala was on a visit to New York when the proceedings against him 
commenced. In bringing the matter to the United States, the Filartigas relied on the 
provisions of the ATCA. The ATCA provides that “[t]he district court shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”.120  The district court 
dismissed the claim by the Filartigas. 121  It was only on appeal that the court 
recognised the fact that victims of international human rights could sue in 
American courts, even for violations that occurred outside the United States of 
America.122 Since Filátiga, the ATCA has been invoked in a number of cases 
involving a wide variety of defendants including corporations.123  
The first invocation of the provisions of the ACTA against a corporation was in the 
Doe v Unocal Corp case.124 The claim related to the sequence of events following 
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the 1988 military takeover in Burma. In the early 1990s it was alleged, that a 
number of international oil companies including Unocal and Total, began 
negotiating with the military government to construct Yadana oil pipe in Burma. In 
1993 Unocal formally entered into an agreement with the military to participate in 
the project. According to the agreement, the military undertook to, among others, 
clear the forest, level the ground, and provide labour materials and security for the 
project. 125  In the course of executing its part of the agreement, the military 
forcefully removed farmers from their villages, confiscated their property and 
forced inhabitants to clear forest, level the pipeline route, build headquarters for 
pipeline employees, prepare military outposts and carry supplies and equipment. It 
was alleged that due to this forced relocation, many villagers lost their homes and 
were deprived of the use of their crops and livestock. Women and young girls were 
targets of rape and other sexual offences by the military. It was the view of the 
plaintiffs that when Unocal entered into an agreement with the military, they knew 
or should have known the history of the military government in relation to human 
right violations of customary international law, including the use of forced 
relocation and forced labour.126 The claim by the plaintiffs was that Unocal was 
complicit in the human rights violations committed by the military against its 
people. Unocal moved to have the matter dismissed on the basis of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. The federal district court held that private actors can be held 
liable for violation of international law even where there is no state action and 
Unocal’s motion was not granted.127  
In the 2002 decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed the view that private actors 
can be held liable for violations of international law.128 However, the status of this 
decision is not clear as the court had ordered that the matter be heard en banc.129 
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This never happened as Unocal reached a confidential settlement, before the case 
could proceed.130  
The court has pointed out in the Doe v Unocal Corp case131 that all what the ATCA 
requires is that (1) there must be a claim by an alien, (2) such a claim must allege 
tort, (3) in violation of international law. Given its extraterritorial reach and 
notwithstanding the fact that it may be dated, the ATCA has for some time served 
as a beacon of hope for plaintiffs seeking to pursue MNCs in American courts. 
Granted, the ATCA was not designed to be a remedy to all human rights 
challenges.132 It was designed to address American challenges of the eighteenth 
century. In actual fact, it is remarkable that 200 years later, the ACTA is still used 
as a potential tool to provide some remedy even to victims of human rights 
violations committed by corporations.   
Despite the ATCA’s promising provisions, courts are at liberty to either apply the 
law of the place where the abuse took place, or decide in favour of a forum other 
than the United States.133 Sometimes when applicants pursue MNCs in the home 
state of incorporation, they do so because the legal system back in the state of 
origin is inadequate in that it does not provide proper remedies. It is argued, that to 
then apply the law of the host country may in some cases result in a travesty of 
justice.  Kinley and Tadaki134 are of the view that the ATCA suffers from three 
limitations. The first limitation is the court’s restrictive interpretation of human rights 
which fall within the ambit of the ATCA. While acknowledging the fact that 
actionable grounds of the ATCA may cover jus cogens,135 the two authors are 
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concerned that the ATCA “almost wholly excludes, economic, social, and cultural 
rights, such as the rights to health, education, housing, and a clean and healthy 
environment, and protection from cultural denigration – rights which are most 
prone to abuse by TNCs”. The second concern relates to the requirement of state 
action. Outside jus cogens norms, the ATCA can only be applicable to non-state 
actors where there is a nexus between their action and that of the home state. A 
major challenge in this regard is that the ATCA does not cover acts of corporations 
where they are acting alone or where there is no nexus between their actions and 
that of the state. The third concern relates to the need to establish personal 
jurisdiction of the defendants in all matters brought under the ATCA.  Where the 
lawsuit is against MNCs, the two authors are of the view that it is not always easy 
to establish the connection between the foreign corporation and the forum.  
In the last fifteen years, courts in the United States of America have grappled with 
the question whether the scope of international law has broadened to cover 
corporate liability.  Part of the debate included whether corporate liability falls 
within the ambit of the provisions of the ATCA. The Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co case provides a good illustration of the debates.136 The case related 
to a claim against Royal Dutch Petroleum Company incorporated in the 
Netherlands, Shell Transport and Trading Company p.l.c incorporated in the 
United Kingdom and their joint subsidiary Shell Petroleum Development Company 
of Nigeria, Ltd (SPD) incorporated in Nigeria. The claimants were Nigerian 
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nationals who had fled to the United States as political asylum seekers. The claim 
was brought under the ATCA alleging that the three corporations violated 
international law by aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in committing a 
wide range of violations, namely, (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against 
humanity; (3) torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention; (5) 
violations of the right to life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and 
(7) property destruction. 137  It was alleged that the defendants provided the 
Nigerian forces with “food, transportation, and compensation, as well as by 
allowing the Nigerian military to use the respondents’ property as a staging ground 
for attack”.138  
The Second Circuit Court dismissed the application on the basis that the law of 
nations does not recognize corporate liability. In this regard, the majority decision 
reached the conclusion that 
no corporation has ever been subjected to any form of liability 
(whether criminal, civil or otherwise) under the customary 
international law of human rights. Rather, sources of customary 
international law have, on several occasions, explicitly rejected the 
idea of corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability has not attained 
a discernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of 
the world in their relations inter se, and it cannot, as a result, form 
the basis of a suit under the ATS [ATCA].139  
Delivering his separate decision, which in essence agreed with the majority’s 
dismissal of the case but not the reasoning, Leval J wrote that the decision of the 
majority, “deals a substantial blow to international law and its undertaking to 
protect fundamental human rights”.140 He castigated the reasoning of the majority 
decision as being, “illogical, misguided, and based on misunderstanding of 
precedent”.141 Leval J premised his dismissal of the claim on the basis that the 
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factual allegations by the claimants did not succeed in pleading a violation of the 
law of nations.142  
By certiorari the matter came before the Supreme Court of the United States to 
consider the question whether the law of nations recognises corporate liability.143 
Having listened to oral arguments, the court directed the parties to consider an 
additional question: “Whether and under what circumstances courts may 
recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States”.144 This additional question overshadowed the original question in that it 
became the basis of the decision of the court.  
Delineating the issue before it, the court was of the view that the issue before it 
was not whether the claimants had a proper claim under the ATCA, but whether a 
claim may reach conduct occurring in the territory of another state.145 Relying on 
the presumption against extraterritorial application, Royal Dutch Petroleum argued 
that the ATCA does not have that reach. 146  If there is no clear intention or 
indication by the legislature to rebut it, it was argued, this principle remains 
applicable.  To rebut the presumption, a statute must have a clear indication of 
extraterritoriality, which the ATCA was found not to have.147 The claimants argued 
that even if the presumption applies, “the text, history and purpose of the ATCA” 
rebuts it.148 The purpose of the presumption is to assist courts not to adopt an 
interpretive approach of domestic law that carry foreign policy consequences not 
clearly articulated by the political branches. The effect of the presumption is that 
courts need to tread with caution in matters that involve foreign policy.149  
The matter was dismissed based on the fact that all the material facts occurred 
outside the United States. The court went on to say that even where the claims 
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have some link with the United States, “they must do so with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application”. 150  Even more 
relevant for this study, is that the court was of the view that where corporations are 
involved, “it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices”.151 
Once again, deferring to the political branch, the court was of the view that if 
congress were to determine otherwise with regard to corporations, then a statute 
more specific than the ATCA would be needed.152  Incidentally, the Corporate 
Code of Conduct Act153 of Cynthia McKinney sought to serve a similar purpose. 
The Act was creatively drafted and sought to target US corporations that employed 
more than twenty employees in a foreign country to adhere to its provisions.154 Not 
much came of the Act as it was never put to the vote.155  
Like in the Circuit Court156 above, a minority decision was also delivered which 
disagreed with the reasoning of the majority decision, but still arrived at the same 
conclusion with the majority decision. Breyer J157 also reached a conclusion that 
there is no sufficient connection with the United States of America and, therefore, 
the claim had to fail. According to Breyer J, having an office in New York is not 
sufficient to establish connection with the United States.158  
It is argued that this restrictive interpretation adopted by the court, has no doubt 
reversed the gains of the ATCA since it was brought to life in the Filátiga and the 
Doe cases above. In addition, the court has created some uncertainties around the 
use of the ATCA by foreign plaintiffs within US courts. Despite the uncertainties, 
the question of whether corporations can be held liable under the ATCA is yet to 
be decided with certainty. Perhaps some of these uncertainties will be settled in 
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future litigation, but as Blichitz sounds a warning, “only the bravest of litigants are 
likely to venture into these uncharted waters”.159  
The South African cases before the American courts illustrate the challenges of 
pursuing MNCs in their home state of incorporation. From South Africa, victims of 
apartheid launched an application against Barclays Bank, Ford Company, General 
Motors Corporation (GM), International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) and 
Daimler AG in the American courts. The claim was brought against these 
companies for their alleged complicity with the apartheid government of South 
Africa in violating human rights. The allegations 160  were that IBM actively 
implemented apartheid by producing race-based identity documents, which 
documents were used by the apartheid government to strip black people of their 
nationality and citizenship; restricted their freedom of movement in and out of 
South Africa and facilitated the geographic segregation against black people.161 
Daimler and Ford manufactured in whole, or in part, security vehicles such as the 
Hippos, Casspirs and Buffels for the apartheid state, which vehicles were used by 
the security forces to suppress opposition to the apartheid system. The employees 
of Daimler and Ford, who participated in activities opposed to the apartheid 
system such as unions and community organisations and expressed anti-
apartheid views, were subjected to dismissal, arrest, intimidation and torture in 
collaboration with the security forces. 162  It was further alleged that Barclays 
purposefully and/or knowingly participated in the apartheid government’s goal of 
separating the races geographically by systematically denying black employees 
the opportunities to work in or transfer to offices in predominantly white areas.163  
The South African cases bear all the hallmarks of the hurdles that plaintiffs suing 
in the home state have to go through.  For over ten years, that is, from 2002 to 
2015 the South African cases have been moving from one hurdle to another within 
the American legal system.164 While these processes were pending before the 
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courts, the two Kiobel decisions above were delivered. On the 27 July 2015, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit finally dismissed the 
application when it ruled that the plaintiffs did not allege sufficient conduct to 
displace the ATCA’s presumption against extraterritoriality. 165 Perhaps a future 
test case which alleges sufficient conduct to displace the ATCA’s presumption 
against extraterritoriality will afford the courts an opportunity to pronounce on 
whether corporations can be held accountable under the ACTA. In the absence of 
one, the door of holding MNCs accountable within the US courts remains half-
open. 
 
Often when transnational litigation studies are conducted, inevitably the focus is 
mainly on the United States of America. The interest in the United States of 
America has to a large degree been influenced by the extraterritorial reach on the 
ATCA, which has no equal in other jurisdictions. With the weaknesses of the 
ATCA beginning to emerge, it becomes imperative to look elsewhere for possible 
avenues to hold MNCs accountable. This study now turns to the United Kingdom. 
 
3.2.2 The Jurisprudence of the courts of the United Kingdom on forum non 
conveniens 
 
Courts in the United Kingdom have also had an opportunity to pronounce on the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Within the Scottish legal system, the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens has a history going back to 1873.166 Since then, the test to 
grant a stay of proceedings has evolved. The doctrine was recognised in England 
in the seventies167 and was accepted into English law by the House of Lords in the 
case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation case.168 The appellants were a Liberian 
Corporation that owned Spiliada, a vessel that sailed under a Liberian flag. The 
management of the corporation was partly run from Greece and partly from 
England. The respondents plied their trade in British Columbia. The dispute was 
about a claim for damages caused by the loading of wet sulphur by the 
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respondents on the appellant’s vessel. The sulphur was loaded in Vancouver and 
was destined to India. A clause of the bills of lading stated that “no matter where 
issued, (the bills of lading) shall be construed as governed by English law and as if 
the vessel sailed under the British flag”.169 The case was an appeal by Spiliada 
Maritime Corporation to have the matter heard in the English court. Consulex was 
opposed to this as it wanted the matter to be heard in Canada.  
 
A determination of which forum is more appropriate than the other is done with 
reference to a wide number of factors.170 The court explored a number of issues 
and then set out a two-part test enquiry on granting a stay of proceedings on the 
basis of forum non conveniens. Firstly, the onus is on the defendant to show that 
there is a forum more appropriate than the English forum where the dispute can be 
heard. In the words of Lord Goff of Chieveley: “The burden resting on the 
defendant is not just to show that England is not a natural or appropriate forum for 
the trial, but to establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or 
distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.”171 The court will explore the 
factors that establish the connection with the other forum.172 Once the defendant 
has discharged the onus, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff. The second part of 
the test is that the plaintiff must show the court that even though the dispute can 
be properly heard in the alternative forum, special circumstances do exist that 
show that substantial justice cannot be obtained in the alternative forum. On 
analysis, the first part of the test makes a practical enquiry on convenience for the 
parties to the litigation and their witnesses, costs and the applicable law (in the 
Spiliada case, the bills of laden or contract). 173  The second part of the test 
enquires into substantive issues of justice, because even if a closer connection 
between the dispute and alternative forum can be established, the court must 
establish “objectively by cogent evidence”174 that the plaintiff will not obtain justice 
in the other forum.  
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The Spiliada test has had an impact on subsequent cases brought in English 
courts against MNCs. There has been a number of cases that were brought before 
the UK courts against MNCs. This study will only discuss two of these cases to 
illustrate the approach followed by the UK courts. As it will be evident in the 
discussion below, the two cases were chosen because they embody the 
challenges that are faced by the plaintiffs in pursuing corporations in their home 
state. The first case is the Connelly v RTZ Corporation plc and Another.175 The 
facts are set out in the majority decision of Lord Goff of Chieveley.176 The plaintiff, 
Edward Connelly, came to South Africa from Scotland in 1971 when he was 21 
years old. Between 1977 and 1982, he worked for Rossing Uranium Ltd (RUL) a 
uranium mining company which carried its business in Namibia. RUL was a 
subsidiary of RTZ an English company with its registered office in London. Upon 
his return to Scotland, it was discovered that Connelly was suffering from cancer 
of the larynx. His lawyers in Scotland wrote to RTZ raising the question of 
compensation. In its reply, RTZ said that the claim should be referred to RUL 
Namibia where the insurers denied liability. Back in Namibia the Legal Assistance 
Centre lodged a claim for compensation on behalf of Connelly under the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act, but the claim was rejected. 
 
Connelly obtained a legal Aid certificate to bring the claim against RTZ in the High 
Court in London. RTZ applied for a stay on the basis that Namibia was the 
appropriate forum for the action. To decide on the appropriate forum, the court had 
recourse to the two-staged test set out in the Spiliada case. Firstly, the court had 
to consider whether there is another forum which is more appropriate to hear the 
matter than the English one. It was accepted that RUL had discharged the onus of 
proving that there exists another forum.177 Connelly agreed that Namibia was the 
appropriate forum, but argued that in Namibia there was no form of assistance 
available to pursue such an action. The court looked at factors which point to the 
other forum as the appropriate one. The judge granted a stay of proceedings. 
Connelly’s lawyers then entered into a conditional fee arrangement as a way of 
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ensuring that their client attains justice, after which they made an application to lift 
the stay of proceedings. Leave to appeal was granted based on the fact that 
lawyers for Connelly had entered into a conditional fee arrangement.178 The court 
then considered the test set out in the Spiliada case and held that:  
 
There is every reason to believe that this case calls for highly 
professional representation, by both lawyers and scientific experts, 
for achievement of substantial justice, and that such 
representation cannot be achieved in Namibia. In these 
circumstances, to revert to the underlying principle, the Namibian 
forum is not one in which the case can be tried more suitably for 
the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice.179 
 
Court processes are by nature tedious and often take a long time. Forum non 
conveniens applications can take even longer partly because of the nature of the 
proceedings whereby parties “litigate in order to determine where they shall 
litigate”.180 In the case of Connelly, it was discovered in 1986 that he was suffering 
from cancer of the larynx. Two years later, his lawyers initiated communication 
with RTZ Corp regarding compensation.181  Following unsuccessful attempts to 
claim compensation from the Workmen’s compensation in Namibia, Connelly 
initiated legal proceedings against RTZ in England in 1994. The matter was in 
England because the allegation was that “RTZ had devised RUL’s policy on 
health, safety and the environment, or alternatively had advised RUL as to the 
contents of the policy”.182  From 1994 to July 1997 when the House of Lords 
delivered its verdict for the interlocutory application, the matter has been moving 
from one forum to another. Even then, it was evident that had the court not 
considered the fact that financial aid does contribute to substantive justice, 
Connelly’s application would have reached the end. With forum non conveniens 
applications, it all depends on whether the court takes a stricter view of the 
doctrine of or not. Connelly’s managed to be heard again, because of the patience 
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of his legal team whose creativity allowed them to explore further strategic 
avenues to get the case heard again. As Meeran points out, access to justice may 
inter alia be denied simply because the plaintiff does not have funding for 
lawyers.183  
 
In the Lubbe and Others v Cape PLC case184 the respondent was a registered 
company in England, which owned subsidiary companies in South Africa, whose 
core business was the mining and processing of asbestos related products. The 
plaintiffs had brought an application before the court alleging that, prior to 1979, 
the defendant while knowing of the injurious effect of asbestos, had failed, as 
parent company, to take appropriate steps to adopt measures of safety through its 
subsidiary company. As a result of this omission, the plaintiffs allege that they 
suffered injury either through exposure, or by merely living near the contaminated 
area. At the time of the application, the defendant had ceased business operations 
in South Africa. Of all the plaintiffs, there was only one who was a British citizen, 
the rest were South Africans most whom were “black and of modest means”.185 
The claim was made against the defendant as a parent company. The core of the 
claim was that the defendant breached a duty of care which it owed to those 
working for its subsidiaries or living near its plant of operations.186 Despite the fact 
that the defendants had discontinued business in South Africa, Cape PLC applied 
for a stay of proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens by arguing that 
South Africa was a more appropriate forum. The court a quo granted a stay on the 
basis that South Africa was the appropriate forum even though the plaintiffs had 
argued that Legal Aid would not be granted if they were to proceed in South 
Africa.187 Further submissions were made and the court once again granted a 
stay. There was a second appeal, which appeal was also dismissed on the basis 
that South Africa is an appropriate forum. 188  On the third appeal the court 
assessed the history of the various applications made by the plaintiff in this 
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matter.189 The court considered a wide range of issues including the fact that the 
respondents no longer had any business connections in South Africa and then 
allowed the plaintiff’s appeal. The decision of the second court of appeal to grant a 
stay was overturned by a majority decision of the House of Lords to which there 
was no dissent.190 
 
In the event that the defendant successfully raises the plea of forum non 
conveniens at all levels of the appeal process, the plaintiff who is still interested in 
pursuing the matter further would have to institute the claim in an alternative 
forum. As discussed above, forum non conveniens processes are sometimes 
protracted as justice delayed may often result in justice denied.191 Financially this 
can also have a negative impact on the lawyers of the claimants.  As Meeran 
notes, the longer the cases drag on, the more this would have financial 
implications for the lawyers of the claimants. Lawyers for MNCs would not even 
feel the impact as they would still receive their remuneration regardless of the 
outcome of the case.192 Often, a stay of proceedings on the basis of forum non 
conveniens marks the end of the litigation.193 As discussed earlier, since most of 
these violations happen in developing countries where there are weak systems 
and poor adherence to the rule of law, for claimants having to go back to host 
countries, may also mean being exposed to challenges such as persecution, 
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delays and lack of funding. 194  In this regard, the innovative approach by the 
European Union to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to which this study now 
turns, is to be lauded. 
 
3.2.3  The doctrine of forum non conveniens in the European Union 
 
Since its formation, the number of states joining the European Union has been on 
the rise. Currently there are twenty-eight member states, six are still on the list of 
candidates and two are potential members.195 Membership to the Union is by 
application. To become a member of the Union, a country needs to meet certain 
set criteria. A prospective member must demonstrate, inter alia, that they will 
comply with all the standards and rules of the Union.196 In addition, prospective 
members must have  
 
 stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; 
 a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and 
market forces in the EU, and  
 the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.197 
 
The Union has not completely displaced national governments as that would be in 
contrast with the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiary determines 
that power should be exercised in a manner that favours local control.198 There is 
a sense of complementarity between national governments and the Union in that 
states have jurisdiction in their own territories and therefore have the power to 
regulate their matters in accordance with their own municipal laws. Inevitably this 
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leads to tensions from time to time.199 Community legal norms of the region though 
have a direct effect within member states.200 This as Weiler points out means that: 
  
Community legal norms that are clear, precise, and self-sufficient 
(not requiring further legislative measures by the authorities of the 
Community or the Member States) must be regarded as the law of 
the land in the sphere of application of Community law.201 
 
In this regard, matters of jurisdiction are regulated by the Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of 
1968.202 Article 2 provides that “persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, 
whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State”. In as far as 
corporations are concerned, Article 53 states that “the seat of a company or other 
legal person or association of natural or legal persons shall be treated as its 
domicile”. A company’s domicile shall be where it has its statutory seat, or central 
administration or principal place of business.203 Article 60(2) makes provision for 
the situation in the United Kingdom and Ireland where the statutory seat means 
“the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place of 
incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law 
of which the formation took place”. 
 
In the Owusu v Jackson204 case, the European Court of Justice was afforded an 
opportunity to make a pronouncement on forum non conveniens based on the 
Brussels Convention. The dispute related to a swimming accident that took place 
in Jamaica where Mr Owusu, a British national, became a tetraplegic after hitting 
his head against a submerged sand bank. According to court papers, another 
English holiday-maker had been involved in a similar accident two years earlier 
and was also rendered tetraplegic. The claim was filed in the United Kingdom 
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against Mr Jackson, also a British national, who had let the holiday resort in 
Jamaica to Mr Owusu, and a number of Jamaican companies. In a claim for 
breach of contract Mr Owusu argued that the contract which gave him access to a 
private beach had an implied term that the beach would be reasonably safe or free 
from hidden dangers.205 The claim in tort against Jamaican companies was two-
fold. Firstly, that they had failed to warn swimmers of the hazards constituted by 
the submerged sand bank, and secondly that they had failed to heed the earlier 
accident.206 Mr Jackson and other defendants argued that the court should not 
exercise its jurisdiction as Jamaica was the suitable forum.  
 
The court made reference to an earlier decision of an English Court of Appeal207 in 
which it was said that it is possible for an English court applying the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on them by 
Article 2 of the Brussels Convention. This the court held, was bad in law.208 The 
court made a number of pronouncements, two of which are worth highlighting. The 
first one is that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory and therefore no 
derogation is allowed, except where such derogation is expressly allowed by the 
Convention.209 Secondly, that the Brussels Convention  
 
precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the 
jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the 
ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more 
appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction 
of no other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have 
no connecting factors to any other Contracting State.210  
 
On the strength of the Brussels Convention and the decision of the European 
Court of Justice, forum non conveniens does no longer constitute a hurdle to a 
foreign plaintiff within the European Union. Though not extraterritorial in reach, the 
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Brussels convention constitutes a sign of hope for prospective plaintiffs within the 
Union.   
 
The position adopted by the European Union provides some hope for plaintiffs 
wishing to hold MNCs to account within the European Union. In light of Article 2 of 
the Brussels Convention and the Owusu decision, forum non conveniens will no 
longer constitute a hurdle in the members of the European Union. Already the 
advantages are now visible as trials are no longer delayed by interlocutory 
proceedings.211  
 
The challenge though is that this is only applicable within one region of the world. 
If plaintiffs have to sue in other parts of the world, such as Canada and the United 
States, forum non conveniens is still applicable. This may therefore translate into 
an untenable situation where whether one gets justice or not may depend on 
where in the world one finds oneself. There is therefore a need for binding 
universal standards which will not address the situation on a case-by-case basis, 
but address the issue of providing access to plaintiffs on an international level.212 
Such standards would relate to regulatory standards, enforcement and locus 
standi. In the past four decades, the international community has without success 
attempted to construct an international regulatory framework for corporations. It is 
to such efforts that this study now turns. 
 
4 INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE POWER AND 
INFLUENCE OF MNCS  
4.1  The UN appoints a Group of Eminent Persons  
At the height of colonisation, there was a very thin line between economic and 
political power of MNCs. The European home states and their MNCs acted in 
unison as they plundered the resources of the colonised territories.213 In the late 
1960s, most of the developing countries raised concerns about the interference of 
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some of the powerful corporations in their domestic political affairs.214 Developing 
countries called for some international regulation and supervision of the activities 
of corporations.215 The process of addressing these concerns was set in motion on 
02 July 1972 when the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (UN) 
adopted Resolution 1721 (LIII),216 requesting the Secretary General of the UN to 
establish a Group of Eminent Persons, with a three-fold mandate. The mandate 
was to study the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process 
of development, especially that of developing countries, and their implications for 
international relations. Secondly, the mandate was to formulate conclusions which 
may possibly be used by governments in making their sovereign decisions 
regarding policy, and thirdly to submit recommendations for appropriate 
international action.  
Twenty eminent persons were appointed and were assisted by two consultants. In 
terms of documents, the Group benefited from a study of the Department of the 
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat titled, Multinational 
Corporations in World Development, 217  which study was specially meant to 
facilitate their deliberations. This study of the United Nations Secretariat was 
presented in four parts dealing with (I) concepts and dimensions, (II) the nature of 
multinational corporations, (III) the impact and tensions and (IV) mapping out a 
programme of action. To accomplish its mandate, the Group held three plenary 
sessions, heard testimonies from fifty leading personalities from government, 
business, trade unions, special and public interest groups and universities. Two 
years later, the Group of Eminent Persons presented their report218 which, among 
others, recommended the establishment of a Commission on Multinational 
Corporations and a UN Centre on Multinational Corporations that will be entrusted 
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with the development of a policy related to MNCs. The second recommendation 
related to the setting up of a Commission to put together a Code of Conduct for 
MNCs.  
Of interest to note, is that the Group of Eminent Persons was aware that the 
problem of MNCs required a long-term solution that may in the long run require 
“the conclusion of a general agreement on multinational corporations having the 
force of an international treaty and containing provisions for machinery and 
sanctions.”219 The proposal however was shelved just as it was raised, as the 
Group went on to state that: “We recognise that it is premature to propose serious 
negotiations on such an agreement and the machinery necessary for its 
enforcement. This requires careful and extended preparation and discussion”.220 
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Group of Eminent Persons, the 
Commission on Transnational Corporations and the United Nations Centre on 
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was established in 1974. The UNCTC with 
its main offices in New York was the focal point for all matters related to MNCs 
and foreign direct investment. The work of the UNCTC was then moved for a brief 
period to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Development (1992 to 1993). After 1993 the Programme on Transnational 
Corporations was transferred to the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva and is now being implemented by UNCTAD's 
Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development.221   
Regarding the Code of Conduct, the Group of Eminent Persons was alert to the 
conceptual difficulties related to the notion of codes in general in that the term can 
be ambiguous in meaning.222 The first ambiguity lies in the fact that a code can 
refer to laws, decrees and rules which are already adopted or being enforced. 
Secondly, a code can refer to a set of rules established for negotiations in 
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international negotiations and a country can choose to adhere to and apply the 
rules. The third category, which is the one preferred by and advocated for by the 
Group of Eminent Person is where a code refers to a “consistent set of 
recommendations which are gradually evolved and which may be revised as 
experience or circumstances require”.223 An important point to note is that the 
Group of Eminent Persons was aware of the fact that such codes, though not 
compulsory in character, would “act as an instrument of moral persuasion, 
strengthened by the authority of international organisations and the support of 
public opinion”.224 Pursuant to the recommendation, on 05 December 1974 by 
Resolution 1913 (LVII) a Commission on Transnational Corporations was created.  
The function of the Commission was two-fold:  
(a) To undertake work which may assist the Economic and Social Council in 
evolving a set of recommendations which would set a basis for a code of 
conduct dealing with transnational corporations; 
(b) To undertake work which would assist the Economic and Social Council in 
considering possible arrangements or agreements on specific aspects to 
transnational corporations with a view to studying the feasibility of formulating 
a general agreement and, on the basis of a decision of the Council, to 
consolidating them into a general agreement at a future date. 
At the first meeting of the Commission, the drafting of a code of conduct was given 
top priority.225 Despite the Group of Eminent Persons having opted for a code of 
conduct which is voluntary, broader issues of the relationship between 
corporations and human rights continued to be a subject of debate. The 
discussions encompassed the typical perennial issues that always appear when 
the debate on MNCs arises. According to the report of the Secretariat, some 
countries were of the view that the code should be voluntary, while others held a 
view that it should be mandatory. Others were of the view that the code should 
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cover the conduct of both states and corporations, while others were of the view 
that it should only be for corporations.226 As the negotiations progressed, the gulf 
between interested parties widened. Due to disagreements between developing 
countries insisting on a legally binding instrument and developed countries 
insisting on a voluntary mechanism, the Draft Code was not adopted.227 Having 
occupied the activities of the Commission since 1974, the negotiations to have a 
code of conduct for MNCs were eventually suspended in July 1992.228 
4.2  The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines 
Two years after the creation of the Commission on Transnational Corporations, 
the OECD countries embarked on its own attempt to set international standards for 
MNCs.229 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises230 (the Guidelines), 
though not legally binding, are recommendations by governments of the thirty-four 
OECD member states plus Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, 
Peru and Romania on how their national corporations should conduct their affairs 
in host states. The Guidelines cover a variety of issues including disclosure of 
information, employment and industrial relations, combating bribery, bribe 
solicitation and extortion, science and technology, competition and the 
environment. The Guidelines “provide voluntary principles and standards for 
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws and internationally 
recognized standards.” 231  In 2000 the Guidelines were revised to include a 
provision that MNCs should “respect the human rights of those affected by their 
activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and 
commitments”.232 The 2000 insertion has since remained part of the subsequent 
provisions of the Guidelines. Though the Guidelines are non-binding on 
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corporations, the commitment of OECD member states to ensure human rights 
observance is encouraging.233 Through the Guidelines, adhering states inter alia 
declare that they will co-operate with each other and with other actors to 
strengthen the international legal and policy framework in which business is 
conducted.234 
Despite their non-binding nature, the Guidelines have been hailed for having 
influenced the development of the language on corporate social responsibility and 
for representing “a rare example of governments seeking to address the 
management of multinational corporations directly in a multilateral setting”.235 On 
their weaknesses, Chirwa236 writes that the Guidelines have not succeeded in 
changing corporate behaviour. This weakness he attributes to the fact that the 
Guidelines are limited in their normative framework and do not have any 
enforcement mechanisms. A further weakness relates to the scope of the 
Guidelines as they only apply to OECD member states and the additional states 
that have voluntarily expressed interest in them. Some scholars hold a view that 
the Guidelines need to be revised further because in their current form they have 
fallen behind other voluntary standards.237  
4.3  Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises 
Following a series of meetings since 1972 in search of international standards for 
corporations, the governing body of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
comprising of governments, employers and workers, approved the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises in November 
1977.238 The Declaration was adopted by the ILO at its 204th Session in Geneva 
and was amended at its 279th Session in November 2000. The Declaration covers 
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235  Bilchitz 2010 South African Law Journal 757.  
236  Chirwa 2006 South African Journal of Human Rights 84-85. 
237  Commission on Human Rights, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights”, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) at para 46. 
238  “The Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy” available at:  http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---
emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_101234.pdf  (accessed on 05 July 2012).  
93 
 
mainly workplace-related rights such as equality of opportunity and treatment, 
security of employment, a minimum age of employment, and conditions and 
benefits of work, among others.239 Adherence to the Declaration is voluntary as its 
provisions are only to be observed on a voluntary basis. 240 In the negotiating 
phase of the Principles, workers and governments of developing countries wanted 
a treaty, but employers wanted a voluntary declaration. 241  Though not legally 
binding on corporations, Chirwa 242  regards the Declaration as a “potent 
acknowledgment by business enterprises that they have human rights obligations”. 
As for the weaknesses, Bilchitz243 is concerned that apart from labour rights, the 
Declaration does not specify other human rights obligations of corporations and 
does not have strong monitoring mechanisms. 
4.4  The UN Global Compact 
Under the stewardship of the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan, the UN 
launched the Global Compact in 2000.244 The Global Compact consists of ten 
principles which deal with human rights, labour standards, the environment and 
anti-corruption measures. On human rights, the Global Compact states that 
“business should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed 
human rights”245 and, secondly, “business should make sure that they are not 
complicit in human rights abuses”. 246  The Global Compact is voluntary and 
participating companies are expected to incorporate the ten principles into their 
operations and publish their support for the Global Compact. 247  Participating 
companies report annually on measures they have taken to contribute to the 
values enshrined in the Global Compact. Companies that fail to comply are 
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July 2011). 
245  Principle One Why Human Rights are important for Business states that: “As part of its 
commitment to the Global Compact, the business community has a responsibility to uphold 
human rights both in the workplace and more broadly within its sphere of influence.” 
246  Principle Two. 
247  See Chirwa 2006 South African Journal of Human Rights 89. 
94 
 
removed from the website of the Global compact. As De Schutter notes, in the 
year 2011 more than 2 000 companies had been removed for failure to comply 
with the reporting requirements.248 It is no exaggeration to say that the Global 
Compact has had a universal appeal.249 Despite its success, the Global Compact 
has flaws which Bilchitz250 outlines as follows: Firstly, it is non-binding and has no 
force in international law, secondly the provisions are vague and expressed in an 
abstract language, thirdly, the Compact relies on the goodwill of the companies 
and does not have any monitoring mechanisms and, finally, it is often merely used 
by companies as a public-relations exercise. 
4.5  Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights 
In 1998, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights resuscitated the need to explore possibilities of drafting a code of conduct 
for corporations based on human rights standards. A working group was set up 
with a mandate to draft binding norms for human rights and MNCs, explore 
possibilities of establishing a monitoring mechanism for MNCs that will also be 
able to sanction MNCs and award compensation where there has been an 
infringement. 251  In 2003 the working group produced the Draft Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights252 (the Draft Norms). The norms are written in a 
treaty-like language and have only twenty-three provisions. 253  The provisions 
include inter alia the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment, 
rights to security of persons, rights of workers, obligations with regard to consumer 
protection and obligations with regard to environmental protection. In keeping with 
the state-centric nature of international law, the norms place the primary 
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responsibility for the protection of human rights on states. Business obligations are 
outlined as an addition to state responsibility and not as a replacement.254  
Thus far, it has become clear that imposing obligations on business will not be 
universally accepted. The Draft Norms have polarised the debate even more.255 
On the positive side, the Draft Norms have been hailed as representing a 
restatement of international legal principles applicable to business.256 This being 
the case, the Draft Norms have not been adopted and therefore “rest in a legal no-
man’s land”.257 While acknowledging the fact that the norms have made strides in 
outlining human rights responsibilities for business and suggesting possible 
mechanisms for enforcement, Bilchitz258 is of the view that the Draft Norms only 
impose few specific obligations. In some instances, he argues, there is only a 
catch-all clause and in certain instances the Draft Norms impose obligations on 
corporations which have not been accepted by all states. He goes on to argue that 
the proposed enforcement mechanisms of the Norms are only rudimentary.  
That corporations have human rights obligations under international law is not a 
universally held view. The Draft Norms were not adopted, mainly because they 
sought to impose direct obligations on corporations under international law. The 
main arguments raised against the Draft Norms were that:259 (1) The Draft Norms 
represents a major shift away from voluntary adherence by business to 
international human rights standards and the need for this shift has not been 
demonstrated; (2) the style of the Draft Norms is unduly negative towards 
business; (3) The recognition of legal obligations on business to “promote, secure 
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the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights” is baseless 
and a misstatement of international law - only States have legal obligations under 
international human rights law; (4) the human rights content of the Draft Norms is 
vague and inaccurate; (5) The legal responsibilities on business identified in the 
Draft Norms go beyond the standards applying to states; (6) The Draft Norms 
require business to undertake balancing decisions more appropriate to the role of 
Governments; (7) The imposition of legal responsibilities on business could shift 
the obligations to protect human rights from Governments to the private sector and 
provide a diversion for states to avoid their own responsibilities; (8) The 
implementation provisions of the Draft Norms are burdensome and unworkable; 
and that (9) The Draft Norms duplicate other initiatives and standards, particularly 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration.  
4.6  UN Special Representative on Issues of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Businesses  
The failure to adopt the Draft Norms did not dampen the UN initiatives in exploring 
international standards for corporations. As discussed in chapter one, in 2005 the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution requesting that 
the UN Secretary-General appoint a Representative on the Issue of Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. 260  For this, 
Ruggie became the face of the mandate. Having been appointed after the failure 
to adopt the Draft Norms, and aware of the concerns that led to the non-adoption 
of the Draft Norms, there was no way that Ruggie was going to steer the 
discussions to the same direction of imposing direct obligations on MNCs. Instead, 
Ruggie designed a conceptual and policy framework that is premised on the 
differentiated but complimentary responsibilities of the obligations of the state and 
those of corporates. The framework hinged on three principles, namely: The 
state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business; the corporate responsibility to respect rights; and the need for more 
effective access to remedies.261 As for what he meant by respect, Ruggie wrote, 
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that “to respect means essentially not to infringe on the rights of others – put 
simply, to do no harm”. 262  The concept of due diligence is central to this 
responsibility to respect. By due diligence Ruggie refers to steps which a company 
must take “to become aware of, prevent and address adverse human rights 
impacts”. 263  He went on to state that the corporate responsibility to respect 
constitutes what the society expects of business.264  
By locating the obligation of corporations to respect human rights in the realm of 
social expectations, the Ruggie mandate has shifted the focus away from binding 
obligations. While this view represents but one of the possible ways to hold MNCs 
to account, it is not the only authoritative view on international law. The challenge 
though, is that given the international stature of the Ruggie mandate, this view 
may be construed as encapsulating the up to date international position on 
MNCs. 265  Without negating the state-centric nature of international law, it is 
important to point out that the view above captures only one aspect of the debate 
on business and human rights.  For instance, there have been some 
developments in international law, particularly since the Second World War. One 
of the most important documents to have emerged shortly after the Second World 
War is the Charter of the United Nations.266 The Charter as Weissbrodt and Kruger 
argue “is both the most prominent treaty and repository of seminal human 
rights”.267 Normatively, the Charter serves as the foundation for the emergence of 
important human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (the UDHR)268 and the so-called International Bill of Rights, to name a 
few.269 The UNDR not only provides an interpretation of the rights set out in the 
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Charter but also encapsulates some of the provisions that have reached the status 
of customary international law.270 The UDHR states in its preamble that  
 [t]he General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and nations, to the end 
that every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in 
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for 
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national 
and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance.271 
Despite the language of the UDHR being state-centric, some scholars have 
argued for an inclusive reading of its provisions. In his much-quoted statement 
Henkin states that “[e]very individual includes juridical persons. Every individual 
and every organ of society excludes no one, company, no market, and no cyber 
space. The Universal Declaration applies to them all”. 272  The inclusive 
interpretation by Henkin, widens the scope of corporate obligations for human 
rights under international law. 
The international initiatives above, point to the fact that corporations need to have 
obligations which are clearly articulated. Corporations are private in nature and 
operate within a private sphere. The state-centric approach looks to states for the 
regulation of these corporations. The difficulty though is that states operate under 
certain political and economic constraints that may hinder their ability to discharge 
their obligations. The situation is further compounded by the wave of privatization 
of services that ordinarily fall within the domain of states and liberalization.273  With 
state regulation at best inadequate and at worst non-existent, the non-binding and 
voluntary initiatives have been directed at MNCs themselves. For instance, when 
the Global Compact274 was drafted, it asked companies to “support and enact, 
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within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption”. 275  The notion that 
corporations have their own “sphere of influence” is in itself an indication of the 
sensitivity to avoid conflating the responsibilities of corporations with those of 
states. This sensitivity also featured as part of the conceptual framework of the 
Ruggie mandate. According to Ruggie, the sphere of influence is a “useful 
metaphor for companies in thinking about their human rights impacts beyond the 
workplace and in identifying opportunities to support human rights, which is what 
the Global Compact seeks to achieve”.276 In his view, the concept conflates two 
different meanings of influence.277 The first meaning refers to where the activities 
of the company or relationships are causing harm to human rights. The second 
one refers to whatever leverage a company may have on other actors that are 
causing harm. The concept of the sphere of influence is itself not without its own 
difficulties, though. As Alston points out, it creates the impression that there is a 
set of rights that are exclusively for states and those that are for corporations. 
Further, it raises difficulties on how the rights are to be delineated between the 
state and the corporation.278 Despite its complexities, this division of obligations 
between the state and the corporations continued to be articulated in the 2003 
Draft Norms. The preamble to the Norms states that  
[e]ven though States have the primary responsibility to promote, 
secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect 
human rights, transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible for 
promoting and securing the human rights set forth in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.279  
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 Like the Global Compact, the Draft Norms are also constructed around the notion 
of obligations for corporations “within their respective sphere of activity”.280 Among 
the list of the obligations imposed on corporations to promote, secure the 
fulfillment of and respect are the right to equal opportunity and non-discriminatory 
practices, right to security of persons, rights of workers, respect of national 
sovereignty and human rights, rights of consumers and the right to environment. 
Though both the Global Compact and the Draft Norms are non-binding, their 
significance lies in the fact that they embody the possible vision of where 
international human rights law may be heading. There is definitely a sense that the 
international community seeks to impose some human rights obligations on 
corporations. What seems to be unclear, though, is the mechanism under which 
this should be done. As to what the nature of such mechanisms should be has led 
to a polarized debate among scholars who advocate for a soft-law approach and a 
hard-law approach.281 Each side of the spectrum sees some advantages for each 
of the approaches. Proponents of soft law282 argue that soft law guidelines have 
some legal value as it impacts on the international law-making process by 
providing the premise on which customary international law may develop, and 
which may eventually lead to the conclusion of a binding treaty.283 Because of their 
flexibility, soft law approaches can cope better with uncertainty and are easier to 
negotiate especially in instances where there is an urgent need for legal clarity.284 
In addition, a soft law instrument offers a solution as it can be negotiated in a 
relatively short period of time and implemented immediately, because its 
applicability is not dependent on the ratification by states. Conversely, proponents 
of a hard law approach to legal regulation argue in favour of a binding 
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commitment, with a clear understanding of consequences in the event of a 
breach.285 For over four decades, the debates in relation to MNCs accountability 
have been struggling to evolve out of the soft law approach into the hard-law 
approach. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The ability of MNCs to violate human rights is well documented. The international 
mechanisms to hold MNCs to account have not managed to get out of the 
conceptual rut. In an ideal world, plaintiffs seeking to hold MNCs to account have 
an option to pursue corporations either in their home state of incorporation or in 
the host state where they ply their trade. This chapter, however, has demonstrated 
that both approaches are not without their challenges. Pursuing MNCs in the host 
country, the challenge is that the plaintiff may discover that the host state does not 
have enough resources to meet both the political and economic might of MNCs. 
On the other hand, pursuing MNCs in their home state of incorporation, the plaintiff 
is likely to be faced with two challenges. Firstly, the plaintiff would either have to 
be financially resourced to be able to pierce through the corporate veil. Assuming 
that the plaintiff does not go through the route of piercing the veil, the plaintiff 
would be faced with procedural challenges such as forum non conveniens.  What 
has become clear in this chapter is that the current regulatory environment for 
MNCs has its own challenges, and secondly, the international mechanisms that 
have been put in place over the last four decades have been hampered by the fact 
that they are all voluntary. This study is of the view that the rising power of MNCs 
and their potential ability to violate human rights requires a non-voluntary system 
of accountability.  
                                                          
285  Shaffer and Pollack 2010 Minnesota Law Review 717-718. 
102 
 
CHAPTER 3 
INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY OF MNCs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It was pointed out in chapter one that the two concepts of accountability and 
responsibility, though sometimes used interchangeably by scholars, are not 
necessarily the same in international law. State responsibility in international law 
literature is used in order to establish legal accountability. Traditionally, both these 
concepts of accountability and responsibility have been used with reference to 
obligations which states owe to each other in international law. The classical 
position in international law is that only states and a limited number of non-state 
actors can be held directly accountable in international law. Corporations are not 
states and do not fit into the latter category and can therefore only be held 
accountable indirectly through the medium of the state under international law. In 
this regard, the doctrine of state responsibility becomes important in that it sets 
out, the obligations states owe to each other, the circumstances under which state 
responsibility can arise and the conditions under which the doctrine of state 
responsibility can be invoked for the conduct of private actors, such as MNCs.  
The concept of MNCs embodies different categories of corporations, with nuanced 
differences between them. The first section will give a brief outline of the different 
categories of international corporations, with a view to setting out the background 
to the discussion of the doctrine of state responsibility in the private sphere. 
International law is a rules-based system and accountability in international law is 
determined with reference to the rules of the legal system. The second section of 
this chapter seeks to discuss the contours of accountability as prescribed by the 
rules of international law. The third section will present an overview of the doctrine 
of state responsibility in international law. The discussion will encompass 
circumstances under which the doctrine of state responsibility can be invoked and 
will also discuss the obligation to make reparation. The fourth section will discuss 
the work of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility in international law (Draft Articles).1 In the fifth section the chapter 
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will discuss state responsibility in the private sphere. The discussion will also 
include some of the limitations of the doctrine of state responsibility in dealing with 
MNCs. The last section of the chapter will conclude.  
2 THE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CORPORATIONS 
The very notion of an international corporation is a complex one with nuanced 
differences. To this end, Mann2 makes a distinction between three categories of 
international corporations.  The first category consists of corporations which are 
national in character, but have international businesses. Typically, these are 
private juristic persons established by private persons to further the private profit 
interest of their shareholders.3 The operations of these private corporations will to 
a large extent depend on the business imperatives of the company. Some authors 
have referred to such entities as uninational corporations. Technically, these 
corporations are not MNCs. 4  Uninational corporations are not necessarily 
international corporations, but international businesses.5 A typical example would 
be MTN, a South African business which operates its business in twenty one 
countries in the Middle East and Africa.6 What characterises these corporations as 
being uninational is mainly ownership. Ownership of most MNCs is uninational.  
Whether as an MNC or a uninational, a corporation can operate in multiple 
jurisdictions through their subsidiaries. A point to make in this regard is that in 
terms of domestic law,7 and international law endorses the same view, a parent 
company and its subsidiary are never treated as one. 8  Regulation of these 
uninational corporations is mainly left to the municipal laws of the home state or 
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state of incorporation. A plaintiff who pursues a home state corporation would inter 
alia still need to go through the parent-subsidiary hurdle.  
The second category consists of corporations whose international character stems 
from a treaty signed by states in a joint venture. These corporations are national in 
character. Corporations of this nature are incorporated nationally, but are 
international in operation. About these corporations Mann writes that “such 
companies owe their conception, though not their birth, to treaties concluded 
between States in law and are national in character”.9  A company so incorporated 
will ordinarily assume the nationality of the state of incorporation. 
The third category consists of inter-governmental corporations which are not only 
conceived through a treaty, but are also created by one and are regulated by 
international law.10 Inter-governmental corporations are often formed to serve a 
public purpose.  These state-created corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions 
and do not have many dealings with national law. 11  As such, these inter-
governmental corporations do not have nationality as they operate outside the 
realm of national law.12 Like in the case of international organizations,13 the legal 
personality of inter-governmental companies will to a large degree be outlined in 
their constitutive documents. These are recognized by international law as they 
are established in terms of a treaty or convention.14  
In the period after the Second World War, a practice emerged among most 
nations, especially in as far as air travel was concerned, to pull resources together 
and establish one airline.15 Such airlines came to be known as “multi-flag airlines”, 
because they were flying flags of the different founding member states, as though 
they were national airlines.16 A typical example of this kind of a corporation from 
the African continent is the now defunct Air Afrique, which was an initiative of over 
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ten West African States. 17  Air Afrique had its headquarters in Abidjan, Ivory 
Coast. 18  This kind of a corporation should however not be confused with a 
situation where heads of state enter into a treaty of co-operation and later a 
corporation is formed pursuant to the treaty by one of the signatories to the treaty 
in question.   
The nuanced differences complicate the MNC phenomenon even further. Complex 
as the phenomenon may be, there are still some characteristics which may clarify 
the nature of an MNC. In this regard, the OECD Guidelines, opted not to define 
what MNCs are but went on to say that:  
These enterprises operate in all sectors of the economy. They 
usually comprise companies or other entities established in more 
than one country and so linked that they may coordinate their 
operations in various ways. While one or more of these entities 
may be able to exercise a significant influence over the activities of 
others, their degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary 
widely from one multinational enterprise to another. Ownership 
may be private, State or mixed.19 
The description above presents both prospects and challenges to the state-centric 
model of accountability. It is through the state of incorporation that a corporation 
gets its identity in international law and such an identity is established through a 
nexus that exists between the state of incorporation and the corporation. The fact 
that MNCs are established in more than one country becomes problematic in that 
the nationality of the corporation will not be easy to establish. This is so because, 
often, an MNC is a product of a conglomeration of corporations of different 
                                                          
17  Onishi N “Troubles tarnish a once-shining African airline” 2001-06-20 New York Times 
available at: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140621132549/http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/20/world/troub
les-tarnish-a-once-shining-african-airline.html?pagewanted=all (accessed on 12 November 
2014).  
18  The airline was established in terms of Article 1 of the Treaty on Air Transport in Africa: 
Establishment of Air Afrique (Yaoundé 1961) Cir 98-AT /19. 
19  The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Para 4. Available at 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/2011Concepts&Principles.pdf (accessed on 28 December 
2015). 
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nationalities joined together for a strategic business purpose.20 In this regard, the 
very creation of an MNC creates a misalignment between municipal law and 
international law. The misalignment emanates from the fact that international law 
has very little dealings with how municipal law regulates the incorporation of 
business entities, and when these corporations do conglomerate to form an MNC, 
international law has “no comfortable, tidy receptacle for such an institution”.21 In 
light of this misalignment, even the definition of MNCs that scholars propose is not 
an international law one, but an economic one.22 Deva, for instance, defines an 
MNC as “an economic entity, in whatever legal form, that owns, controls, or 
manages operations, either alone or in conjunction with other entities, in two or 
more countries”.23  
What is clear from Deva’s definition is that corporations are somehow linked. The 
link however is not a legal one, but an economic one. No matter how scattered the 
entities may be, in terms of economics, the fact that there is a common or central 
control is what holds the different units together. 24  This is where another 
misalignment with international law emerges. Through the nationality principle, 
international law sees an MNC as made up of components, as opposed to a 
centrally controlled unified entity.25 It will become evident in this chapter that the 
element of control becomes important with regard to the doctrine of state 
responsibility, particularly where the state is involved.  
Though there are different nuances in the forms of corporations discussed above, 
what is a common factor in all of them is the involvement of the state at the 
different stages of the operation of the different corporations. The home state is 
involved at the level of incorporation and the host state when receiving such a 
corporation in the form of foreign direct investment within its territory. The state of 
incorporation sets the minimum requirement that a corporation has to meet so as 
                                                          
20  See Vagts 1970 Harvard Law Review 740. Also see Legwaila T “The nature of a headquarter 
company: A comparative analysis” 2013 (46) De Jure 801. 
21  Vagts 1970 Harvard Law Review 740. 
22  Muchlinski Multinational Enterprises and the Law  5.  
23  Deva S “Human rights violations by multinational corporations and international law: Where 
from here?” 2003 (19) Connecticut Journal of International Law 6; Muchlinski Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law 5. 
24  Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 6; Hansen RF “The international legal 
personality of multinational enterprises: Treaty, custom and the governance gap” 2010 (10) 
Global Jurist 8-9.  
25  See Hansen 2010 Global Jurist 83. 
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to be conferred with domestic legal personality - as a result a nexus is created 
between the state of incorporation and the corporation. A corporation so 
incorporated is viewed by international law as a national of the state of 
incorporation.  
Sometimes the home state is the one that champions the business ventures 
beyond its own territorial borders by negotiating and facilitating business deals for 
their home corporations.26 Often when heads of state go on a diplomatic visit to 
foreign countries, they are accompanied by a whole host of captains of industry 
who seek opportunities to extend their businesses.27 It is no exaggeration to say 
that often the underlying expectation is that better diplomatic relations will yield 
better economic prospects.28 As discussed in chapter two of this study,29 even as 
MNCs expand their trade to other countries, they still go through pre-entry 
negotiations with the host state. In the absence of political and economic 
considerations, the pre-entry negotiations become crucial in setting the 
parameters of the operations of an MNC. Whether in the home state or host 
states, the regulatory environment of corporations is determined by states and this 
is by no means an insignificant role in both domestic and international law.  
Notwithstanding this pivotal regulatory role played by states, the involvement of 
states in the affairs of corporations has its own limits. Economic globalisation 
thrives where there is little state involvement in the affairs of the economy. In 
addition, in the era of globalisation states have outsourced, privatised and 
contracted out some of the services that ordinarily fall within their scope of 
competence, to private actors. Services which were traditionally of a public nature 
such as health, education and the running of prisons, have now become 
                                                          
26  McCorquodale R and Simons P “Responsibility beyond borders: State responsibility for 
extraterritorial violations by corporations of international human rights law” 2007 (70) Modern 
Law Review 598 - 601. 
27  For an illustration of this point see Hayes S “The importance of president Obama's Africa trip” 
U.S. News and World Report (2013-06-24) available at: 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/06/24/obama-visits-africa (accessed 
on 14 November 2014) and also “China, South Africa upgrade relations to ‘comprehensive 
strategic partnership’" available at http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/xwdt/t726883.htm 
(accessed on 14 November 2014).  
28  See “Good diplomatic relations should yield good economic benefits: Zuma” available at: 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/949d0880475071d0a516a5da2831d264/Good-diplomatic-
relations-should-translate-into-economic-spin-off:-Zuma-20151502 (accessed on 16 
February 2015). 
29  See the discussion in Chapter 2 of this study. 
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privatised.30 This begs the question: where does this leave the doctrine of state 
responsibility when a state privatises some of its functions? Commentators are of 
one voice in arguing that such a state would still have certain obligations arising 
from the services rendered by the privatized corporation.31 In his 2011 report, 
Ruggie has emphatically stated that the fact that a state has privatised its services 
does not necessarily mean that it is absolved from its international human rights 
obligations.32  Equally, the fact that a state is held responsible for a particular 
violation committed by a private actor, does not exonerate the private entity 
concerned.33  
However, not all acts of state officials and private actors give rise to state 
responsibility. There are instances when state officials act in their private capacity 
and such acts cannot be attributed to a state. Lawson illustrates this through an 
example of a police official who goes home with his state issued weapon and finds 
his wife with a lover. If in a fit of rage the official kills the lover in a private act, such 
an act would not be considered an act of the state.34 This, however, is not the 
same as saying that such an act would not be punishable in law. State 
responsibility in this example, would arise where a state fails to exercise due 
diligence to ensure that private actors do not commit human rights violations.35 
The rationale for not attributing every conduct to the state is that citizens must be 
at liberty to execute their daily activities without the state interfering in their 
affairs. 36  For state responsibility to arise, certain conditions, which will be 
discussed below, must first prevail. 
                                                          
30  McCorquodale R and Simons 2007 Modern Law Review 607; McBeth A “Privatising human 
rights: What happens to the state’s human rights duties when services are privatised?” 2004 
(5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 133–142. 
31  See McBeth 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 133-154. 
32  See Human Rights Council, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations ‘Respect, Protect and Remedy’ Framework” A/HRC/17/31 
(21 March 2011) para 5 (Commentary to the Guiding Principles). 
33  McBeth 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 142. 
34   Lawson R “Out of Control. State Responsibility and Human Rights: Will the ILC’s Definition 
of the ‘Act of State’ meet the Challenges of the 21st Century?” in Castermans-Holleman M, 
Van Hoof  F and Smith J (eds) The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century Human 
Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr  
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 1998) 95-96. 
35  Chirwa DM “The doctrine of state responsibility as a potential means of holding private 
actors accountable for human rights” 2004 (5) Melbourne Journal of International Law 17. 
The concept of due diligence will be discussed below. 
36  Wolfrum R “State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of Renewed Relevance” 
in Ragazzi M (ed) International Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter 
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In a similar manner, the conduct of private corporations will generally not give rise 
to state responsibility. Even where the entity is state owned or the state is a major 
shareholder, this fact alone will not give rise to state responsibility.37 As will be 
discussed below, certain conditions must first prevail before state responsibility 
can arise. Once again, this does not at all mean that the state is absolved from its 
obligations. The mere fact that a state nationalises or privatises its own services 
would not necessarily have any impact on its obligations. Where services are 
privatised, a state may not interfere in the delivery of such services, but the same 
state may not abdicate its oversight responsibility to monitor and ensure that such 
services are rolled out to all those in need in accordance with set standards.38 
Admittedly, a state that is directly responsible for providing services would not 
have the same obligations as the one that has outsourced such services. 
Inevitably, the character of the obligations would vary.39  
Whether the services are privatized or nationalised, the state remains the locus of 
responsibility in international human rights law. As Ratner and Tadaki assert, 
international human rights law depends on domestic law implementation for its 
provisions, “not only with respect to a state’s own actual or potential violations of 
individual rights (vertical application), but also, importantly, with respect to actions 
between private actors (horizontal application)”.40 In this regard, the law of state 
responsibility becomes of utmost importance. If anything, the law of state 
responsibility bridges the gap between the home state of incorporation and the 
host state, where MNCs ply their trade, in that the obligations, though varied in 
content and character, are imposed on both categories of states. As discussed 
above, the doctrine of state responsibility unfolds within an environment regulated 
by rules. It is these rules that determine the contours of the doctrine. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2005) 425. 
37  McCorquodale and Simons 2007 Modern Law Review 606. 
38  McBeth 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 138. 
39  McBeth 2004 Melbourne Journal of International Law 153. 
40  Kinley D and Tadaki J “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities for 
corporations at international law” 2004 (44) Virginia Journal of International Law 937. 
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3 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A RULES-BASED SYSTEM 
The very science of international law is founded on rules.41 The conception of law 
as a body of rules lies at the heart of positivism. Since these rules emanate from 
states, a positivistic conception of international law views states as the foundation 
of the whole legal system. It is states that create the rules of the legal system.42 In 
turn, the rules bind mainly states - and this is the basis for the classical view of 
international law. The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) has in this 
regard stated that: 
International law governs relations between independent States. 
The rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their 
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally 
accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order 
to regulate the relations between those co-existing independent 
communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.43 
 
Initially, the rules were meant to deal with the question of self-help in general.44 Up 
until the turn of the twentieth century, it was permissible for states to use force to 
compel another state to pay debts owed to its national.45 The move away from 
self-help, as Sohn points out, distilled itself into two main rules.46 The first one was 
that the state became responsible for what happened within its territory and for its 
citizen’s conduct on the high seas. The second one was that the foreigner’s home 
state was entitled to reparations for any injury to its citizens. In light of these two 
                                                          
41   For a general discussion see Sohn LB ‘“Generally accepted’ international rules” 1986 (61) 
Washington Law Review 1073-1080; Vázquez CM “Direct vs indirect obligations for 
corporations under international law” 2005 (43) Columbia Journal of International Law 932- 
947. 
42  See Anghie A “Finding the peripheries: Sovereignty and colonialism in nineteenth century 
international law” 1999 (40) Harvard International Law Journal 13 and Humphrey JP “On the 
foundations of International law” 1945 (39) American Journal of International Law 233. 
43  Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series. A no. 10 at 18 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Lotus case).  
44  Sohn LB “The new international law: Protection of the rights of individuals rather than states” 
1982 (32) American University Law Review 2.  
45  Sucharitkul S “State responsibility and international law liability under international law” 1996 
(18) Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review  824. 
46  Sohn 1982 American University Law Review 2. 
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rules, an offending state had an obligation to make reparation for injuries suffered 
by nationals of other states.47  
It is against the backdrop of these rules that the doctrine of state responsibility 
emerged as a tool for dealing with violations of international law.48 As an entity, a 
state can only act through its officials or nationals.49 However, as was already 
mentioned, not every act of state officials will give rise to the doctrine of state 
responsibility. For the doctrine of state responsibility to arise, the conduct must 
satisfy one of the requirements outlined in the Draft Articles.50    
The doctrine of state responsibility arises only within a very limited scope as 
prescribed by the rules of international law. Generally, the rules of international law 
are of two kinds. International law scholars make a distinction between primary 
rules of international law and secondary ones.51 These rules are state-centric in 
that the primary rules of international law are addressed to states, and under 
secondary rules, only states can incur responsibility for breaching the rules of 
international law.52  The primary rules encompasses customary or treaty-based 
rules, which lay down obligations for states, while secondary rules establish when 
a breach of primary rules by a state may have occurred and further establish the 
consequences that arise from such a breach.53 On the distinction between the two 
sets of rules, Dugard writes that substantive rules require states to act in a 
particular way, or abstain from certain actions in their relations with each other, or 
encompass rules relating to how they should treat nationals of other states.54 The 
distinction between the two sets of rules was to be helpful to the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in its work on state responsibility. In the Commentary to the 
Draft Articles, Crawford writes, that 
 [t]he distinction between primary and secondary rules of 
responsibility, was indispensable. Without such a distinction, there 
                                                          
47  Sucharitkul 1996 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 823. 
48   Sucharitkul 1996 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 823. 
49  Wolfrum State Responsibility for Private Actors 424; Lawson Out of Control 94. 
50  The Draft Articles will be discussed in section 4.2 below. 
51  Linderfalk U “State responsibility and primary-secondary rules terminology: The role of 
language for an understanding of the international legal system” (2008) 78 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 53-72. 
52  Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of International Law 932-933. 
53  Linderfalk 2009 Nordic Journal of International Law 55; Lawson Out of Control 97. 
54  Dugard International Law: A South Africa perspective 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 2011) 270. 
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was a constant danger of trying to do too much, in effect, of telling 
states what kinds of obligations they can have. However difficult it 
may be to draw in particular cases, the distinction allowed the 
framework of State law responsibility to be set out without going 
into the content of these obligations.55  
Despite this being the case, it should be noted that it is not always easy to make a 
clear distinction, as the two sets of rules do overlap in practice.56 Notwithstanding 
this overlap, it is commonly accepted by scholars that the doctrine of state 
responsibility forms part of the secondary rules of international law.57  
Further, the rules of international law can either be regulative or constitutive in 
nature.58 The distinction between the two lies in the fact that a regulative rule 
identifies conduct or a state of affairs that is proscribed or permitted. The 
constitutive rule, on the other hand, confers legal qualities on acts, persons and a 
state of affairs. Constitutive rules do this by, among others, delimiting respective 
territories of two neighbouring states and specifying the extension of a treaty 
term.59 The interplay between the different categories of rules plays a pivotal role 
vis-a-vis the doctrine of state responsibility in international law. If there is no 
breach of the primary rules of international law, then the doctrine of state 
responsibility cannot be invoked.60 Non-invocation of state responsibility means 
that there will be no legal accountability in international law.  
Legal accountability in international law is determined with reference to the rules of 
the legal system. In light of the private-public divide in international law, the 
classical view holds that the public sphere is the domain for states, while the 
private sphere is mainly the terrain for non-state actors.61 Corporations operate 
                                                          
55  Crawford J The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: 
Introductions, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2002) 15. 
56  Quirico O “Ius Cogens: A Puzzle” in Szabó M (ed) State Responsibility and the Law of 
Treaties (Eleven International Publishing The Hague 2010) 101. 
57  Linderfalk 2009 Nordic Journal of International Law 54. 
58  Linderfalk 2009 Nordic Journal of International Law 59. 
59  For further examples see Linderfalk 2009 Nordic Journal of International Law 59-60. 
60  See Brunnée J “International legal accountability through the lens of the law of state 
responsibility” 2005 (36) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 25-26. 
61  For a critique of this dualism see Chinkin C “A critique of the public/private dimension” 1999 
(10) European Journal of International Law 387–395, Charlesworth H “Worlds Apart: 
Public/Private Distinctions in International Law” in Thornton M (ed) Public and Private: 
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mainly in the private sphere. Whether the rules of international law extend to 
corporations as well, is a subject of great debate among scholars.62 International 
law has evolved to an extent that both states and non-state actors do enjoy rights 
under international law, but according to the classical view, it is only states that 
have obligations under the legal system.63 A determination of what obligations 
states owe to each other is done with reference to the rules of international law. 
Classically, legal accountability in international law is mainly about how states 
account to each other in terms of positive international law rules. 64  A vexing 
question, according to Ratner, is what types of human rights abuses by private 
actors do states have a duty to prevent and remedy then?65  
Regional human rights bodies have had an opportunity to adjudicate on the state’s 
obligation to protect human rights in the private sphere. These, according to 
Clapham, have required the state to set in place policies to prevent and punish 
private violence; to ensure adequate protection from forced labour in the context of 
trafficked domestic help; to ensure that press freedom does not disproportionately 
infringe on respect for private life; to regulate entities that pollute and infringe on 
rights to enjoy ones home and family life; to prevent employers from engaging in 
anti-union practices; and to ensure that concessions given to corporations do not 
undermine the enjoyment of the right to food, housing, and safe environment.66 
What this list highlights, is that regional human rights bodies have cast wide the 
net of positive obligations to protect human rights in the private sphere. Such 
positive obligations emanate from the doctrine of state responsibility to which the 
discussion now turns. 
  
                                                          
62   Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 943. For more on this debate see 
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63  Vázquez 2005 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 932 - 933. 
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4 STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1 An overview of the doctrine 
The law of state responsibility is a fundamental principle of international law.67 In 
essence, the law of state responsibility is to international law what the law of delict 
is to municipal law.68 The fundamental basis for the law of state responsibility is 
that states owe each other certain obligations. A corollary to this principle is that a 
breach of an obligation involves an obligation to make reparation. The PCIJ has in 
this regard stated that  
it is a principle of international law, and even general conception of 
law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to 
make reparation in an adequate form.69  
State obligations may either be treaty based or may flow from the general 
obligations owed towards all states.70 Typically, the treaty-based obligations would 
flow from the rules relating to consent. From a positivistic point of view, state 
consent constitutes the very foundation of international law. The rationale behind 
consent is that states are only bound by those agreements and decisions to which 
they have freely consented. In this regard, the act of signing or consenting to 
treaties would constitute one of the typical forms of the expression of the free will of 
the state. Despite a claim that international law norms are equal in status, in effect 
a hierarchy of these norms has emerged from practice.71 Both jus cogens and 
obligations erga omnes have courted controversy in international law.72 The former 
are peremptory norms from which no state can derogate. The latter are obligations 
which a state owes to the international community as a whole, and the 
enforcement of which the international community has an interest in.  
                                                          
67  Shaw MN International Law 7th ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014) 566. 
68  Dugard International Law 269.  
69  Chorzów Factory (Claim for Indemnity) (1928) PCIJ, Series A, no 13 at 21. 
70  Dugard International Law 269. 
71  Durgard International Law 24 - 25. 
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Jus cogens consist of peremptory norms such as prohibitions against slavery, 
genocide, racial discrimination, torture and the denial of self-determination.73 What 
is apparent from this list is that the content of jus cogens is made up of human 
rights issues.74 Obligations erga omnes, on the other hand, are obligations which a 
state owes to the international community as a whole, and the enforcement of 
which the international community has an interest in.75 If obligations erga omnes 
are of interest to the international community as a whole, it follows that if violated, 
these obligations would give rise to a general right of standing to the international 
community as a whole.76 A treaty becomes void if at the time of its conclusion it is 
in conflict with a peremptory norm of international law.77    
As mentioned above, theoretically, a conception of international law as consisting 
of a set of rules is deeply rooted in positivism. A positivistic conception of 
international law places a premium on state consent in that states are only bound 
by rules to which they have consented. The positivistic conception has been a 
dominant view in international law over the centuries. The concept of jus cogens 
constitutes a deviation from the dominant view in that it is rooted in the natural law 
conception of international law.78 Natural law or law of nature was conceived and 
developed by the Greeks and later by the Romans. Classical international law 
writers such as Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) a Dominican priest, Francisco 
Suarez, a Jesuit priest (1548-1617) and Hugo Grotius, a Dutch humanist (1583-
1645), relied on the natural law theory to argue for the universal appeal of 
international law.79 The central tenet of natural law is that there are certain laws 
whose content is from nature and as such should have a universal appeal. The 
underlying assumption is that such universal appeal should prevail regardless of 
whether states have consented to it, or not.  
                                                          
73  See Dugard  International Law 38 -39; Barcelona Traction case at 33. 
74  See Bianchi A “Human rights and the magic of jus cogens” 2008 (19) European Journal of 
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The use of the concept of jus cogens went into a hiatus and was only revived by 
the International Law Commission in its work on the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.80 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention81 states that:  
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the 
international community as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.  
In the event that a new peremptory norm of international law emerges, the Vienna 
Convention states that “any treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void 
and terminates”.82 The codification of Article 53 has been interpreted by some 
scholars as representing the “positivisation” of natural law. 83  Despite its long 
association with natural law and its codification in the Vienna Convention, the 
concept of jus cogens continued to receive attention mainly from scholars and very 
little mention in the courts. It was only in 2006 that the concept received judicial 
recognition from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).84 
With regard to obligations erga omnes, the ICJ has stated that: 
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign 
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to 
them the protection of the law and assumes obligations concerning the 
treatment to be afforded to them. In particular, an essential distinction 
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the 
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another 
State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former 
                                                          
80  Dugard Recognition and the United Nations 138. 
81  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (the Vienna Convention). Available 
at:  http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (accessed 
on 11 June 2011). 
82  Article 64 of the Vienna Convention. 
83  Bianchi 2008 European Journal of International Law 492. 
84  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Rwanda), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 2006 ICJ Reports 4 at 29 – 30, 50 - 51.  
117 
 
are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights 
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.85 
According to Orakhelashvili, the rationale for peremptory norms of international 
law is to ensure that the interests of the international community as a whole prevail 
over the conflicting interests of individual states and groups of states.86  
The use of the expression “international community” is a settled one in 
international law.87 This being the case, many scholars do not explain what they 
mean by international community and yet, when analysed closely, this concept 
may need further clarity or contextualisation.88 As Greig points out, the community 
referred to can solely be that of states, or a broader community, including 
international governmental and non-governmental organisations. 89  There is a 
sense that scholars and international tribunals use the concept with reference to a 
community which is solely made up of states.90 It can also be argued though, that 
within the realm of human rights, the concept cannot just be limited to states to the 
exclusion of non-state actors. To exclude non-state actors will not only be 
anachronistic, but will be out of sync with the latest developments internationally.91 
McCorquodale is of the view that the use of the concept should extend beyond 
states, mainly because how states treat their nationals within their territories is no 
longer a matter that concerns states alone, but also the broader international 
community, including individuals. 92  In this regard Deva uses the concept to 
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attention of the entire international community, of which Iran itself has been a member since 
time immemorial, to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind now 
before the Court”. Unless stated otherwise, reference to this concept in this thesis will 
include both states and non-state actors. 
91  Crawford J “Responsibility to the international community as a whole” 2001 (8) Indiana 
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participants” 2008 (8) International Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional 118.  
118 
 
encompass international institutions, nation-states, MNCs, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the media, consumers and the academia.93 In a similar 
manner this study will adopt an inclusive approach. 
Under international human rights law state obligations generate four levels of 
duties, that is, the duty to respect, to protect to promote and to fulfil human 
rights.94 These obligations are not confined to the geographical territorial limits of a 
state, but extend beyond its boundaries. 95  As long as jurisdiction can be 
established, the obligation will arise. The jurisprudence that has emerged on these 
obligations points to the fact that jurisdiction can only be established for acts 
outside the state’s territory, with reference to the principle of effective control.96 In 
this regard McCorquodale and Simon note that  
a state can be found to be in violation of its obligations under 
international human rights treaties for actions taken 
extraterritorially, in relation to anyone within the power, effective 
control or authority of that state, as well as within an area over 
which that state exercises effective control.97  
In the event that there has been a breach of an international law obligation either 
through an act or omission and such a breach can be attributed to a state, then the 
doctrine of state responsibility can be invoked. 98  The doctrine of state 
                                                          
93  Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1 footnote 3. 
94  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 
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96  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA), Merits, 
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98  De Aréchaga EJ and Tanzi A “International State Responsibility” in Bedjaoui M (ed) 
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responsibility employs a language akin to that used in the law of obligations in that 
once there is a breach, the matter is narrowed down to the affected parties only. In 
the case of the doctrine of state responsibility, it becomes a matter between the 
state to which an act or omission can be attributed, and the state which has been 
wronged by the breach.99 This was the view adopted by the PCIJ in the Phosphate 
case where it was stated that when a state commits an internationally wrongful act 
against another state, international responsibility is established between the two 
states.100 The doctrine of state responsibility was later codified following the work 
of the International Law Commission (ILC). 
4.2 Towards the codification of international law on state responsibility 
The General Assembly of the United Nations is empowered to initiate studies and 
make recommendations to, among others, encourage the progressive 
development of international law and its codification.101 Pursuant to this mandate, 
the General Assembly established the ILC. The subject of state responsibility has 
been on the agenda of the ILC for a greater part since the inception of the 
Commission.102 Having commenced its work in 1956, the ILC only managed to 
complete its first reading of an entire set of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility in 1996. It was only in 2001 that the ILC adopted the complete Draft 
Articles on second reading.103 The 59 Draft Articles are presented in four parts, 
dealing with (1) the internationally wrongful act of a state; (2) the content of the 
international responsibility of a state; (3) the implementation of the international 
responsibility of a state; and (4) general provisions. With an exception of few 
additions, particularly with regard to state responsibility for the violation of 
peremptory norms, the Draft Articles, as Dugard asserts, represent a codification 
of rules of international law on state responsibility.104 Conversely, Scobbie is of the 
view that the Draft Articles do contain some provisions which amount to the 
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progressive development of international law that goes beyond the codification of 
existing custom.105 Judicially, the Draft Articles have been cited with approval by 
international tribunals.106 Three concerns regarding the Draft Articles are worth 
noting though. The first one is that the Draft Articles have adopted a state-centric 
approach to international law. This, in an era where non-state actors, such as 
MNCs, have increased in both number and stature, has a potential to create 
challenges. Secondly, the Draft Articles have not been adopted as a treaty and are 
therefore not binding.107 Thirdly, the Draft Articles took too long to be put together 
to an extent that it can be argued that they became outdated even before they 
were adopted. This is so because over the period that the ILC has been busy with 
the Draft Articles, the international legal system has evolved to include other 
actors. Weiss, for instance, points out that while the ILC’s exclusive concern with 
states may have been appropriate at the beginning of its work, it does not reflect 
the international system of the twenty-first century.108  
Article 1 of the Draft Articles on state responsibility provides that “every 
internationally wrongful act of a state entails the international responsibility of that 
state”. This provision has been interpreted to be a statement of the basic principle 
that a breach of international law by a state entails its international 
responsibility. 109  It was pointed out above that the law of state responsibility 
resembles that of delict in municipal law. In municipal law, the law of delict clearly 
spells out the various elements of wrongfulness. In a similar mode, the Draft 
Articles set out elements of an internationally wrongful act. A state can only incur 
international responsibility for its own wrongful acts or those committed by non-
state actors under certain specified circumstances. 
Article 2 states that:  
 There is an internationally wrongful act of a state when conduct 
consisting of an action or omission: 
 (a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
                                                          
105  Scobbie I “The invocation of responsibility for the breach of ‘obligations under peremptory 
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106  Dugard International Law 272. 
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Journal of International Law 799. 
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 (b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
 
The two central components of an internationally wrongful act are that (1) there 
must be a wrongful act of a state which constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation and (2) such an act must be attributable to the state under international 
law. In the US Diplomatic and Consular Staff case, the ICJ adopted the same view 
that in order to establish the responsibility of Iran, it must first determine the 
degree to which the acts complained of could be regarded as imputable to the 
Iranian State. Secondly, there must be a determination of whether such acts were 
compatible or incompatible with the obligations of Iran under international law.110 
Put differently, the breach complained of must be a breach of an international 
obligation and that breach must be attributable to the state in international law. 
The emphasis on international law is not incidental because the question of 
conformity of national legislation with international law is generally a matter of 
international law.111 Of course there are exceptions to this as it is the case in 
South Africa, where the Constitution provides that “Customary international law is 
law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament”.112 Notwithstanding the exceptions, the general approach is that where 
there is a conflict between national legislation and international law in determining 
whether there is a breach of an international obligation or not, international law 
would prevail. In this regard, Section 233 of the South African Constitution states 
that, “when interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable 
interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any 
alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law”.113  
As to which conduct can be attributable to a state, Article 4 states that:  
1. The conduct of any state organ shall be considered an act 
of that State under international law, whether the organ 
exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, 
whatever position it holds in the organization of the state, and 
                                                          
110  United States Diplomatic case at 3.  
111  Norwegian Loans (France v Norway) 1957 ICJ Reports 9 at 37. 
112  Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
113  Section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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whatever its character as an organ of the central government 
or of a territorial unit of the state. 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status 
in accordance with the internal law of the state. 
MNCs are not organs of state and therefore do not fit into this category. In his final 
report, Ruggie has referred to business as “specialized organs of society”.114 To 
accommodate entities like MNCs, the Draft Articles have made provision for 
actions of entities or persons whose conduct do not fall within the ambit of the 
provisions of Article 4. Article 5 provides that: 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of state under 
Article 4 which is empowered by the law of that state to exercise elements 
of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under 
international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in 
the particular instance.115   
Article 5 can be interpreted to encompass entities such as para-statals which are 
not organs of state, but are empowered by law to exercise governmental 
authority.116 If an MNC happens to exercise governmental authority, its conduct 
can give rise to state responsibility under this provision, provided that it is 
“empowered” to exercise elements of governmental authority. In this regard, 
Article 8 becomes important as it provides that:  
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered 
an act of a state under international law if the person or group of 
persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct.117  
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The Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Prosecutor v Tadic case has pronounced that 
in order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a 
State, it must be proved that the State wields overall control over 
the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but also 
by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military 
activity. Only then can the State be held internationally 
accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not 
necessary that, in addition, the State should also issue, either to 
the head or to members of the group, instructions for the 
commission of specific acts contrary to international law.118 
According to Chirwa, this means that private actions of security companies 
contracted to provide security to prisons as well as private airlines exercising 
delegated power relating to immigration control, can give rise to state 
responsibility.119 The rationale seems to be simply this: that as long as it can be 
established that the corporation was acting on “the instructions of, or under the 
direction of or control of the state”, state responsibility would arise.  As Cassese 
points out, the three tests for “acting on the instructions,” “under the direct control 
of”, or “under the control of”, are not cumulative, but are disjunctive.120 It seems 
that the question of the degree of control a state should have for state 
responsibility to arise is not settled as yet.121 As a result it is not clear whether the 
state should have an “effective control” or whether the “overall control” of the state 
over the entity would suffice. The ICJ seems to favour the “effective control” test 
as opposed to the “overall control” test.122  
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In the context of South Africa, state owned entities are easy to identify. 123 As 
discussed earlier, the fact that a state has shares in a corporation may in certain 
instances not necessarily give rise to state responsibility. The Appeals Chamber of 
the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Prosecutor v Tadic case has 
indicated that the degree of control may vary according to the factual 
circumstances of each case.124  
 
The Draft Articles also address a situation of persons who, though not empowered 
to exercise government authority, find themselves exercising it all the same. The 
conduct of such a person may also be considered an act of state, if that person is 
in fact exercising government authority in the absence of the official 
authorisation.125 Another category of persons or organs considered is one where 
persons or organs of state empowered to exercise governmental authority and 
such persons or organs of state act in that capacity and exceed authority or act in 
contravention of the instructions given. Such conduct will be considered to be that 
of the state in international law.126  The latter provision, according to Dugard, 
means that state responsibility extends to ultra vires acts committed by officials.127 
Conversely, some scholars argue that a state cannot be held responsible for acts 
and omissions committed by individuals who have the status of organs of state, 
but are acting in their private capacity.128 The example above of a police man who 
kills his lover would fall in this category. The test they argue is whether the agent, 
even though acting ultra vires appears to be acting in the course of exercising his 
official duties or holding himself out as having such authority. The significance of 
the distinction lies in the fact that it determines whether the state should be held 
directly or indirectly responsible for such conduct.129  
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Another category that the Draft Articles have contemplated relates to conduct 
which is not an act of state as provided for by Article 4 or is not empowered by the 
law of the state as required by Article 5. Such conduct may still be considered an 
act of state under international law “if and to the extent that the State 
acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own”.130 A state can also 
breach an international obligation when an act of that state is not in conformity with 
what is required of it by its own international obligation, regardless of its origin or 
character.131  
 
It is evident that the Draft Articles provide for a narrow and limited scope within 
which state responsibility may arise particularly in relation to the activities of 
MNCs. Generally, activities of MNCs do not fall within the ambit of the Draft 
Articles and will therefore not give rise to state responsibility. Further, state 
responsibility does not automatically arise each time there is a breach. It has to be 
invoked in accordance with the rules of international law.  
 
4.3 Invocation of state responsibility 
If the doctrine of state responsibility is limited in scope (in that it is rules- based), 
even more limited are the provisions that deal with invocation. Generally, legal 
processes only take effect when initiated by the aggrieved party or complainant. 
The same applies to international law processes in relation to the doctrine of state 
responsibility. In this regard the concept of invocation becomes important. Scobbie 
laments the fact that despite invocation being such an important concept, the Draft 
Articles do not define what the concept means.132 In the commentary on the Draft 
Articles Crawford states that  
invocation should be understood as taking measures of a relatively 
formal character, for example, the raising or presentation of a 
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claim against another State or the commencement of proceedings 
before an international court or tribunal.133  
Invocation serves as the key that unlocks international law processes and 
remedies. Just as state responsibility arises based on a nexus between the breach 
and the state, invocation also follows the same pattern in that there is a need to 
establish the nexus between the injured state and the breach.  In this regard 
Article 42 provides that: A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the 
responsibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed: 
(a)  to that State individually;  
(b) a group of States including that State, or the international 
community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation; 
(i) specifically affects that State; or 
(ii) is of such a character as radically to change the 
position of all the other States to which the obligation 
is owed with respect to the further performance of the 
obligation. 
In terms of Article 48, a state, other than the injured one, may invoke state 
responsibility for the breach of an international obligation if 
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of states including 
that State, and (b) is established for the protection of a collective 
interest of the group; or the obligation breached is owed to the 
international community as a whole.  
Article 42(a) may be directed to obligations that may have arisen out of bilateral 
treaties whereby an individual state would have obligations to a particular state.134 
In this case it would make sense that only the injured party would be empowered 
to invoke state responsibility as obligations may have been specific to its needs. 
Article 48, however, also seems to be directed towards multilateral treaties and 
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obligation arising from obligations erga omnes. This is so because in multilateral 
treaties a state has obligations that it owes to a specific group of states, whereas 
with regard to obligations erga omnes states have obligations that they owe to the 
international community as a whole. The Draft Articles deal with serious breaches 
of peremptory norms of general international law in a separate chapter.135 In terms 
of Article 41, states are “to cooperate to bring an end through lawful means” to any 
serious breach of a peremptory norm of general international law.136 
The Draft Articles have also contemplated situations under which a claim premised 
on a breach of state responsibility may not be invoked. Under Article 44, state 
responsibility may not be invoked if (1) the claim is not brought in accordance with 
any applicable rule relating to the nationality claims and (2) the claim is one to 
which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any effective local 
remedy has not been exhausted. In terms of Article 45, the responsibility of a state 
may not be invoked if the injured state has validly waived the claim and (2) the 
injured state is considered as having, by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced 
in the lapse of the claim. While time is of the essence, there is no authority to give 
an indication of how soon a claim should be lodged. The matter is solely left to the 
discretion of the Court to determine.137  
A state entitled to invoke state responsibility may request the performance of 
reparation from the state in breach.138 Reparation may take the form of restitution, 
compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination.139 The view of the 
PCIJ is that such reparation, must  
so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act 
and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have 
existed if the act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if 
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this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value 
which restitution in kind would bear.140  
Given the state-centric nature of the Draft Articles, it is axiomatic that the 
obligations contemplated in the Draft Articles are those of states, and the same 
can be said of the breaches and remedies. The Draft Articles make a very scant 
mention of non-state actors. Where non-state actors are mentioned, however, 
such reference is not made in a way that empowers them to have a meaningful 
role within the state-centric system. A typical example is in Article 33 that deals 
with the scope of international obligations.141 Part two of this provision states that 
“this part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international 
responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other 
than a State”.142 According to Crawford paragraph 2 of Article 33 should not be 
read to be empowering persons and entities other than states, to invoke state 
responsibility.143 In his view, the Article merely recognizes the possibility that state 
responsibility may be invoked by them.144  Commenting on Article 33(2), Weiss 
points out that the Article recognizes that the primary rules of international law may 
provide rights for non-state entities.145 For both Crawford and Weiss, this provision 
provides a window of opportunity in that it opens up the possibility for non-state 
actors to invoke state responsibility. An unresolved issue with the views of the two 
scholars though is that they too are not clear as to when the possibility for non-
state actors to invoke state responsibility will arise and under what circumstances. 
A perennial challenge to the international legal system relates to how it responds 
to human rights violations emerging from the private sphere, which is also one of 
the aspects that this study seeks to address. It is trite that international law is 
bifurcated into objects and subjects of the legal system. Within this division, 
international law imposes direct obligations on its subjects, meaning those entities 
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with international legal personality. Objects of the legal system only have 
obligations indirectly through the state. The nature of human rights obligations is 
itself bifurcated. Conceptually a distinction is made between negative obligations 
and positive obligations. As Jӓgers146 observes, the action required of a holder of 
negative obligations is that they must refrain from causing harm or infringing on 
the rights of others. Conversely, positive obligations require the holder of an 
obligation to take an action so as to realize a particular right. Argued to the logical 
conclusion, the answer is predictable as to whether MNCs have positive 
obligations under international law. As Alston points out, the system is designed 
and structured in such a way that an answer is given before the question is even 
asked.147 If the logic above is to be followed, it becomes clear that conventionally 
MNCs operate in the private sphere, and are not subjects of international law and 
therefore do not have direct obligations under international law. 
In light of the distinction between the two systems, the question posed by Jӓgers 
becomes relevant. Her enquiry in relation to the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility is whether the rules developed by the ILC equally apply to 
international human rights law.148 To find an answer she turns to Article 55149 
which deals with lex specialis and asks whether international human rights law 
should be considered lex specialis?150 She concludes that practice has shown that 
international bodies do apply the principles of state responsibility when dealing 
with human rights issues. Her conclusion is further motivated by the fact that some 
authors have equally expressed the view that the “general rules of state 
responsibility are equally applicable within the framework of human rights”. 151 
These general rules have put an emphasis on state obligations, even in the private 
sphere. It is on this basis there is an optimistic view that the law of state 
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responsibility offers an interesting and yet underutilised tool for addressing human 
rights violations resulting from corporate activity.152   
In discharging their obligations, both host and home states have a raft of 
measures at their disposal to deal with challenges posed by the phenomenon of 
economic globalisation. Options available to states are not only limited to legal 
measures. In addition to belonging to the family of nations under the umbrella of 
the United Nations, most states belong to political interest groups which are also 
powerful in their own right. For instance, most industrialised nations, which are to a 
large degree home states to most MNCs, are members of the G8 153 and the 
G20154 groupings. Meetings of the two groups address inter alia global challenges 
that are mainly related to the economy of the world. Nothing prevents these home 
states from collectively agreeing on international human rights standards for the 
international operations of their own MNCs. Such an agreement may even be 
concluded in the form of a treaty. 
According to McCorquodale and Simons, international human rights law “requires 
a state to take measures – such as by legislation and administrative practices – to 
control, regulate, investigate and prosecute actions by non-state actors that violate 
human rights of those within the territory of that state”.155 This of course is not a 
closed list. Individually or through multilateral agreements, states are at liberty to 
design measures to deal with non-state actors. Developing countries for instance, 
can also make use of non-legal means, in addition to the measures outlined 
above. Most of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)156 feature on the list 
identifying the Least Developed Countries (LDC)157 and are members of the G77 
countries.158 Issues of South-South economic investment feature prominently on 
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the agenda of the G77 countries’ meetings. The challenge is for these groups to 
jointly agree among themselves on the minimum human rights standards they 
expect from corporations that invest within their territorial borders. OECD 
guidelines discussed in the preceding chapter, though not binding, resemble such 
an initiative, albeit from developed countries’ point of view. By so doing, the 
developing countries will make it impossible for MNCs to look for countries with 
lower human rights standards. By agreeing among themselves on standards to 
impose on MNCs, developing countries would eliminate the race to the bottom and 
the run-away corporation phenomenon.159  
Lobbying is also a tool that is available to developing countries.160 In addition to 
setting their own binding universal standards, developing countries can also lobby 
with the developed countries to make sure that they encourage their own 
corporations to adhere to such set standards. Such an initiative can be 
coordinated around the various meetings of these political groupings or be raised 
within the multilateral bodies such as the UN. The key to unlocking the measures 
outlined above lies in the political will of the state. And this goes for both the 
developing and developed nations. 
5 STATE RESPONSIBILITY IN RELATION TO PRIVATE CONDUCT 
The general principle in international law is that conduct of private persons cannot 
be attributed to a state, unless there exists a special relationship between the 
private person and the state. 161   As was already pointed out, the positivistic 
conception of international law and its emphasis on state consent have a bearing 
on state responsibility in relation to private conduct. The basis for the doctrine of 
state responsibility is that states are not responsible for conduct of private persons 
and the conduct of persons not acting on their behalf.162 There are of course 
exceptions to this rule.163 The first exception is conduct that falls within the scope 
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of Article 8 of the Draft Articles, as discussed above. The second relates to where 
a person or group of persons are acting on the instructions of or under the control 
of a state as contemplated by Article 9 of the Draft Articles. By their very nature, 
acts of private actors have a tendency to escape scrutiny. The private sphere is 
where most human rights violations by both states and non-stators alike occur. For 
example, feminist scholars have been consistent in pointing out that the private 
sphere is where the subordination of women takes place. In this regard Chinkin 
points out that 
domestic violence against women can be designated as a private 
wrong, an individual matter that is outside international scrutiny. 
The tradition of viewing sexual conduct as private allows sexual 
abuse by public officials, such as prison officials or police officers, 
also to be readily discounted as not coming within their official 
duties. Failure by a state to investigate and punish such matters is 
a continuation of the exclusion of family/private life even from 
domestic intervention and thus from international accountability.164  
As discussed earlier, under the international human rights norms, states have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. In a similar vein, Ruggie’s 
UN mandate revolved around a framework which he titled to respect, protect and 
remedy.165 In relation to the duty to protect, his final report is instructive in that the 
first part of the report rests on “the State’s duty to protect against human rights 
abuses by third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate 
policies, regulation, and adjudication”.166 Within their own territories and subject to 
their jurisdictions, international human rights law enjoins it on states to protect 
human rights, which duty includes protecting individuals against human rights 
violations by private entities. For instance Article 2(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that: 
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Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect 
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.167  
State parties are enjoined to put in place legislative and other measures to ensure 
the enjoyment of the rights recognized in the ICCPR.168  Further, state parties 
undertake to ensure that any person whose rights have been violated will have an 
effective remedy.169 In this regard, state parties undertake to ensure that such 
remedies are determined by “competent judicial, administrative and legislative 
authorities”.170 Equally important is the fact that state parties undertake to ensure 
that such remedies are enforced by competent authorities when granted.171 The 
ICCPR further requests states to report on the obstacles to the effectiveness of the 
existing remedies.172 The foregoing provisions enjoin it upon states to take positive 
steps to prevent violations of human rights, even those that emanate from private 
actors.173 The obligations outlined in Article 2 of the ICCPR are such that every 
state has a legal interest in their performance, and therefore constitute obligations 
erga omnes.174  
Should it happen that such violations have already taken place, states have an 
obligation to take positive steps to investigate and sanction such conduct. 175 
Taking positive steps has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee to 
mean that state parties should adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative 
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and other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations. 176 
International and regional tribunals have followed the same line of reasoning when 
adjudicating state obligations under international human rights law.  
5.1  Jurisprudence on state responsibility in the private sphere 
What has become evident from both the overview of the doctrine of state 
responsibility and the Draft Articles on State Responsibility above is that there is 
nothing that prevents states from taking measures to guarantee the protection of 
human rights within their territories and jurisdiction. Even apart from the stipulated 
obligations, states must ensure that there are legal systems to ensure the 
enjoyment of these rights.177 If the responsibility of the home state arises from the 
extraterritorial operations of MNCs, nothing stops the home state from 
promulgating a regulatory legislation to deal with the extraterritorial activities of 
MNCs. The ATCA in the United States of America though dated and not without its 
own challenges, stands out as a classic example in this regard. Modern day 
examples of legislation with an extraterritorial reach were attempted in the United 
States of America,178 Australia179 and the United Kingdom.180 The initiatives in both 
the United States and Australia were scuppered. As discussed above, in relation to 
the non-legal measures available to states, the failure or success of these 
initiatives depend on the political will of the states concerned. 181  The United 
Kingdom Corporate Responsibility Bill initiative, on the other hand, managed to 
have some relative success even though the end product was not as robust as the 
initial proposal.182  
International instruments have articulated state obligations in a way that 
encapsulates both the specified and non-specified obligations of states. Article 2(1) 
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of the Covenant on Economic and Social Responsibility, for instance, states (albeit 
in the context of occupying powers) that:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take 
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-
operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures.183  
International tribunals and courts have interpreted state obligations in a way that 
expects states to take preventive, protective and remedial measures in dealing 
with activities of private actors. Such was the approach of the ICJ in the Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v Uganda) 
case.184 The dispute arose when the Democratic Republic of Congo instituted an 
action against the Republic of Uganda for alleged acts of aggression perpetrated 
by Uganda on the territory of the DRC. The Court found that as an occupying 
power, Uganda at all times had the obligation to “take all measures in its power to 
restore, and ensure, as far as it is possible, public order and safety in the occupied 
area”. These obligations are interpreted in a wide and far-reaching manner. As the 
court continued, the  
obligation comprised the duty to secure respect for the applicable 
rules of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of the occupied 
territory against acts of violence, and not to tolerate such violence 
by any third party.185 
The ICJ unanimously found that the Republic of Uganda had an obligation to make 
reparations to the DRC for the injury caused.  
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Regionally, the approach of the ICJ to state obligations was echoed by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.186 La Commission Nationale des 
droit des l’Homme et des Libertes de la Federation Nationale des Union de Jeunes 
Avocats de France brought a communication before the African Commission of 
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) alleging serious human rights violations in 
Chad. Among some of the allegations were that journalists were harassed and 
attacked by unidentified individuals believed to be security agents of the 
government.187 Further allegations were that in Chad there were, among others, 
arbitrary arrests and that people disappeared. Prisoners were also subjected to 
inhuman treatment. Within the backdrop of Article 1 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 188  which provides that member states shall 
“recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall 
undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them”, the 
ACHPR pronounced that “[e]ven when it cannot be proved that violations were 
committed by government agents, the government had a responsibility to secure 
the safety and the liberty of its citizens, and to conduct investigations into 
murders”.189 Chad was therefore found to have been responsible for the violations 
of the African Charter.   
 
The Inter-American system has also interpreted states’ obligations in a manner 
that insists on accountability of states in the private sphere. The American 
Convention of Human Rights provides that “[t]he State parties to this Convention 
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure all 
persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and 
freedoms”.190 The scope of this provision came under scrutiny in the Velásque 
Rodriquez v Honduras case before the Inter-American Court.191 The case arose 
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out of the events in Honduras between 1981 and 1984. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights presented evidence to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights alleging that the Honduran government conducted, 
or at least tolerated a practice of forced disappearances of people. The question 
before the Court was whether the Honduran government could be held 
responsible for the disappearances. The Court found the Honduran government 
responsible for the failure to prevent and punish forced disappearance committed 
by persons whom it could not associate with the state. The reasoning of the court 
was that: 
 An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is an act of a 
private person or because a private person has not been 
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the 
Convention”.192  
The court went on to state that: 
 The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to 
carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its 
jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the 
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate 
compensation.193 
An even more emphatic statement by the court is that:  
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a 
violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State 
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apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished 
and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as 
soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to 
ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons 
within its jurisdiction. The same is true when the State allows 
private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the 
detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention.194   
The court is aware of the fact that “in certain circumstances, it may be difficult to 
investigate acts that violate an individual's rights. The duty to investigate, like the 
duty to prevent, is not breached merely because the investigation does not 
produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a serious 
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective”.195 
The concept of due diligence casts the net of state responsibility wide and has had 
a bearing on international initiatives to deal with non-state actors.196 For example, 
the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights197 
has adopted the concept of due diligence too. With regard to acts by non-state 
actors the Maastricht Guidelines state that: 
The obligation to protect includes the State's responsibility to 
ensure that private entities or individuals, including transnational 
corporations over which they exercise jurisdiction, do not deprive 
individuals of their economic, social and cultural rights. States are 
responsible for violations of economic, social and cultural rights 
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that result from their failure to exercise due diligence in controlling 
the behaviour of such non-state actors.198 
International tribunals have approached the concept of due diligence in such a way 
that it serves as an inclusive concept, even for conduct by private actors that 
cannot be attributed to a state.199 Article 2 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) provides that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. In 
the case of Osman v United Kingdom Mrs Osman's husband was killed by her 
son's former teacher. Her son was seriously wounded in the same incident.200 The 
dispute concerned the alleged failure of authorities to protect the right to life of Mrs 
Osman’s husband and her son from threat posed by individuals and lawfulness of 
restrictions on the applicants' right of access to a court to sue authorities for 
damage caused by such failure. Having observed that the state’s obligations 
enjoins it on the state not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of 
life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its 
jurisdiction, the court went on to say that: 
It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect 
extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by 
putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person backed up by law-
enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and 
sanctioning of breaches of such provisions.201  
The protection of human rights in the private sphere brings to the fore the question 
of the interface between international law and municipal law. There are no guiding 
rules or procedures as to which of the two systems should be more responsible for 
the protection of human rights in the private sphere. Domestic courts remain the 
locus of accountability in international law. Theoretically, domestic courts can 
provide a remedy for a breach of international law.202 The efficacy of the system 
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though will to a large degree depend on the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between municipal law and international law. The relationship between the two 
legal systems has for a long time been explained in terms of two diametrically 
opposed theories, namely, dualism and monism.203 The argument of the dualists is 
premised on the notion that international law and municipal laws are two different 
systems. 204  Within the jurisdiction of a state, international law must first be 
transformed into or incorporated into municipal law for it to apply.205 Monism, on 
the other hand, contends that international law and municipal laws are intertwined. 
According to monism, when a state party ratifies a treaty, international law 
becomes part of municipal law without it being incorporated into municipal law.206  
Increasingly most legal systems are no longer distinctly monist or dualist, but 
instead exhibit elements of both approaches.207 As a result, the fine distinction 
between the two theories is being challenged.208  
International human rights law as an offshoot of international law, has inherited 
these dichotomies and debates. A monist approach argues that unless 
international human rights treaties are ratified, they will not have an impact at a 
national level.209 Viljoen points out that legal theory has established a correlation 
between the extent of the integration of international human rights treaties into the 
legal system of a country and the status enjoyed by international law in the same 
system.210 The paradox of international human rights law is more manifest in the 
relationship between international human rights law and municipal law. While the 
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focus of international human rights law is on the protection of the rights of the 
individual against the state, the system depends on the same state to give effect to 
those rights first. A dualist approach will argue that if treaties or international 
agreements are ratified but not incorporated by a state, such treaties or 
agreements will only bind a state at an international level only.211 As Viljoen points 
out, to become meaningful international human rights must be brought “home”.212 
Axiomatically, peremptory norms such as jus cogens and obligations erga omnes 
would constitute an exception to this view. 
The foregoing discussion begs the question: Whether the protection of human 
rights in the private sphere should be left entirely to domestic law or whether it 
should be a matter of international law?213 According to Knox214 human rights in 
the private sphere have generally been protected by domestic law when: 
(a) Human rights law contemplates that states have a general duty to restrict the 
private actions that interfere with the enjoyment of human rights, but leaves 
to governments the task of specifying the resulting private duties; 
(b) Human rights law itself specifies the private duties that governments are 
obliged to impose; 
(c) Human rights law directly places duties on private actors, but leaves the 
enforcement of those duties to domestic law; and  
(d) Human rights law enforces private duties at the international level through 
international tribunals or other institutions. 
The protection of human rights in the private sphere is saddled with complexities 
that are historical, conceptual and practical in nature.215 As pointed out above, 
while state obligations are both vertical and horizontal, historically the classical 
conception of human rights has put more emphasis on the vertical obligations of 
states. To talk of human rights in the private sphere is therefore to take the 
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debates out of the classical model. The move from the public to the private sphere 
brings with it its own conceptual challenges. The concept of Drittwirkung within the 
European Human Rights system provides a good illustration of the complexities 
that arise in an attempt to protect human rights in the private sphere. The 
multifaceted concept of Drittwirkung has its origin in the jurisprudence of the 
German courts and has since made its way into the European Human rights 
system.216 The concept of Drittwirkung was invoked with reference to the “third 
party effect”. As Clapham points out, it was used with reference to the possible 
application of the German Basic Law in cases where the litigants were both private 
parties. 217  The significance of Drittwirkung lies in the fact that it affirms the 
horizontal application of human rights norms in the private sphere to private 
individuals in their private relationships among themselves. 218  The notion that 
fundamental rights apply horizontally in the private sphere has become part of 
most jurisdictions, including South Africa. 219  In South Africa for instance, the 
Constitution provides that “[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a 
juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right.”220 In most 
municipal jurisdictions, it is no longer controversial to say that the fundamental 
human rights apply in the private sphere. What is still not settled is the protection 
of human rights in the private sphere in international and regional tribunals, and 
this is where the concept of Drittwirkung has received both acclaim and criticism 
alike.  
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It is trite that the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights are 
state centric. The language of the Convention is aimed at the traditional vertical 
conception of human rights protection, with duties and obligations imposed on 
state parties. The concept Drittwirkung, however, takes the discourse out of the 
traditional matrix into the private sphere by extending its application to non-state 
parties. Drittwirking can either be direct or indirect. 221  Direct Drittwirkung 
contemplates a situation where an individual can lodge a complaint directly against 
a private person by invoking a human right before an international tribunal. Indirect 
Drittwurkung, on the other hand, refers to a situation whereby complaints can only 
be lodged if responsibility can be attributed to state authorities.   
The idea that an individual can approach an international tribunal and lodge a 
complaint is a rather positive development towards the protection of human rights 
in the private sphere. However, as Jӓgers points out, some scholars are of the 
view that there can be no horizontal effect at an international level as the system 
does not have enforcement mechanisms in place. 222  The absence of an 
enforcement mechanism is a lamentable setback for the protection of human 
rights, for two reasons. Firstly, it negates the fundamental principle that where 
there is a violation of a right there must be a remedy. In the absence of remedies, 
the protection of human rights in the private sphere will have a hollow ring. 
Secondly, the deficit highlights the struggle of the state-centric system to adjust to 
non-state parties. Thus, even the concept of the Dritwirkung does not seem to be 
taking the protection of human rights any further.223  
5.2  The limitations of the doctrine of state responsibility 
At a national level, most states do have a host of laws that corporations have to 
adhere to, but these are only within the confines of the borders of a given states.224 
Regional and international human rights bodies are state-centric to a large degree. 
The jurisdiction of these bodies is therefore mainly confined to complaints against 
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states.225 The law of state responsibility, especially for violations of rights in the 
private sphere, lends itself to two limitations.226 The first relates to the fact that for 
state responsibility to arise, a connection must be established between the state 
and the conduct constituting a violation. However, relationships in the private 
sphere are by their very nature private and, therefore, do not have much 
connection to the state. Secondly, generally only states can bring an action against 
another state in the ICJ as individuals or groups do not have locus standi.227  
There, however, seems to be a shift in international law in that non-state actors are 
granted locus standi in some international tribunals. For instance, non-
governmental organizations and individuals, among others, have locus standi in 
the European Court of Human Rights.228  
There has been a proliferation of non-state actors and not all their acts are 
attributable to a state so as to give rise to state responsibility. As discussed above, 
some of these non-state actors, like MNCs, have grown in stature and power and 
are even engaged in state-like activities. This being the case, the Draft Articles are 
written in a language that does not anticipate the invocation of state responsibility 
by non-state actors. The state-centric nature of the Draft Articles is its own 
nemesis in dealing with the activities of MNCs. In this regard, Deva submits that 
“any international mechanism that tries to fix liability of MNCs ‘solely’ through 
states has failed in the past and is bound to fail in the future”.229 For this rather 
pessimistic view he gives the following seven reasons:230  
 
(1) State governments cannot exercise effective control over MNCs, because of 
trans-border limitations: States operate within a defined territory and MNCs 
do not. 
(2) Sometimes states, or their corporate hands, are in connivance with MNCs. 
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(3) States are interested parties in a quest to establish a mechanism for 
corporate accountability. 
(4) Even if states wish to control MNCs, some of them, especially developing 
ones, do not possess the legal and / or economic capacity to do so. 
(5) Since MNCs operate in several countries, a suit for fixing responsibility before 
a municipal court is often scuttled with the plea of forum non conveniens. 
(6) There is a possibility of friction and confrontation between states if the 
municipal laws of country X are applied to a MNC incorporated in country Y. 
(7) States are notoriously inconsistent in their respect and enforcement of 
international human rights. 
 
Valid as the concerns raised by Deva may be, they overlook the fact that there is 
nothing in the Draft Articles on State Responsibility that prevents states from taking 
both legal and non-legal measures to address each of the points he has raised. 
With regard to his first point above, this chapter has pointed out that state 
obligations under international human rights law are not confined to the territory of 
a given state but can also be established through jurisdiction. Nothing in the 
doctrine of state responsibility prevents a home state for promulgating 
extraterritorial legislation. Regarding his second point, it would to a large degree 
depend on the seriousness of the offence that the state and the MNCs connive in. 
If the matter is of such a serious nature that it violates peremptory norms of 
international law surely remedial measures can be taken by any state. On the third 
point raised, the fact that states are interested parties in a quest to establish an 
accountability mechanism should in fact work in favour of states and not against 
them. One commentator has pointed out that to a large degree, states obey 
international law based on self-interest.231 With regard to the fourth point, Knox 
asserts that even in a relatively weak government, a state continues to be a single 
powerful entity within its own jurisdiction.232 In addition, this chapter has argued 
that states are also at liberty to collectively lobby powerful home states. This is not 
proscribed by the doctrine of state responsibility. In relation to the fifth point raised, 
the Brussel Convention of European Union233 has demonstrated that by putting 
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regulatory mechanisms in place certain hurdles such as forum non conveniens can 
be overcome. It would be recalled from the second chapter that forum non 
conveniens does no longer apply within the European Union member states. For 
points six and seven, it is worth pointing out that nothing in the Draft Articles 
prohibits states from collectively addressing the challenges posed by MNCs. A 
classic example of this is the initiative by the OECD countries discussed in chapter 
one of this study. Though limited to only a number of states, the OECD initiative 
has at least put in place standards that are to be adhered to by corporations from 
OECD countries, albeit on a voluntary basis. 
 
As discussed above, what seems to be a major weakness with the indirect 
accountability in international law is that it is solely dependent on the medium of 
the state. A corollary to this challenge is that generally individuals and groups do 
not have the locus standi to enforce their rights in most international tribunals. 
While states have a raft of measures that they can put in place to ensure respect, 
protection and fulfil human rights, evidence points to the fact that for political and 
economic reasons, not all states have the political will to do so.  If the indirect 
mode of accountability fails them, especially where the corporation connives with 
the state, victims of human rights violations do not have much recourse in an 
attempt to enforce their rights.234 It is the argument of this study that in addition to 
the indirect mode of accountability, there is a dire need to hold MNCs directly 
accountable for their human rights violations under international law.  
States play a pivotal role under the international legal system. As Ruggie asserts, 
individually they are the “primary duty-bearers under international human rights 
law, and collectively they are the trustees of the international human rights 
regime”.235 Arising from this role states have both rights and obligations. A state 
may choose not to exercise its rights in full, but may not choose not to discharge 
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its obligations in full.236 Article 13 of the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States of 1949237 states that:  
Every state has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it 
may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an 
excuse for failure to perform this duty.  
 
At municipal level, effect is given to the international law obligations through 
constitutions or legislation. States have a number of options as to where to locate 
international law within the hierarchy of their municipal legal systems. According to 
Viljoen, they may place international law above all national laws, including the 
Constitution, or they may place it on par with the Constitution, but above other 
national laws, or they may place it on the same level with other national laws.238  
The test is not where international law is located in the hierarchy of laws of a state, 
but whether the state has discharged its obligations or not. In discharging their 
obligations, states have a duty to ensure that their laws are in conformity with their 
obligations under international law.239 Accountability in this model, regardless of 
where the state locates international law, would still take place at the level of 
domestic courts and will depend on the state to ensure that domestic courts are 
functional. Indeed states have invoked criminal, civil and administrative sanctions 
to hold corporations to account. 240  However, as the preceding chapters have 
illustrated, relying solely on domestic courts is not without its own pitfalls. 
In relation to the accountability of MNCs the challenges become even more 
pronounced in that the state-centric approach operates on the basis of the 
existence of the nexus between the state and the entity. The glaring challenge is 
that globalisation has generally widened the gap between the state and MNCs, 
thus putting MNCs beyond the reach of the state-centric system of accountability. 
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For this reason, the state-centric approach has been criticised for not only being 
out of step with the prevailing international power relations, but also for shielding 
MNCs from assuming responsibilities for their actions.241 The net effect of this is 
that for victims of human rights violations, the state-centric system fails them 
where it is needed most. As Shelton242 writes, under international law, the state is 
obliged to ensure that there are domestic remedies for those who have suffered 
harm. The challenge however, as she aptly points out, is that in the event that the 
state does not meet its obligations, international law does not have procedures for 
an aggrieved individual to hold the state accountable before an international 
institution. The same argument can be made in the case of corporations. Beyond 
the domestic remedies, aggrieved victims of corporate human rights violations 
have nowhere to go. The conceptualisation of MNCs as having international 
personality, though not a panacea to the challenge of MNC accountability in 
international law, provides an additional avenue for victims of corporate human 
rights violations to assert their rights. What the architecture 243  of such a 
mechanism would look like, is the subject of the discussion in chapter five of this 
study. 
6 BRIDGING THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAPS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM 
In addition to the challenges posed by globalisation, inherently the international 
legal system has some gaps that make it difficult to hold MNCs to account for their 
human rights violations. The greatest accountability hurdle of MNCs under 
international law is the division between the private and the public spheres. 
Because of the historical context within which it arose, the language of human 
rights protection has traditionally been concerned with the protection of human 
rights vis-à-vis the state in the public sphere.244 The inherent weakness with this 
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approach is that it overlooks the emerging power of private entities vis-à-vis the 
individual and private relations between individuals.245 A further division which the 
legal system makes is the distinction between the subjects and objects of 
international law.246 The legal system is still trapped in this dichotomy in that its 
theories, rules and institutional mechanisms of accountability are fashioned in silos 
reflecting the divisions and the distinctions.  
It was pointed out in the first chapter to this study that under globalisation, the 
ordering of the international community is undergoing multiple processes all 
unfolding at the same time. 247  These processes are simultaneously moving 
towards and away from the state. The regulatory environment of corporations, for 
instance, is a classic example of this complex movement in that corporations are 
creations of national legislation. 248  This means that for their own existence, 
corporations need the state to facilitate the process of their incorporation. Once 
incorporated, corporations especially those with no link to the state, gravitate away 
from the state into the private sphere, a sphere which the international legal 
system is still struggling to conceptualise. Because of the division between the two 
spheres, state involvement in the private sphere is very minimal. The weakness of 
the system is exposed in that states are held to account in an area where their 
involvement is only minimal. 249  The conceptualisation of MNCs as having 
international legal personality, it will be argued, will allow corporations to account 
directly for their own violations under the international legal system and not 
through the prism of the state.  
In the private sphere, at least in as far as international law is concerned, MNCs 
operate in a legal vacuum especially in relation to human rights accountability. 
About this Duruigbo writes that “without a doubt, the current situation has 
succeeded in placing MNCs in a sphere where their operations are conducted in a 
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legal and moral vacuum”.250 The absence of a legal regulatory framework means 
that technically there are no human rights obligations that arise from the activities 
of corporations in the private sphere, while all international law obligations are 
placed on the state. As it was discussed above, state responsibility for private acts 
operates on the basis of the nexus that exists between the corporation and the 
state. If there is no nexus, state responsibility will not arise. With no legal point of 
reference against which to directly measure the activities of corporations in the 
private sphere, international initiatives are reduced to just mere exhortations and 
recommendations. The Ruggie mandate for instance, did not succeed in steering 
itself out of these dichotomies. In fact, the mandate replicates the divisions in that it 
is constructed around the duty of the state to protect against human rights abuses 
by third parties, including business enterprises, and the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. 251  In the era of globalisation, the weaknesses of the 
bifurcated model of accountability quickly become apparent for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, the framework is constructed on the model of a powerful state that 
is in control politically, economically and legally. This however, does not resonate 
with the reality of most states particularly those confronted by human right 
challenges emanating from MNCs.  The Ruggie mandate was cognisant of the fact 
that the risk of human rights abuses is heightened in conflict affected areas where 
there is conflict over the control of territory, resources or the government itself.252 
Ordinarily, such states have weak systems of accountability and governance. It is 
axiomatic that such states would in all likelihood be unable to discharge their 
obligations to protect against human rights violations. An asymmetry is therefore 
created between what the theory outlines and what the factual reality for some 
states is. This then implies that while the state-centric approach is constructed 
around a conception of a powerful state, human rights abuses in relation to MNCs 
have mostly emerged from very weak states with weak institutions of governance. 
To continue insisting on a state-centric approach under such circumstances 
becomes futile. 
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Secondly, the international operations of MNCs extend to beyond territories of 
states. Because MNCs, as Bratspies writes, “operate across national borders, 
beyond constrains of one nation’s domestic law, their actions are too often viewed 
as beyond the reach of any law”. 253  This is where human rights are more 
vulnerable and at risk of being violated and yet international law, as Ruggie points 
out, does not impose any duties on states to “regulate the extraterritorial activities 
of business domiciled in their territory and or/jurisdiction”.254 Practically this means 
that MNCs operating in weak states are technically free to do as they wish 
especially given the fact that their home states do not have any legal obligation to 
regulate their affairs. In light of the fact that the traditional state-centric system has 
no room for MNCs, international law has no answer to this anomaly. Because 
there is no legal framework to refer to, the Ruggie mandate for business to respect 
human rights, remains just an exhortation. The exhortation is that the need for 
business to respect human rights 
 is a global standard of expected conduct for all business 
enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of 
state’s abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights 
obligations, and does not diminish those obligations. And it exists 
over and above compliance with national laws and regulations 
protecting human rights.255  
 
The difficulty with the exhortation is that, like all other international voluntary 
measures, it has no legal basis and therefore cannot be enforced. The challenge 
with all voluntary measures in relation to issues of accountability for human rights 
violations of MNCs discussed thus far, is that the “mechanism only works when 
MNCs, the potential violators of human rights, want it to work”.256 As a result, 
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should MNCs not adhere to the exhortation the international legal system has no 
way of enforcing it. Though not a panacea to all the challenges facing the state-
centric system of accountability, the conceptualisation of MNCs as having 
international legal personality in international law, it will be argued, assists to 
address part of the challenge in that it bridges the gap between the public and the 
private spheres. In addition, it gives the international legal system a handle on 
MNCs thus also narrowing the governance gap referred to in the preceding 
chapters. 
Internally, the legal system too is experiencing multiple processes all unfolding at 
the same time.  While domestic courts remain the locus of accountability in 
international law, the international legal system has over the years expanded and 
in the process also fragmented at the same time.257 New specialised areas dealing 
with issues of trade, environment, human rights, the sea, investment and refugees 
have emerged under the auspices of international law.258  The adoption of the 
Rome Statute marked the addition of criminal law to the list of specialised areas. It 
can be argued that for its own self-preservation, the expansion of international law 
into these areas is important for the credibility, legitimacy and relevance of the 
legal system to modern international challenges. Notwithstanding this, 
fragmentation poses its own challenges to the legal system. As some scholars 
have argued, it has the potential to open up the door for “the erosion of general 
international law, emergence of conflicting jurisprudence, forum-shopping and loss 
of legal security”.259 This concern is not unfounded, particularly in light of the fact 
that the international community has in the last fifty years witnessed an emergence 
of numerous international courts and tribunals. 260  Though operating under the 
ambit of the same international law, these tribunals and courts do not have a co-
ordinated point of convergence. Each has its own rules, and deals with different 
aspects of the different subjects of international law. Functionally this means that 
each of the courts and tribunals must tread with caution not to encroach on to the 
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area of specialisation of the other. Buergenthal underscores this point by stating 
that 
each tribunal has an obligation to respect the general and special 
competence of the other judicial and quasi-judicial institutions 
which comprise the system, to recognize that it has an obligation, 
when rendering judgements, to take account of the case-law of 
other judicial institutions that have pronounced on the same 
subject and, most importantly, to promote and be open to the 
jurisprudential interaction or cross fertilization.261  
 
Inevitably, any attempt to duplicate the institutional mechanisms of accountability 
increases the chances of the conflicting jurisprudence. The view proposed in this 
study is that the multiplicity of institutional mechanisms can be minimised by 
constructing a theory of accountability at a conceptual point of convergence of 
those subjects with some legal commonalities.262 It will be argued that as the 
multiple processes continue to unfold in all directions under globalisation, points of 
convergence between some of the subjects and concepts of international law have 
emerged. These points of convergence provide a basis for a theory of 
accountability for human rights by MNCs in the era of globalisation.  
7 CONCLUSION 
Not all international corporations are the same as there are nuanced differences 
among them. Some of these corporations are private in nature, while others have 
a closer proximity to the state as they are treaty based. As to which of these would 
give rise to state responsibility depends on the rules of international law. This 
chapter has argued that international law is a rules-based system. It was illustrated 
that both the state’s vertical and horizontal obligations arise from the rules of the 
legal system. The chapter has argued that despite being state-centric, the doctrine 
of state responsibility provides a raft of measures that states can adopt so as to 
discharge their obligations in international law, particularly with regard to conduct 
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of MNCs. What has become apparent in this chapter is that despite its potential to 
serve as a useful tool of indirect accountability of MNCs, the doctrine of state 
responsibility is not without its own limitations. Such limitations relate to the fact 
that the doctrine of state responsibility is state-centric and this becomes a 
challenge where states do not have a political will to put measures to protect 
human rights in place. The second challenge relates to enforcement of 
internationally protected rights by individuals and groups of people as to a large 
degree these do not have locus standi in most international tribunals and fora.  
It is this study’s argument that the deficiencies of the state-centric regulatory 
framework, coupled with the inadequacies of the voluntary accountability 
mechanisms263 of MNCs, provide a basis for the argument advanced in this study 
that there is a need to, in addition to the indirect mode of accountability, hold 
MNCs directly accountable in international law. According to the rules of 
international law direct accountability is reserved for those entities upon which the 
legal system has conferred international legal personality. This then begs the 
question: If it is argued that international law should confer international legal 
personality on MNCs, on what basis would international law do that? To answer 
this question, the study will turn to a discussion of the concept of international 
personality in international law in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to discuss the concept of international legal personality as it 
has evolved to encompass non-state entities. The discussion will not so much 
focus on the chronological flow of events, but on the conceptual evolution. The 
international legal system has over the years evolved to confer limited international 
legal personality to a limited number of non-state actors. 1  International legal 
personality to these non-state entities was conferred at different times in response 
to different challenges.2 As already discussed in chapter one, international law is 
an “actor-centred system”. In this regard, it becomes important to establish how 
the legal system identifies its actors.  
What has become evident in the preceding chapters is that MNCs are elusive and 
are therefore not within the full grasp of any legal system, including international 
law. In international law the concept of international legal personality provides the 
legal system with a conceptual grasp of its actors. The rationale for the discussion 
in this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, the chapter seeks to establish whether 
international law has evolved to such an extent that MNCs can be considered to 
be subjects of the international legal system. If indeed the legal system has 
evolved as such, the second leg of the discussion will then seek to establish the 
basis for arguing that international law has evolved to include MNCs.  
The presentation of this chapter will be in seven parts, including this introduction. 
The first part will set the context to the evolution of the concept of international 
personality in international law. In the second section, the chapter will discuss the 
use of the concept of international person in international law. In the third section 
the chapter will discuss the sources of international law and its development. In 
this regard a cursory overview of the sources of international law will also be 
presented. The fourth section will discuss the different philosophical and 
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theoretical conceptions of the concept of concept of international personality in 
international law. How entities acquire international legal personality in 
international law will also be covered in the discussion. As Klabbers points out, 
there is still no agreement on “the modalities of acquiring personality, the extent 
and scope of personality, and the precise consequences to be attached to 
personality”. 3   In the fifth section the chapter will discuss the acquisition of 
international personality in international law. To illustrate the complexities 
surrounding the acquisition of international personality, the chapter will present a 
brief survey of the various subjects of international law and how these entities 
have acquired their limited international legal personality in international law. 
NGOs do not have international legal personality in international law, but are very 
active within the legal system. The sixth section will discuss the role of NGOs 
within the international legal system. Drawing from the discussions in the 
preceding subsections of this chapter, the seventh section will conceptualise the 
international legal personality of MNCs in international law, and then conclude. 
2 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL 
PERSONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concept of international legal personality seems to have come full circle, 
because international law has not always been about state relations to the 
exclusion of non-state entities.4 In the early years of international law, as Koh 
writes, “the public/private, domestic/international categories that later came to 
dominate classical international legal theory had not been developed”.5 The state-
centric focus of international law emerged from the work of Jeremy Bentham, who 
coined the term “international law”.6 The use of the word person with reference to 
the state has its origin in the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and was 
developed further by Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694).7 Hobbes used the concept to 
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explain his theory of social contract and the creation of a state. A state, according 
to Hobbes, was formed when natural persons through a social contract authorised 
one person to be their representative and wear a mask8 as a sovereign actor 
under whom the rest were united.9 Pufendorf saw a state as a moral person with 
the ability to perform actions unique to itself and different from those of 
individuals.10 However, he did not see a state as having personality in international 
law as he denied the existence of international law separate from natural law.11 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, (1646-1716) is the first writer to use the term 
international legal personality in his work the Codex iuris gentium diplomaticus of 
1693. 12  For Leibniz, the concept of international legal personality is directly 
connected to sovereignty as it has a component of representation of the public. 
Leibniz defines international legal personality as follows:  
He possesses a personality in international law who represents the 
public liberty, such that he is not subject to the tutelage or the power 
of anyone else, but has in himself the power of war and of alliances; 
although he may perhaps be limited by the bounds of obligation 
towards a superior and owe him homage, fidelity and obedience. If 
his authority, then, is sufficiently extensive, it is agreed to call him a 
potentate, and he will be called a sovereign or a sovereign power ... 
Those are counted among sovereign powers, then, and are held to 
possess sovereignty, who can count on sufficient freedom and power 
to exercise some influence in international affairs, with armies or by 
treaties.13 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Review 217-218; Nijman JE The Concept of International Legal Personality: An Inquiry into 
the History and Theory of International Law (TMC Asser Press The Hague 2004) 50-58. 
8  The word persona in Latin means a mask or a disguise. See Cheng B “Introduction to 
Subjects of International Law” in Bedjaoui M (ed) International Law: Achievements and 
Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Dordrecht 1991) 24; Radin M “The endless problem 
of corporate personality” 1932 (32) Columbia Law Review 645; Paasivirta E “The European 
Union: From an aggregate of states to a legal person” 1997 (2) Hofstra Law and Policy 
Symposium 40; Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality VII-VIII.  
9  See Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 52. 
10 Aufricht 1942 The American Political Science Review 218; Nijman The Concept of 
International Legal Personality 57 - 58. 
11  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 58. 
12 Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 29. 
13 Leibniz GW Codex Iuris Gentium diplomaticus (1693) 175 as quoted in Nijman The Concept 
of International Legal Personality 58-59. Emphasis in the original text. 
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Sovereignty 14  and international legal personality are intertwined. According to 
Nijman, the two have been “intimately connected” to an extent that (traditionally) 
the state person was regarded as absolutely sovereign and states were the only 
entities endowed with international legal personality.15  
The concept of international legal personality has over the centuries been used 
differently by different scholars.16 After Bentham, international law scholars were of 
the opinion that only states had international legal personality.17  In the period 
before the Second World War, as Nijman points out, the concept received a place 
of prominence in scholarly debates and in treaty law. It featured prominently as a 
tool around which international law was to be revised.18 In the scholarly discourses 
of the post Second World War era, however, the concept was eclipsed by the 
doctrine of state sovereignty. Nijman19 attributes the decline to the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in the Reparations case.20 Following this judgment, 
scholars were content to just quote from it instead of continuing the theoretical 
discourse of the concept of international legal personality. This non-engaging 
attitude was to prevail throughout a greater part of the Cold War era. 21  The 
situation has not improved much in the contemporary era to an extent that Nijman 
has reached the conclusion that contemporary scholars have neglected the 
concept of international legal personality. 22  There seems, however, to be a 
resurgence of interest in the concept as monographs, journal articles and books 
on the subject are beginning to emerge.23  
                                                          
14   For a detailed discussion on the evolution of the concept of sovereignty and its use see: 
Ferreira-Snyman MP  2006 (12) “The evolution of state sovereignty: A historical overview” 
Fundamina 1-28; Fassbender B “Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law” in 
Walker  N (ed)  Sovereignty in Transition (Hart Publishing Oxford 2003) 115 – 143; Van der 
Vyver “The Concept of Political Sovereignty” in Visser C (ed) Essays in Honour of Ellison 
Khan (Juta Cape Town 1989) 289-360. 
15 Nijman J “Sovereignty and Personality: A Process of Inclusion” in Kreijen G (ed) State, 
Sovereignty and International Governance (Oxford University Press New York 2002)109. 
16   See Nijman Sovereignty and Personality 109 –144. 
17  See Lauterpacht H “The subjects of the law of nations” 1947 (63) The Law Quarterly Review 
439-440, Nijman Sovereignty and Personality 109-110.  
18   Nijman Sovereignty and Personality 113.    
19  Nijman Sovereignty and Personality 113–114; Nijman The Concept of International Legal 
Personality 4. 
20  Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 
ICJ Reports 178 (hereinafter the Reparation for Injuries case).  
21  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 277-288.   
22  Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality 387-388. 
23  See for example, Portmann R Legal Personality in International Law (Cambridge University 
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Conventionally, international personality is reserved for entities which enjoy both 
the substantive and procedural rights and duties in international law.24 An entity 
with international personality is one that has the capacity to possess such rights 
and duties and by extension be able to enforce them under international law. For 
legal participation, the concept of international legal personality becomes 
important. In this regard, legal personality is the conditio sine qua non for legal 
participation within a legal system.25 To this end, legal participation is preceded by 
“community acceptance through the granting by states of rights and/or obligations 
under international law to the entity in question”.26 How this granting of acceptance 
takes place is a subject of great debate among scholars. In as far as states are 
concerned, the law of recognition in international law is relevant.27 An entity so 
recognised has legal personality and can be held accountable under the rules of 
international law.  
Unlike municipal legal systems, international law does not have set categories of 
persons. Municipal law, makes a distinction between natural and juristic persons. 
Juristic persons may include, among others, churches, universities, corporations, 
non-profit organisations and non-governmental organisations. There are clear 
rules as to how each category attains personhood. 28  In most municipal legal 
systems, legal personality is determined with reference to the law of persons. It is 
the law of persons which determines the actors it endows with rights and duties 
and the legal consequences that arise from such actions.29 For instance, in South 
Africa the law of persons is defined as  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Press Cambridge 2010); Meijknecht A Towards International Personality: The Position of 
Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Intersentia Antwerpen 2001); Nijman 
JE “Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law: Revisiting the ‘Realist Theory’ of 
International Legal Personality” in Noortmann M and Ryngaert C (eds) Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate Publishing 
Farnham 2010); Johns F (ed) International Legal Personality (Ashgate Publishing Farnham 
2010); Nijman The Concept of International Legal Personality. 
24  Charney JI “Transnational corporations and developing public international law” 1983 (87) 
Duke Law Journal 774.  
25  Klabbers J “The Concept of Legal Personality” in Fleurs J (ed) International Legal 
Personality (Ashgate Publishing Farnham 2010) 5.  
26  Nowrot K “Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of influential Non-state Actors: 
Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative Responsibilities” in Fleurs J (ed) 
International Legal Personality (Ashgate Publishing Farnham 2010) 372. 
27  The law of recognition will be briefly discussed below. 
28  Bilchitz D “Moving beyond arbitrariness: The legal personhood and dignity of non-human 
animals” 2009 (25) South Africa Journal of Human Rights 41. 
29  Portmann Legal Personality in International Law 7 who writes that “[h]istorically, this law of 
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that part of private law which determines which beings or entities are 
legal subjects or persons, the way in which legal personality begins 
and is terminated, which different classes of legal subjects are 
distinguished, and the legal status of each of these classes of 
persons.30 
In international law, legal personality is employed as a tool to identify who the main 
role players in the system are and the rights and duties that flow from being 
conferred with such a status. However, international legal personality in 
international law, as Portmann31 notes, has its own peculiarities that set it apart 
from municipal law. The first peculiarity relates to the fact that personality in 
international law includes the competence to create the law. He points out that 
contrary to municipal law, where the creation of the law is the competence of 
centralised state power, international law as a legal system emanates from its 
primary persons, namely, states.32 The second peculiarity, which has a bearing on 
the first, is that international law has no centralised law of persons, nor any treaty 
containing rules that comprehensively deal with matters of legal personality.33 To 
this end Nijman notes that: 
Unlike most domestic legal systems, international law lacks the rules 
to stipulate which are the system’s legal persons. There is no 
‘Vienna convention on the law of international legal persons’.34  
International law does not have a closed number of legal subjects and its 
horizontal evolution to include non-state actors bears credence to this fact.35 As a 
result, the question as to who the subjects of international law are cannot always 
                                                                                                                                                                                
persons was concerned with marking several distinctions in the legal personality of 
individuals. It comprised classes like nobles, clerics, serfs or slaves to which it allocated 
degrees of personality in law”.  
30  Cronjé DSP and Heaton J The South African Law of Persons (Butterworths Durban 1999) 1. 
31  Portmann Legal Personality in International Law 8-9. 
32  Private law and its sub-disciplines such as contract law constitute an exception in this 
regard. 
33  Portmann Legal Personality in International Law 9; Cassese International Law in a Divided 
World 77. 
34  Nijman Non-State Actors and the International Rule of Law 100.  
35  Nowrot Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of influential Non-state Actors 372; 
Nowrot K “Legal consequences of globalisation: The status of non-governmental 
organisations under international law” 1999 (6) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621. 
161 
 
be answered with certainty.36 Schlemmer’s comment in relation to whether an 
individual is a subject of international law illustrates this point. She writes: 
Generally speaking, whether an individual can be a subject of 
international law, depends on your definition of international legal 
subjectivity. In turn, this definition depends on which author you 
choose to follow and can also not be viewed in a vacuum; you 
must consider the position within the international community as 
well.37 
Whether to say that an entity has legal personality is the same as saying that it is a 
subject of the legal system is debatable and controversial.38 Raič39 points out that 
in a municipal legal system, legal persons or natural persons are always subjects 
of law, but subjects of law are not necessarily legal persons. For Klabbers40 the 
concept of legal personality is ambivalent. To illustrate this point, he asserts that in 
a municipal legal system, to say that a six year old is a subject of the law does not 
necessarily mean that he or she has legal personality as yet. The same can be 
said of a mentally handicapped person who, though a natural person, may not 
everywhere be regarded as a legal person. Historically, the same distinction was 
made with regard to slaves, who were no doubt natural persons, but were not 
considered to be legal persons. A legal person’s status plays a major role in 
determining whether they have legal capacity, capacity to act and capacity to 
litigate.41  International law has borrowed the use of these concepts with their 
attendant confusions. As Clapham points out, under international law, the 
discussion of the subjects of international law is confusing and incomplete.42 Legal 
                                                          
36  Vukas B “States, Peoples and Minorities as Subjects of International Law” in Fleurs J (ed) 
International Legal Personality (Ashgate Publishing Farnham 2010) 79. 
37   Schlemmer EC “A new international law on foreign investment” 2005 (3) Tydskrif vir die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 534. 
38  Raič D Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International The Hague 
2002) 11. 
39  Raič Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 11. 
40  Klabbers The Concept of Legal Personality 5. 
41  Waschefort G “The pseudo legal personality of non-state armed groups in international law” 
2011 (36) South African Yearbook of International Law 227. 
42  Clapham A Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2006) 59. Also Klabbers J “(I Can’t Get No) Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the 
Emergence of Non-State Actors” in Bianchi A (ed) Non-State Actors and International Law 
(Ashgate Publishing Farnham 2009) 39 who is of the opinion that “[t]he idea of ‘subjects’ of 
the international legal system is a confusing idea, and the confusion stems in part from being 
conflated with the notion of international legal personality. For many authors, 
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personality, he writes, “has remained entangled with the misleading concept of 
‘subjects’ of international law and the attendant question of attributions of 
statehood under international law”.43  
The idea of differentiating between the concepts of legal personality and the 
subjects of a legal system is not universally held by scholars. For some scholars 
the distinction between the two concepts is of no relevance and, as a result, they 
use the two concepts interchangeably.44 For these scholars, international legal 
personality is reserved for entities which enjoy both the substantive and procedural 
rights and duties in international law.45 Such entities are subjects of international 
law. This study, in a similar manner uses the concept of subject or legal person 
with reference to 
an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties and 
endowed with the capacity to take legal action in the international 
plane.46 
This means that an entity that has been conferred with international legal 
personality does not only have rights and obligations under the legal system, but 
can also directly enforce such rights in the appropriate forum. Van Hoof,47 is of the 
view that the concept of international personality “may be considered an empty 
shell because it does not give a clue as to what rights and/or duties the entity 
concerned has in the concrete case at hand”. To illustrate his point he argues that 
no two states enjoy the same rights and duties in international law. Because of the 
centrality of consent in international law, state duties vary according to what the 
different states have consented to.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
understandably, subjectivity and legal personality are one and the same, and there is nothing 
particularly wrong with treating them as such in pragmatic fashion”.  
43 Clapham Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 59. 
44  See Portmann Legal Personality in International Law 1.  
45  Charney 1983 Duke Law Journal 774.  
46  Menon PK “The International personality of individuals in international law: A broadening of 
the traditional doctrine” 1992 (1) Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 152; Raič 
Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 11. 
47  Van Hoof F “International Human Rights Obligations for Companies and Domestic Courts: 
An unlikely Combination? in Castermans-Holleman M, Van Hoof F and Smith J (eds) The 
Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century Human Rights, International Organisations and 
Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (Kluwer Law International The Hague 1998) 
53. 
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From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the concept of international legal 
personality in international law is highly contested among scholars.48 Despite the 
debates, contests and confusions, the concept of international legal personality 
continues to be of great importance in international law. It is only entities that have 
been granted legal personality or have been recognised by the legal system that 
can perform legal acts within the legal system.49 The concept of international legal 
personality serves as a “handle” through which the legal system engages the actor 
conceptually and practically.50  
In light of the foregoing discussion, it follows that the concept of international legal 
personality provides a possible means to holding MNCs directly accountable under 
international law. International law develops through its sources. If it is asserted 
that international law has conferred international legal personality on non-state 
actors, it becomes important to know the basis for such a conferral.51 The answer 
lies in the role played by the sources of the legal system in its development. 
3 SOURCE BASED DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
As lawmakers in international law, states are the primary decision makers and are 
therefore both the source and the authority of the law.52 Only states can decide 
which entities to empower with international personality, the method of conferring 
such personality and the purpose of international personality so conferred. The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice has encapsulated the sources of 
international law into the following:53  
  
                                                          
48  See Waschefort 2011 South African Yearbook of International Law 233. 
49  Klabbers J “The Concept of Legal Personality” in Fleurs J (ed) International Legal Personality 
(Ashgate Publishing Farnham 2010) 17. 
50  Hansen RF “The international legal personality of multinational enterprises: Treaty, custom 
and governance gap” 2012 (10) Globalist 78. 
51   Hickey JE “The source of international legal personality in the 21st century” 1997 (2) Hofstra 
Law and Policy Symposium 1. 
52  Fuachald OK and Stigen J “Corporate responsibility before international institutions” 2009 
(40) George Washington International Law Review 1029; Mutua M “Standard setting in 
human rights: Critique and prognosis” 2007 (29) Human Rights Quarterly 551. 
53  See Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) available at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II (accessed on 
15 May 2012). 
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3.1 Treaties54 
Treaties constitute the most conventional method in international law of creating 
rights and duties. 55  Accordingly, treaties “establish obligations with which 
international law requires the parties to comply”.56 From antiquity to modern-day 
society, treaties have been a constant feature in inter-state relations.57  These 
treaties covered a variety of issues that arose out of bilateral or multilateral 
relations of states. Until the late nineteen sixties, there were no set rules or 
guidelines in place to guide the process of treaty making. Since 1969, there are 
set rules of treaty making and these depend on who the parties to the treaty are. 
For inter-state treaties, the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties of 196958 (the 1969 Convention) apply. Article 2(1)(a) of this Convention 
defines a treaty as 
an international agreement concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation.  
For treaties concluded between a state and an International Organisation or 
between two International Organisations, the provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organisations or between 
International Organisations of 198659 (the 1986 Convention) apply.  
A treaty binds only the parties who have signed and ratified its terms.60 In line with 
a positivist conception of international law, consent plays an important role in the 
binding effect of a treaty. Determining the mode of state consent is itself a 
                                                          
54  Sometimes referred to in other texts as convention, covenant or charter. These terms are 
used interchangeable and do not affect the legal meaning. See Viljoen F International 
Human Rights Law in Africa (Oxford University Press Oxford 2007) 20.  
55  Okeke CN Controversial Subjects of International Law (Rotterdam University Press 
Rotterdam 1974) 192. 
56  Vázquez CM “Treaty-based rights and remedies of individuals” 1992 (92) Columbia Law 
Review 1082. 
57  See Shaw MN International Law 7th ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014) 12-
13. 
58  Available at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-
18232-English.pdf (accessed on 02 February 2013). 
59  Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf. 
(accessed on 02 February 2013). 
60  North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgment, 1969 ICJ Reports 3 at 24 (hereinafter the 
North Sea Continental Shelf cases).  
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challenge though as states do not always give explicit consent.61 The situation 
becomes different where a treaty reflects rules of customary international law. In 
the latter case, non-parties to a treaty are bound merely because a given treaty 
reaffirms the rules of customary international law. Should there be a need to 
supplement or amend an aspect of an existing treaty, then protocols are adopted. 
The legal effect of a protocol is the same as that of the treaty.62  
As discussed in chapters one and two of this study, treaty-signing powers have not 
always been the preserve of states. Historically, powerful corporations have had 
powers to wage wars and even enter into treaties with states. This practice has 
since dissipated as the international norms evolved. Since its inception, the United 
Nations has adopted a plethora of human rights treaties dealing with inter alia, the 
prevention of genocide, the advancement of cultural rights, elimination of 
discrimination against women and the rights of the child.63 On their own accord, 
states have entered into a wide range of bilateral and multilateral treaties on a 
catalogue of issues, including investment. 64  In essence, there is nothing that 
prevents states from adopting a treaty to regulate the activities of MNCs or from 
conferring treaty-making powers on corporations. In the field of international 
investment, states have signed treaties to facilitate trade. 65  On the African 
continent, the Organisation for Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) 
Treaty is but one example of what is possible for states to jointly do. The OHADA 
is an initiate of 17 African states aimed at harmonising commercial law in the 
French speaking zone of the African continent.66 
                                                          
61  Hansen RF “The international legal personality of multinational enterprises: Treaty, custom 
and the governance gap” 2010 (10) Global Jurist 13. 
62  Viljoen International Human Rights 20. 
63  See Buergenthal T “The evolving international human rights system” 2006 (100) American 
Journal of International Law 789-790.  
64  See Hansen 2012 Globalist 1-9. 
65  Born G “A new generation of international adjudication” 2012 (61) Duke Law Journal 832 - 
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66  See “Treaty on the Law of Uniform Business in Africa” available at: 
http://www.ohadalegis.com/anglais/traiteharmonisationgb.htm (accessed on 15 December 
2015). For an analysis of the OHADA Treaty see Samb M “Human Rights and Business Law 
in the African Context” in Mancuso S and Fombad CM (eds) Comparative Law in Africa: 
Methodologies and Concepts (Juta Cape Town 2015) 168-174. 
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A treaty-based approach to granting international legal personality with a view to 
holding them accountable does not seem to have found favour with both states 
and business. As seen from the discussion in the first chapter of this study, most 
states from the developed countries and their corporations seem reluctant if not 
out rightly opposed to the idea of adopting a treaty in relation to MNCs. The 
closest the international community has come towards having an international 
treaty for MNCs was with the 2003 Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights67 (the Draft Norms). However, this was never realised, as the Draft 
Norms have since been jettisoned and have been overtaken by other international 
initiatives such as the Guiding Principles arising from the Ruggie mandate.  
Once again, there is a renewed call to explore possibilities of having a treaty as a 
tool to regulate the activities of MNCs.68 The call seems to suggest that until there 
is a treaty in place to regulate the activities of MNCs internationally, certain states 
and civil society activists will never rest. Ruggie, though, is not convinced that the 
latest call will yield the desired results. Recounting the various attempts to regulate 
the activities of MNCs by treaty going back to the 1970s and how these have not 
succeeded, Ruggie asks:  
Will this attempt to impose binding international obligations on 
transnational corporations [MNCs] turn out to be another instance 
of the classic dysfunction of doing the same thing over and over 
and expecting a different result? Or might the negotiations come to 
reflect more deeply on the reasons for this prior record and move 
in a productive direction?69  
                                                          
67  Available at: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.En.   
(Accessed on 27 June 2011). 
68  See Zhang J “Negotiations kick off on a binding treaty on business and human rights” 
available at: https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/11/26/negotiations-kick-off-on-a-binding-treaty-on-
business-and-human-rights/ (accessed on 10 December 2015). 
69  Ruggie JG “The past as a prologue? A moment of truth for business and human rights treaty” 
available at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/Treaty_Final.pdf (accessed on 27 
January 2015). 
167 
 
Predictably, Ruggie is of the view that the only workable solution, for now, lies in 
the Guiding Principles that emanated from his mandate and were unanimously 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council.   
3.2 Custom 
Like treaties, custom is dependent on consent, but is unlike treaties not written 
down. In case of a dispute as to the existence of a custom, the consent of the 
state will be inferred from its conduct or practice. For a practice to become a rule 
of customary international law, it must satisfy two requirements: It must be a 
settled practice (usus) and the practice must be accepted as an obligation (opinio 
juris). Settled practice is difficult to prove, and it becomes even more difficult to 
ascertain how long a practice should be in practice for before it can become 
settled practice.70 For customary law to be established, both requirements of usus 
and opinio juris must be satisfied. For opinio juris, a state concerned must have a 
sense of obligation towards the settled practice. Like practice, it is difficult to prove 
the existence of opinio juris.71 This then begs the question: If it is this difficult to 
establish the two requirements at the level of state-to-state relations, how much 
more difficult would it be at the level of the state versus an individual? Viljoen 
concludes that custom is less helpful in the human rights discourse as it is difficult 
to collect empirical proof of how states behave towards individual citizens.72 The 
situation is slightly different in the case of MNCs though. 
In the absence of treaties to regulate the activities of MNCs in relation to human 
rights, courts have turned to custom. For instance, in Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum,73 a claim was brought against a corporation alleging violation of the law 
of nations under the Alien Tort Act (ATCA).74 The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit dismissed the claim on the basis of the absence of custom. 
The challenge with custom is that there are no guidelines on how to determine it 
and, as a result, a lot is left to inference. While it is accepted that custom takes 
time to develop, it is not clear as to exactly when custom is formed. As a result, 
                                                          
70  See Columbia v Peruvian 1950 ICJ Reports 266. 
71  North Sea Continental Shelf case at 3.  
72  Viljoen International Human Rights 27. 
73  621 F. 3d 111 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2010 148-149 (hereinafter the Kiobel Second 
Circuit Court decision). 
74  Alien Tort Act 23 U.S.C of 1789 (hereinafter referred to as the ATCA). 
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custom and its development is a contentious issue among scholars.75 Custom 
develops organically and does not crystallise at a particular time.76 A comparative 
observation to note is that custom operates in a slightly different way from treaties. 
A treaty, unless it reflects a customary law norm of international law, would not 
apply to states that are not party to the particular treaty. Custom once established, 
applies to all states unless a state is a persistent objector. If a state does not 
register its objection then consent would be inferred from its silence.77 While the 
Second World War marks the turning point in how international law relates to the 
individual, there is no particular moment in history at which limited international 
legal personality was conferred on the individual. The limited international legal 
personality of individuals in international law has developed gradually through 
custom.78 
 
Based on both treaty and custom, Hansen has constructed an argument for the 
international personality of MNCs in international law.79 His argument is premised 
on the simple basis that international investment law is part of public international 
law.80 Under international investment law, about 173 states have signed more than 
2600 bilateral investment treaties.81 Through these treaties, certain international 
law rights and duties arise vis-à-vis the signing state and the MNC concerned. On 
this basis Hansen82 asserts that 
 
states cannot have their cake and eat it. Either MNE [MNC] investors 
are international persons with international law rights or they are not. 
For states that have ratified treaties granting international law rights 
and personality to MNEs, MNEs are international persons, 
recognised as holding legal personality within the international legal 
                                                          
75  Hansen 2012 Globalist 18. 
76  Bilchitz D “A Chasm Between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’? A Critique of the Normative Foundations of 
the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles” in Deva S and Bilchitz D (eds) Human 
Rights Obligations of Business: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect? 
(Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2013) 114. 
77  Hansen 2012 Globalist 18. 
78  Hansen 2012 Globalist 13-16. 
79  Hansen 2012 Globalist 1-129. 
80  Hansen 2012 Globalist 3. 
81  Hansen  2012 Globalist 7. 
82  Hansen  2012 Globalist 15-16. 
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system, with a standing ability to acquire rights, duties and claim 
capacity within the system.  
 
If followed to its logical conclusion, the argument raised by Hansen makes great 
sense. Both international human rights law and international investment law 
operate in the same realm of international law and are part of it, albeit with 
nuanced differences. Granting international legal personality to MNCs under 
international investment law and not under the international human rights law 
therefore creates an anomalous situation. 83  The anomaly is that under 
international investment law, MNCs have international legal personality and 
therefore hold certain rights and duties, while under international human rights law 
they have rights and not duties. This anomalous situation is a reflection of the 
ambivalent practice by states in as far as the international legal personality of 
MNCs is concerned.   
 
3.3 The general principles of law recognised by civilized nations 
In accordance with legal theory, this is the most contested of all the sources, 
because it strikes at the heart of the debate between natural law theorists and 
positivists. Since states do not need to give consent to this source, natural law 
theorists have argued that this source confirms the natural law basis of 
international law.84 Adherents of the positivistic conception of international law do 
not find this source to be acceptable.85 Contested as it may be, this source may be 
of assistance to an international tribunal or court in a situation where both treaty 
and custom are silent on a matter, or not applicable. The difficulty with this source, 
however, is with regard to its binding effect on a party to a dispute.  
3.4 Judicial decisions or precedent and the teachings of the highly 
published publicists 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice is to be read with 
the provisions of article 59.86 In international law, reliance on judicial decisions and 
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precedents is problematic. Because of its decentralised nature, international law 
also has decentralised judicial bodies.87 As Oellers-Frahm points out, international 
judicial bodies exist on the same footing and are therefore not obliged to follow 
each other’s precedent even when there is an overlap in the subject-matter under 
consideration.88 Despite the provisions of article 59, Dugard notes that there is a 
tendency among the courts to follow their own previous decisions and the 
decisions of other international tribunals.89  
Unlike in earlier years, reference to highly published publicists as sources of 
international law is on the wane.90 It is axiomatic that the latter would be the case 
given the constantly changing challenges that the modern-day international human 
rights discourse is confronted with, as opposed to what the highly published jurists 
would have reflected on. A view is gaining momentum that equates scholars with 
publicists contemplated by the Statute. 91  This is also not very helpful as 
international law has a whole host of scholars with divergent views. For instance, 
on the issue of corporations and human rights, there are as many scholars as 
there are views on each side of the debate. This should however not be of great 
concern as reliance on both the judicial decisions and the teachings of the highly 
published publicists is generally used only as a subsidiary means for the 
determination of the rules of the law.92 
Like almost all other areas of international law, the source based analysis of 
international law is also contested. In this regard Hollis writes, “[s]cholars and 
practitioners have never been able to agree on a definitive list of what sources 
contain the rules of international law, let alone what method, or methods, provide 
the basis for obligation for such rules”.93 This notwithstanding, Article 38(1) does 
not constitute a closed list of sources for international law. There are sources that 
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89  Dugard International Law 35. 
90  Dugard International Law 36. 
91   Kiobel Second Circuit Court decision at 131; Estreicher S “Rethinking the binding effect of 
customary international law” 2003 (44) Virginia Journal of International Law 7. 
92  See Article 38(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention. 
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are non-binding such as declarations and resolutions of the United Nations and 
other international organisations. 94  As evidenced by the sources above, 
normatively and institutionally, international law and international human rights law 
are intertwined. The norms and ideals inscribed in both the Charter of the United 
Nations95 and the Universal Declarations of Human Rights96 impose duties on 
states for the protection of human rights to be enjoyed by individuals. Above all, 
member states have undertaken to fulfil the obligations they have undertaken 
under the Charter.97 The human rights ideology was also to serve as the basis for 
states to recognise individuals as subjects of international law.98 The position of the 
individual in international law gave rise to both philosophical debates and theoretical 
debates to be discussed in the next segment. 
 4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
4.1  Philosophical foundations 
The concept of international legal personality is inextricably intertwined with that of 
international law itself. How one conceives of the concept of international legal 
personality inevitably impacts on what one perceives to be the nature of 
international law.99 This is so because the evolution of the concept of international 
legal personality is intertwined with the evolution of international law itself. 100 
Accordingly, Green points out that one cannot take a stand on issues of 
international legal personality without implicating more fundamental concepts such 
as state sovereignty and the nature of international legal obligations. 101 
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Conversely, one cannot take a stand on the nature of international law and its 
obligations without implicating the concept of international legal personality.  
Legal theory provides the key to understanding the trajectory that the debates on 
international law and its nature have followed over the years. As Derham asserts 
“any discussion of legal personality almost necessarily opens up the field of legal 
theory”. 102  The debates on international legal personality are steeped in the 
philosophical positions of natural law adherents and positivists on the very nature 
of international law itself. Natural law or law of nature was conceived and 
developed by the Greeks and later by the Romans. The central tenet of natural law 
is that there are certain laws whose content is from nature and therefore should 
have a universal appeal. Early philosophers argued that natural law was higher 
than earthly laws. They understood natural law to embody elementary principles of 
justice, which were apparent to the eye of reason alone.103 Such unchangeable 
principles transcend the will and consent of human beings. 104  For natural law 
lawyers, therefore, the binding effect of international law did not depend on the will 
or consent of states.  
Over the centuries, there have been different inputs from different scholars 
inclined to natural law. These scholars, though, did not depart from the employ of 
nature to explain reality, but have instead added nuanced variations to it. 105 
Thomas Aquinas for instance, introduced a divine element to the debate. He 
taught that natural law was part of the law of God which was discoverable by 
human reason.106 In his view, natural law complemented that part of eternal law 
that has been divinely revealed through the scriptures.107 For him, natural law 
served as the basis for conferring immutable rights upon individuals.108 Natural law 
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was to serve as the philosophical basis for the concept of natural rights theory 
which is closely associated with the concept of human rights.109 The concept of 
human rights owes its origins to the work of both Thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke.110 Until the arrival of the two scholars, rights were understood as privileges 
to people given according to status. For natural law lawyers, therefore, the 
individual is the primary unit of international law and in this regard the role of the 
state is viewed and understood in relation to its obligations to the individual.111  
Positivism, on the other hand, borrowed a lot of its methodological approach from 
the Renaissance era with its emphasis on reason and empiricism. However unlike 
other theories that base their methodology on deduction and reasoning only, 
positivism bases its theories on empirical data. The core of positivists’ argument is 
that only those principles which have been adopted by states may be deemed to 
be law.112 Their conception of international law rules is premised on the primacy of 
the autonomous sovereign state to an extent that the only limitations to state 
sovereignty are those to which states have consented.113 According to this view, 
states give their express consent through treaties, while implied consent may be 
given through usage, which is custom.114  
The two approaches are not without their limitations though. According to 
Purvis,115 natural law theory was “condemned as religious, arbitrary, subjective, 
unprincipled, and unknowable”, while positivism, on the other hand, was seen as 
being “excessively historical, unable to assure that international law reflected the 
normative beliefs of the day”. Despite their inherent limitations, the two theories 
have provided a basis for understanding the different trajectories that the debates 
on the nature of international law have followed over the years.116 The scholarly 
debates became so predictable in that where the natural law theory dominated, the role of 
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the individual in international law became the centre of focus, and where positivism 
dominated, state sovereignty became the focal point. Because international institutional
117 
mechanisms were created at the height of state sovereignty, most of them, as it 
will be discussed in the next chapter, reflect the dominance of the state-centric 
paradigm.   
4.2  Theoretical foundations of the concept of international personality 
Over the years, bodies other than states, have been recognised as subjects of 
international law, capable of incurring certain international rights and duties. 
Modern international law writers reject the view that only states are subjects of 
international law.118 The challenge though, is that outside the state-centric model 
of conceptualising international law, there are no set criteria in place to determine 
international legal personality of non-state entities. In addition, there is no set 
formula or criteria to determine the horizontal evolution of the concept of 
international legal personality to include non-state actors. Furthermore, it is not 
clear as to what factual reality must prevail before the international legal system 
can broaden its list of subjects.  The question as to which entities can qualify as 
subjects of international law thus remains a debated one.  According to 
Lauterpacht,119 the debate over subjects of international law has been mainly two-
fold. First, the debate revolved around the controversy as to whether only states 
and individuals were subjects of international law. Secondly, the debate focused 
specifically on the position of individuals. In as far as individuals were concerned, 
the debate was whether individuals could possess rights directly given to them by 
customary law and treaties. Three theories or conceptions120 have emerged from 
these debates:  
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4.2.1  The realist theory121 
Philosophically, this theory is deeply rooted in the positivistic conception of 
international law. Adherents of this theory argue that an entity called a state is real 
and exists in and under international law, separate from human beings. State 
sovereignty plays a pivotal role in the conception of international law. The state 
therefore is a person in law with legal personality.122 Realist scholars argue that 
the concept of international legal personality has relevance in as far as it relates to 
states, but outside that it has no relevance. 123  In their view, only states are 
subjects of international law and human beings and other non-state actors are only 
objects of international law. The realist theory has received criticism on the basis 
that entities other than states also possess international legal personality and that 
this theory is therefore no longer tenable.124 The core of the argument advanced 
by the realists is that even if individuals derive some benefits under international 
law, such a benefit is derived not by virtue of a right which accrues to them, but by 
virtue of a right enjoyed by the state of which the individual is a national.125 The 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case126 provides an illustration of this. Mr 
Mavrommatis, a Greek national, was granted certain concessions by the Ottoman 
Empire which was the sovereign power over Palestine at the time of the signing of 
a contract.  When the League of Nations assigned the British mandate over 
Palestine, the British government refused to recognise concessionary rights which 
Mr Mavrommatis had. Greece took up the claim of Mr Mavrommatis and brought it 
to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).  The court held that:          
It is true that the dispute was at first between a private person and a 
state ... Subsequently, the Greek Government took up the case. The 
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dispute then entered upon a new phase; it entered the domain of 
international law, and became a dispute between two states ... It is an 
elementary principle of international law that a state is entitled to protect 
its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law 
committed by another state, from whom they have been unable to 
obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case 
of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or 
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a state is in reality 
asserting its own rights - its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, 
respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, 
whether the present dispute originates in an injury to a private interest, 
which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes, is 
irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a state has taken up a case on 
behalf of one of its subjects before an international tribunal, in the eyes 
of the latter the state is sole claimant.127 
Portmann128 points out that the formulation in the Mavrommatis case provides the 
basis for diplomatic protection in that the ill-treatment of a foreign national affects 
the international rights of the home state of the national, and not the right of the 
individual. When Greece took up the matter to the PCIJ it was asserting its own 
right, not the right of Mr Mavrommatis. The second observation he makes is that 
the international legal system does not see individuals as separate entities in their 
own right, but as nationals of a particular state. The net effect of this is that only 
states are subjects of international law. The realist view has also impacted locus 
standi in international courts and tribunals. With the exception of some regional 
courts, the general rule is that individuals lack standing to assert violations of 
international treaties. 129  For questions of jurisdiction and the international 
protection of the individual, the question of nationality becomes of paramount 
importance as it establishes a link between the individual and the state.130  
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It should be noted, however, that nothing in international law rules precludes 
states from conferring rights on individuals which are enforceable in international 
law. This was the approach adopted by the PCIJ in the Danzig Railway Officials 
case.131 In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, Danzig was 
ceded by Germany and became a free city. Danzig then entered into an 
agreement with Poland according to which Danzig railways were to be 
administered by Poland. A further agreement, the endgültiges Beamtenabkommen 
was entered into which regulated the entry of Danzig railway workers into Polish 
employment. Some of the Danzig railway workers brought employment claims 
based on the Beamtenabkommen. On whether the Beamtenabkommen, being an 
international treaty applicable to state parties was also applicable to individuals, 
the court said:  
It may be readily admitted that, according to a well-established principle 
of international law, the Beamtenabkommen, being an international 
agreement, cannot as such create direct rights and obligations for 
private individuals. But it cannot be disputed that the very object of an 
international agreement, according to the intention of the contracting 
parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some definite rules 
creating individual rights and obligations and enforceable by the 
national courts. That there is such an intention in the present case can 
be established by reference to the terms of the Beamtenabkommen.132 
This decision has received mixed reactions. Scholars like Lauterpacht have 
interpreted the view above as an acknowledgment by the court that treaties, if 
parties so intend, can apply directly to individuals.133 The view by Lauterpacht 
accords with the positivistic view of international law that states are only bound by 
those rules to which they have expressly consented. If states create obligations for 
themselves through a treaty, then the will of such states should be given effect. 
For Portmann, 134  the Danzig decision is a continuation of the state-centric 
approach to international personality, “but applied in such a way as to partly open 
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the (back) door for involving the individual in international law”. Like in the case of 
individuals, it is submitted that nothing prevents states from conferring rights and 
direct obligations on MNCs, by means of a treaty. 
4.2.2  Fictional theory 
Scholars who hold this view stand diametrically opposed to the views of the 
realists. Their argument is hinged on the fact that the core of the law, whether 
under national or international law, is to regulate human conduct. It is to human 
beings that norms, whether of municipal or international law, apply. A state in their 
view is only an abstract structure acting through individuals.135  This is the view 
that was adopted by the Nuremburg Tribunal after the Second World War which 
held that: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who committed such crimes 
can the provisions of international law be enforced.136 
The fictional theory argues that the legal personality of the state cannot be real 
and is therefore only a fiction. The fictional theorists do not dispute the fact that 
norms of international law were conventionally addressed to the state. The core of 
their argument is that, indirectly, the same norms are addressed to individuals. In 
concordance with the natural law theory, the fictional theory gives primacy to 
individuals as subject of international law.137  
Raič138  is of the view that the debate between the realists and fictionalists is 
misdirected as international law does not define its actors on the basis of realness 
or unrealness. International law, he argues, defines its subjects on the basis of 
legal rules. It is these rules that would guide states as they decide on which 
entities should be subjects of international law. This argument of Raič is equally 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, the rules of international law are applicable 
only when determining the legal subjectivity of states. When the issue of the 
subjects of international law involves non-state actors, the matter is left solely to 
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the discretion of the states and for this there are no clear guiding rules. Secondly, 
there is an element of international law rules that is fictional. For instance, legal 
personality is itself a legal construct139 and therefore there might be some basis for 
arguing that a state is but an abstract in international law. 
4.2.3  Functional theory 
The functional theory provides a golden mean between the two extremes of both 
the positivists and the naturalist theories.140 This theory was proposed by the post 
Second World War scholars who were frustrated by the indeterminacy of 
international legal theory of the time. 141  These scholars sought to move 
international law out of its classical dilemma by adopting an approach that is 
pragmatic and functional. 142  Reality as opposed to abstracts became the 
contextual basis of their scholarship.143 In as far as international legal personality 
is concerned, the functionalists sought to develop a progressive approach to 
international law that is inclusive of non-state actors.144 They were of the view that 
international legal personality should not be restricted to limited subjects but 
should be granted to those entities which are capable of performing legal functions 
under international law.145 These entities perform certain legal functions and have 
distinct separate legal personalities in international law separate from those of 
states.146  The functionalists therefore sought a vision of international law that 
acknowledges the existence and proliferation of non-states.147 As a result, they did 
not find concepts like subjects of international law and international legal 
personality of much assistance in their project.148  
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5 THE ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As it is with most international law concepts, almost every aspect of the concept of 
international legal personality in international law is contested. The task of 
determining the legal personality of international law subjects is to a large degree 
left to scholars.  As a result, the debates on international legal personality have 
been unbridled, and have therefore resulted in varied opinions. Clapham highlights 
this point when he writes that: 
The list of subjects of international law is determined by the text-
book writers and not by any authoritative decision making body. 
Even if bodies such as the International Court of Justice and the 
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have pronounced 
on the topics of subjects and personality, this can only represent 
an ad hoc declaration of the situation rather than a constitutive act 
creating personality.149  
As seen from the preceding segment, most of the discussions of the concept of 
international legal personality are, as a result, steeped in the discussions put 
forward by various scholars. Scholars make a distinction between the primary 
subjects of international law and secondary ones.150 Primary subjects are those 
subjects that attain their existence directly from the rules of international law itself, 
and secondary subjects being those entities that derive their existence from the 
formal decisions of primary subjects.151 A commonly held position in international 
law is that as primary subjects of international law, states would confer personality 
on secondary subjects either by an international instrument such as a treaty, or by 
acquiescence.152 This approach, as already discussed above, is not without its 
own limitations.  
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Meijknecht153 provides an interesting reflection on the acquisition of international 
legal personality. Basing her reflection on the work of the German scholar Gierke, 
she explains that legal personality can emerge in one of three ways. Gierke’s work 
was a reflection on how legal personality evolved within the German domestic law 
context. Meijknecht borrowed Gierke’s conceptualisation to explain how legal 
personality functions within the context of international law. Firstly, personality can 
emerge through the factual existence of an entity. Secondly, legal personality can 
be attributed through the use of the law. Thirdly, legal personality can be attributed 
to an entity through an official document. The three distinctions, as she elaborates, 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Although the German domestic law may 
assist in determining international legal personality, it has certain limitations.154 
The first limitation is that the distinctions made are silent on the context that may 
necessitate the need to confer legal personality on an entity. Entities assert 
themselves differently on the international plane. Not all entities adopt a passive 
approach and wait for the system to confer personality on them. Some entities, like 
liberation movements and insurgents, assert themselves in demand for 
recognition.155  
The determination of international legal personality is complex and may depend on 
many factors.  As Shaw writes:  
A range of factors needs to be carefully examined before it can be 
determined whether an entity has international legal personality 
and, if so, what rights, duties and competences apply in the 
particular case. Personality is a relative phenomenon varying with 
circumstances. It will always involve a test of judgment and 
perception of the situation at hand and the overall context of the 
current nature and requirements of the international community at 
large.156  
Some scholars are of the opinion that the focus should not be on how international 
personality is conferred, but rather on what an entity is capable of doing, as an 
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indication that such entity possesses legal personality in international law. For this 
they analyse the rights and obligations which the entity enjoys as evidence of the 
fact that such an entity possesses international legal personality.157  
From the above discussion, it is clear that the concept of international legal 
personality is highly contested and debated. The debates are not any less robust 
in the context of the legal personality of states, for which international law has 
developed certain criteria. 
5.1 States as subjects of international law 
By way of a brief background, the Peace Treaty of Westphalia158 marked a turning 
point in the development of modern international law and the power of sovereign 
states. For international law, Westphalia marked the beginning of its development. 
International law was secularised and was therefore freed from any religious 
background.159 In as far as the sovereign state is concerned, Westphalia marked a 
shift from the hierarchical model of societal organisation to a new model consisting 
of equality of sovereign states not subject to any external authority. 160  The 
sovereign state was to play a pivotal role in the evolution of modern international 
law over the years. Despite the increasingly important role the nation state had 
assumed, there were no set rules in the early centuries to determine statehood for 
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international law purposes. Existing states had the discretion whether or not to 
recognise the new entity as a state.161   
Early classical writers were not concerned about any of the processes of state 
creation. A new state could either be formed by integrating two separate states or 
through a process of dividing an existing one. How a state came into being was 
thus not of importance to them. They accepted the concept of the state without 
giving a definition to it. It was only in the later centuries that recognition became an 
important requirement for statehood, and even then it was discussed in relation to 
state consent.162 Both recognition and consent, at least in as far as positivists were 
concerned, formed the basis of international law. International law became binding 
only to those states that had consented to it. Recognition became a tool through 
which to welcome states into the community of nations.163 Entities so recognised, 
became states and thus international legal persons.  
Though international legal personality has expanded to include other subjects, 
statehood continues to be the main co-ordinating principle of international law. 
Unlike secondary subjects, the legal subjectivity of states originates from a de 
facto process and not from any formal decision of existing subjects. 164  The 
existence of original subjects (in other words, states) is dependent on the 
existence of a factual situation as required by law. This view however should also 
be qualified. International legal personality has both a juridical and a political 
dimension to it.165 A commonly held view by scholars is that to attain international 
legal personality, an entity seeking to become a state must meet the set criteria for 
statehood and also be recognised as a state by other existing states.166 As it will 
be discussed below, the political requirement is fulfilled when an entity seeking to 
be a state satisfies the criteria for statehood, while the juridical aspect is 
dependent on recognition of such an entity by existing states.    
                                                          
161   Crawford J The Creation of States in International Law 2nd ed (Oxford University Press 
Oxford 2006) 6–7.  
162  Crawford The Creation of States 13.  
163   Crawford The Creation of States 15. 
164  Cassese International Law in a Divided World 77. 
165  Ip EC “The power of international personality in regional integration” UNU-CRIS Working 
Papers, W-2010/4 available at: http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/06331.pdf 
(accessed on 22 July 2011). 
166 Recognition is discussed in the subsection below. 
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As discussed above, states are the principal law creators in international law. 
According to Van Hoof, states are subjects par excellence, while some non-state 
entities have limited and derivative personality. 167  The rising number of other 
subjects of international law owes their existence in law to states. The existence of 
non-state entities as secondary subjects of international law thus depends on the 
will of states.168 The sovereign state, therefore, continues to be of significance to 
the evolution of international law. According to Klabbers, there is a symbiosis 
between states and international law in that “the existence of the state facilitates 
international law, whereas the very structure of international law facilitates 
statehood”.169 
Despite its importance in international law, there is no set definition of what a state 
is.170 The existence of a state in international law is determined with reference to 
questions of fact and the law.171 The criteria for statehood are clearly set out by 
the rules of international law. Article I of the Montevideo Convention of the Rights 
and Duties of States of 1933 provides that:  
The State as a person of international law should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined 
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations 
with other States.172  
It is generally accepted that the Montevideo criteria have attained the status of 
general customary international law.173 Though still not uniform, there seems to be 
an emerging viewpoint among scholars that respect for human rights and self-
determination is becoming an additional requirement for statehood.174 This study is 
                                                          
167 Van Hoof International Human Rights Obligations for Companies and Domestic Courts 52–
53. 
168  Agarwal International Law and Human Rights 61. 
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171  Shaw International Law 144. 
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of the view that the requirement of respect for human rights and self-determination 
is a rather promising development for the protection of human rights especially 
given the fact that, historically, the manner in which an entity exercised its 
authority within its territorial borders was of no concern to the international 
community.175 There are now some sporadic signs that respect for human rights 
and self-determination is becoming a pre-condition for statehood.176 There is even 
a viewpoint that within the United Nations (UN), advancement of self-determination 
has become a criterion to be considered in the decision on statehood.177 
Although an entity may meet the criteria for statehood as prescribed by the 
Montevideo Convention, a question may still be asked whether such an entity 
becomes a state for international law purposes. An even more important question 
for this study is whether such an entity has international personality or not. 
Whether the fulfilment of the Montevideo requirements by an entity marks the birth 
of a state is a debatable question.178 This question relates to what Dugard179 
describes as the “most maligned and controversial branch of international law” - 
the law of recognition. It is to the law of recognition that this study now turns. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
self-determination writes that: “A significant body of practice attests to the reality of the link; 
but it remains to be seen whether self-determination as such has become a criterion of 
Statehood; and if so, with what effects.” 
175  Dugard International Law 87 writes that: “Neither the League of Nations nor any State raised 
objections to South Africa’s racial policies when it became an independent member of the 
community of states. Since 1945 many new States with poor human rights record have been 
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suggestion that the recognition of States with outrageous human rights records should be 
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176  Dugard International Law 87 illustrates this point by using the example of the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in 1991. The European Community made it clear that it would only 
recognise those states with evidence of some willingness and capacity to respect and 
protect human rights. However, this was not fulfilled as Croatia was recognised by the 
European Community before giving assurances that it would protect the rights of minorities. 
Bosnia was recognised at the time when one of the great tragedies of the centuries was 
unfolding within its borders. 
177  Dugard The Law of Recognition and the United Nations (Grotius Publications Limited 
Cambridge 1987) 79. Admission to the UN is briefly discussed below. 
178   For a detailed discussion of recognition see: Dugard International Law 91-102;  Dugard  The 
Law of Recognition,   Shaw International Law 321-322; Raič Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination 82-88 
179  Dugard The Law of Recognition 1. See also Kelsen H “Recognition in international law: 
Theoretical observations” 1941 (35) American Journal of International Law 605 who points 
out that “[t]he problem of recognition of States and governments has neither in theory nor in 
practice been solved satisfactorily. Hardly any other question is more controversial, or leads 
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5.1.1  The law of recognition 
The role of recognition in international law cannot be underestimated. It is the 
foundation upon which international law is built.180 To the positivistic conception of 
international law, which views international law as a body of rules that governs 
inter-state relations, recognition plays an even more important role. Its importance 
lies in the fact that it constitutes the branch of law that determines the existence of 
states.181 In addition, recognition encapsulates some of the fundamental principles 
of international law such as sovereignty, autonomy, and consent. At no stage are 
autonomous sovereign states compelled to recognise other states, insurgents and 
governments. Recognition is an act which sovereign states freely exercise. 182 
Despite its importance, however, there is still no clearly formulated position in 
international law of what recognition entails. International law has afforded states a 
lot of discretion with regard to which entities they recognise, on what basis and 
how. As a result, state practice reveals a lack of uniformity, and this has led to 
recognition being “badly misunderstood and needlessly confused”. 183  In both 
theory and practice, recognition has not only attracted controversy, but has led to 
paradoxical situations.184 
Recognition serves two purposes - a political and a legal one.185 A political act is 
purely dependent on the subjective decision of the recognising state. This, 
according to Menon, is a determination based on convenience and national 
interest.186 Through the act of political recognition, an existing state affirms that it 
is willing to enter into political and other relations with the entity which it recognises 
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as a state.187 Factually, therefore, even if an entity seeking to become a state has 
met all the requirements for statehood, such an entity still needs other existing 
states to recognise it. In an attempt to develop a legal theory of recognition, 
Lauterpacht advanced a view that as soon as an entity has met all the 
requirements of statehood, such an entity had a right to be recognised while 
existing states had a duty to recognise it.188   
International law prescribes neither the process nor the form of recognition. Just 
as states are free to decide as to which entities to recognise, states are equally 
free to determine how they want to recognise other states or governments. A state 
can expressly recognise an entity as a state or imply such recognition in its 
practice. 189  The act of recognition can either be a unilateral act from the 
recognising state or a bilateral one in that it would involve mutual transactions 
between the recognising state and the state being recognised.190  This therefore 
means that an entity becomes a state even if it is recognised by one state only. 
The fact that an entity has been recognised by one state does not necessarily 
make it a state for other states, as it is the case with Palestine and Kosovo. Other 
states must also exercise their discretion to determine the statehood of such an 
entity for themselves. This uncertainty is one of the inherent weaknesses of 
unilateral recognition in that it has the potential to create an untenable situation of 
creating an entity that is a state for one set of states and not a state for others.  
Since its formation, the UN has played an important role in, among others, 
international diplomacy with far-reaching political consequences for nation states. 
Membership to the UN is by admission subject to meeting statehood 
requirements.191 Given the role that the UN has assumed in international relations, 
it follows that nation states stand to benefit from becoming members of the 
community of nations. Being admitted to the UN, however, is not necessarily the 
same as being recognised by the institution.192 The UN does not have the power 
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to recognise states or governments.193 A debate has emerged among scholars 
regarding the admission of states to the UN vis-a-vis recognition. Menon194 is of 
the view that admission to the UN carries more weight than recognition of 
statehood. The core of his argument is that admission to the UN adds to the rights 
and duties of the state under the Charter of the United Nations.  He articulates this 
view as follows:  
Articles 2(1) and (4) make it clear that every member is regarded 
by the United Nations as a sovereign state with a position under 
general international law equal to that of other sovereign states. 
As such, it would be reasonable to draw the conclusion that the 
members who voted for admission of a state to the United Nations, 
unless they express their will of objection, are to be considered to 
have granted recognition of that state implicitly.195  
 
In a similar vein, Dugard196 is of the view that the UN has in the past admitted 
colonies as members and therefore secured their statehood through admission to 
the body. Secondly, existing member states of the UN have also used their vote in 
the Security Council or the General Assembly to acknowledge the statehood of a 
new member as opposed to providing formal notification of recognition. Thirdly, 
Article 4 of the Charter and the political organs of the UN consider statehood in 
admitting new entities as members. Drawing from the dictum of the Reparation for 
Injuries case 197  that “the vast majority of the members of the international 
community had the power, in conformity with international law, to bring into being 
an entity possessing objective international personality”, he concludes that the UN 
has capacity to confirm the existence of a new state. Based on the foregoing, a 
case can be made for collective recognition by institutions such as the UN, 
European Union and African Union, for instance.  
The second purpose which recognition serves is a legal one. Legally, a 
determination as to whether international law applies to the new entity in its 
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relationship with other states is done with reference to recognition.198 Ruda199 
defines recognition of states as 
a unilateral act whereby one or more States admit, whether expressly or 
tacitly, that they regard the said political entity as a State; consequently, 
they also admit that the said entity is an international legal personality, 
and as such is capable of acquiring international rights and contracting 
international obligations.  
 
For international law purposes, the legal aspect of recognition is important as it 
endows the new entity with international legal personality. An entity that meets the 
Montevideo Convention requirements but has not been recognised, is legally  
without international personality. As was pointed out earlier, unlike municipal law, 
in as far as legal personality is concerned, international law is decentralised and 
does not have a central body with established procedures to determine the 
existence of facts to which certain legal principles can be applied to the concept of 
international personality. International law, as Kelsen points out, has instead 
empowered states to decide on issues of legal personality.200 The net effect of this 
is that an a priori claim to legal personality in international law cannot be made.201  
One of the problems raised by recognition is that state practice reveals a lack of 
consistency in relation to the application of recognition.202 In addition, international 
scholars are divided on the role of recognition vis-a-vis the Montevideo 
requirements. The debate on recognition has led to two different schools of 
thought: the constitutive and the declaratory theories.   
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5.1.1.1 The constitutive theory 
The constitutive theory of recognition asserts that it is only through recognition that 
a state comes into being under international law. According to Kelsen,203 what the 
constitutive theory means is that before recognition, the unrecognised entity does 
not legally exist in relation to the recognising state.  
It must be pointed out that the number of states in the international community has 
increased significantly in the last centuries.204 Even more important is the fact that 
ideologically, religiously and politically the world is polarised. Chances are that not 
all states will confer recognition on the same entity at the same time. Some states 
may choose not to recognise the new entity at all. This choice may not necessarily 
be based on the non-existence or existence of the factual reality, but on certain 
political or strategic considerations. 205  This concurrent recognition and non-
recognition of the same entity has the potential to create an anomalous situation in 
international law. Some of the objections against the constitutive theory are 
located within this potential anomaly. According to Dugard, 206  if an entity is 
recognised by state A and not by state B, it becomes in effect both a state and a 
non-state.  Legally, this anomalous situation means that an entity in such a 
position could not derive international law rights and also does not have an 
international law obligation not to attack its neighbours. The net effect of this is that 
an entity exists, but does not exist for international law purposes. As Raič 207 
correctly points out, “it is incomprehensible that a State may exist outside 
international law”. Dugard208 is of the view that this anomalous situation can be 
remedied by admission through the collective recognition of states through the UN. 
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The basis for his argument is that if all members within the UN recognise each 
other as states, there will be no room for an anomalous situation to arise where 
the same entity is considered to be a state by some states and not a state by 
others.  
5.1.1.2 The declaratory theory 
The declaratory theory of recognition, on the other hand, holds that once there is 
factual evidence that the criteria for statehood are fulfilled, a state comes into 
existence. Recognition in this regard, becomes only an affirmation of what is 
already in existence. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention of the Rights and 
Duties of States provides that:  
The political existence of the State is independent of recognition of the 
independence of other States. Even before recognition the State has the 
right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its 
conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organise itself as it 
sees fit, to legislate upon its interest, administer its services, and to 
define its jurisdiction and competence of its courts.209  
 
For the declaratory theory, statehood thus comes into being once there is an 
existence of the factual situation. The declaratory theory is however not without its 
limitations. As Raič210 notes:  
 
The theory assumes that the existence of a mere factual situation, which 
is a result of the fulfilment of the criteria for Statehood would lead ipso 
facto to international personality, which is incorrect. For, international 
personality is not the result of the mere existence of a factual situation. It 
is the result of the existence of an international legal rule which requires 
the existence of certain facts for the attribution of international 
personality to that factual situation. 
 
The existence of a state for international law purposes is not only a factual matter 
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but also a matter of law, which the declaratory theory seems to overlook. By so 
doing the theory tends to “depreciate the importance of recognition”.211  
 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses inherent in each of the two theories, recognition 
remains an important aspect of international law. Some authors have even 
suggested that recognition has both the declaratory and constitutive elements to 
it.212   
 
In light of the foregoing discussion, a state, at least according to the constitutive 
theory, comes into being once both the factual and the legal requirements of 
statehood have been met. Documents like the constitution, a decree or a 
proclamation would give an indication of the “critical date of commencement of 
Statehood”. 213  This means that an entity that meets all the requirements of 
statehood may in actual fact be in existence before recognition, with all the rights 
and attributes of sovereignty but without rights vis-a-vis other states.214 It is only 
after recognition that the new state would be able to exercise its rights vis-a-vis 
other states.  
 
It should also be pointed out that a state which has been recognised by other 
states may be in existence, but its government may not necessarily be recognised 
by other states. The 2011 uprisings in Libya serve as an example in this regard. At 
no stage during the uprisings against the government of Muammar Gaddafi, was 
the existence of Libya as a state questioned by the international community. What 
was in contention was the recognition of the government that was in charge of 
Libya at the time.215 There is no connection between recognition of government 
and of the state. As Menon points out, a state once recognised, is perpetual and 
survives the form of its government.216 
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5.2 Legal personality of insurgents 
 
It is evident from the discussion above that the legal personality of the primary 
subjects of international law is itself conceptually and theoretically contested. The 
concept of legal personality becomes even more contested when it moves 
horizontally to encompass non-state entities, such as insurgents. These are 
entities that for one reason or the other pose a challenge to statehood. The 
international community is only too familiar with the concept of insurgents. Wars 
have been a perennial feature in the evolution of states over the ages throughout 
the world.217 Just as the concept of human rights has evolved over time, so have 
the methods of protecting human rights, especially in a war situation. The question 
whether international humanitarian law applies to armed groups is controversial.218 
Due to the state-centric nature of international law, the rules of international law 
were applicable only to states. The activities of insurgents on the international 
plane, like those of MNCs, have highlighted the mismatch between the state-
centric nature of international law and international reality which is fast becoming 
less state-centred. 219  A problem then arose where there was armed conflict 
between a state and insurgents. Since insurgents had no legal standing in 
international law, the rules of armed conflict were not applicable to them. Thus, an 
untenable situation arose where the rules of international law, especially 
humanitarian laws were applicable only to one party to the conflict. 220  For 
insurgents to comply with the rule of international law, they too needed to derive a 
benefit from such rules. It is within this context that the debate over the recognition 
of insurgents emerged. As Cassese points out, states and insurgents have been 
the dramatis personae of the international community since its inception.221 This is 
not to say that insurgents are like states. The two entities are not the same and 
therefore do not possess the same powers in international law. The position of 
states in international law is very clear; they are the principal subjects of 
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international law. Insurgents, on the other hand, occupy a rather curious position in 
international law.  Their status is aptly captured by Cassese who writes that 
insurgents  
 
come into being through their struggle against the State to which 
they formally belonged. They are born from a wound in the body of 
a particular State and are therefore not easily accepted by the 
international community unless they can prove that they exercise 
some of the sovereign rights typical of a State. They assert 
themselves by force, and acquire international status proportionate 
to their power and authority.222 
 
It should be pointed out that not every conflict will give rise to the protection of 
international law. International law makes a distinction between rebellion, 
insurgency and belligerency. 223  International law does not involve itself in a 
situation that constitutes a rebellion within a state. In a situation of a rebellion, 
states are left to their own devices to deal with rebellions using their own domestic 
institutions. It is only when a conflict results in a large scale armed conflict within a 
given state that international law intervenes to afford protection to belligerent 
parties. Such intervention is preceded by recognition of insurgency. A 
determination of whether there is an armed conflict is done with reference to a 
number of factors.224 Firstly, there must be an existence of civil war within a state, 
beyond the scope of a mere local unrest. Secondly, insurgents must occupy a 
substantial part of territory of the state where they wield authority over the people 
in that given locality. Thirdly, rebels must have a measure of orderly administration 
and also adhere to a single command that will enable them to act responsibly. The 
state of belligerency is considered to have been reached when, as a matter of fact, 
an insurgency has met all the three requirements outlined. 225  Clearly the 
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requirements are framed in a way that uses states as the measure against which 
insurgents are to be measured. It is clear that insurgents can only be recognised 
when they manifest state-like features.  
 
Modern wars are fought by parties different from those originally contemplated by 
international law. For instance, the struggle for decolonisation, particularly on the 
African continent, was fought on different fronts. Most independent African states 
were liberated by national liberation movements who unsuccessfully wanted their 
strife to be regarded as international armed conflict. To date, the status of national 
liberation movements in international law is still undetermined.226 In the twentieth 
century, the status of terrorists under international law continues to be a subject of 
great debate.227 Through the act of recognition, an individual state acknowledges 
“the existence of an uprising or revolution against an established government and 
declares that it grants certain rights to the rebel party”. 228  When recognised, 
insurgents can have access to ports of the recognising governments and their 
soldiers are entitled to receive the status of war prisoners, if captured. 229 
Recognition also affords insurgents an opportunity to invoke international law.230 In 
additional to being beneficial to insurgents, recognition also imposes certain 
responsibilities on insurgents. Insurgents have a duty to abide by international 
humanitarian laws.231 Recognition therefore becomes a basis for imposing rights 
and responsibilities on insurgents, which would not otherwise have been possible. 
In this regard, it may be argued that insurgents are afforded limited international 
personality.232  
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5.3 Legal personality of individuals in international law 
 
The position of the individual in the international legal system is a curious one. It 
was mentioned in the first chapter of this study that international law is in a 
constant state of development. What is rather interesting to note, is that the 
individual either as a bearer of human rights has not always been part of the 
development of the international legal system. 233  The notion of the legal 
personality of the individual only emerged towards the end of the nineteenth 
century and was intensified after the Second World War.234 The legal personality 
of the individual has been a subject of great debate. Generally, scholarly opinion 
on the position of the individual in international law has followed different 
trajectories.235 The one category of scholars holds a view that is state-centric and 
therefore rejects the international personality of the individual. The individual, this 
approach argues, is not a subject of international law but its object. As an object, 
the individual has no rights and duties under international law. The effect of this is 
that the individual cannot seek protection under international law or violate its 
rules.236 Diametrically opposed to the first approach, is the view that adopts a 
fictional approach to the concept of the state and therefore asserts that the 
individual is the sole and only real subject of international law.237 Nijman238 adopts 
a balanced view that sees both the state and the individual as bearers of 
international personality in international law. However, in her conception, 
individuals are the legal persons par excellence and therefore the primary legal 
persons, while states are secondary persons of international law. On the other 
hand, Higgins, as pointed out above, adopts a view that does not embrace or 
reject the legal personality of the individual in international law, but proposes an 
approach that rejects the concept of subject in international law altogether.239 She 
instead proposes that the concept of the subject should be replaced by that of a 
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participant. Within this model, the individual will be conceived of as a participant 
alongside other participants.240  
The post Second World War era marked a great shift in the position of the 
individual in international law. International human rights instruments became 
explicit in affording individuals certain rights and responsibilities in international 
law. It is now no longer contested that the rights and duties of individuals feature 
prominently in international law.241 As Orakhelashvili points out, their rights feature 
in treaties, are accepted in international law as part of universal customary law and 
are also recognised as part of jus cogens.242  
Procedurally, individuals now have international standing in certain international 
tribunals and regional courts. 243  For instance, within the European Economic 
Community, for human rights purposes, the individual enjoys the same status as 
states. In the Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie Der Belastingen244 
the court held that:  
The community constitutes a new legal order of international law 
for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, and subjects of which 
compromise not only Members States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law 
therefore not only impose obligations on individuals but is also 
intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are 
expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations 
which the Treaty imposes in clearly defined way upon individuals 
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as well as upon the Member States and institutions of the 
Community. 
The regional human rights system has brought about an added impetus to the 
human rights protection regime.245 The European System for the Protection of 
Human Rights, the first of the three systems to be established, has charted the 
way in effectively protecting the rights of the individual.246 Central to the European 
System is the European Convention on Human Rights which serves not only as a 
blue print for giving legal content to human rights in Europe but also as a founding 
document for the establishment of the machinery to supervise and enforce those 
rights.247 The European Commission can receive communication from individuals 
claiming violations by contracting parties.248  
The Inter-American Human Rights System and the African System of Human 
Rights and People’s Rights249 were each modelled after the European Human 
Rights system. 250  Article 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
provides that:  
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally 
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may 
lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or 
complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.  
The African System of Human and People’s Rights affords individuals locus standi 
to submit communications before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.251 Furthermore, the system has been hailed for innovatively introducing the 
concept of duties on individuals.252 In as far as the court is concerned, the Protocol 
to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of an 
                                                          
245   See Mutua 2007 Human Rights Quarterly 587-594. 
246   Buergenthal T “The evolving international human rights system” 2006 (100) American 
Journal of International Law 792. 
247  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS. 222 
(1950), (entered into force on 3 September 1953), (hereinafter the European Convention) 
248  Article 25(1) the European Convention. 
249  The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (1982), 
(entered into force on 21 October 1986), (hereinafter the African Charter).  
250  The American Convention of Human Rights, OASTS No. 36 (1969), (entered into force on 18 
July 1978), (hereinafter the American Convention). 
251  Article 56(1) of the African Charter. 
252  These duties appear in Articles 27-29 of the African Charter. See also Mutua 2007 Human 
Rights Quarterly 588; Viljoen International Human Rights 248-251. 
199 
 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has opted to leave the locus standi 
of the individual to the discretion of the court.253 Even then the state continues to 
play a determinative role.254 
Despite these legal developments, there are still some practical realities that 
hamper individuals from asserting their rights in international tribunals or courts.255 
These are, according to Meijknecht,256 due to the fact that in most countries where 
human rights violations occur, people do not have information about the availability 
of international remedies for such violations. A further contributing factor is that 
those who know about the existence of these remedies are unable to take 
appropriate legal steps either because it is physically impossible to do so, or that 
they are afraid of the repercussions of doing so.  
The position of certain categories of “peoples” who have organised themselves in 
pursuance of a right to self-determination in international law is not yet clear in 
international law. This is so because both concepts of peoples and self-
determination are not clearly defined in international law, and have over the years 
become a source of great debate. 257  In an in depth study of the position of 
minorities and indigenous peoples in international law, Meijknecht concludes that  
as far as the position of indigenous peoples in international law 
is concerned, it appears that they have international legal 
capacity and that they are bearers of international rights and 
duties but, that the main obstacle on their road to international 
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personality lies at the level of international jus standi.258 
She reaches this conclusion after having explored the various approaches that are 
used by international law instruments when dealing with questions of minorities 
and indigenous people. International law has conceptualised minorities and 
indigenous people mainly in three ways.259 In some documents, international law 
uses a language that is indirect in which the protection of minorities and 
indigenous people is phrased as obligations to states. The second possible 
approach is one that deals directly with minorities and indigenous people as direct 
subjects of the rights and duties. The third approach is a blend of the first and the 
second approaches in that the language of the instrument addresses itself to 
minorities and indigenous peoples but continues to contain explicit state 
obligations.260 Each of the approaches would therefore have an impact on how the 
rights and duties outlined are enforced, which is why it becomes difficult to come 
to a definite conclusion regarding the international personality of minorities and 
indigenous people.  
While there is little doubt that individuals are now subjects of international law, 
specifically for the purposes of international human rights law, the international law 
position of minorities and indigenous peoples in international law is still an open 
question.261 Another category of non-state actors with an uncontested position in 
international law is that of international organisations. 
5.4 Legal personality of international organisations 
The concept of international organisations generally refers to institutions such as 
the UN and its specialised agencies262 and regional organisations.263 Over the last 
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few decades, international organisations have grown to outnumber sovereign 
states.264 In terms of scope and power, it is no exaggeration to say that there is 
virtually no aspect of modern day life that is not governed or influenced by 
international organisations in one way or the other.265 Areas such as peace and 
security, human rights, labour, trade and intellectual property, among others, are 
now regulated by rules that emanate from international organisations.  
The notion of a group of states cooperating to form institutions tasked with 
responsibilities to serve their mutual interest is not new in history.266 However, the 
status of these intergovernmental organisations in international law remained 
unarticulated for years. It was only in 1949 that the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the case concerning Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations brought about some clarity regarding the status of international 
organisations.267 The decision of the ICJ marked a turning point in international 
law as it has since been generally accepted that international organisations, along 
with states, have international legal personality and are therefore subjects of 
international law.268 For Bederman,269 the Reparations for Injuries case represents 
the final vindication that states are not the only subjects of international law. In his 
view, the ICJ decision signalled the final days of the law of nations by ushering in 
the era of international law. 
Even after the Reparations for Injuries case, one aspect that is still not clear, is 
what international law regards to be international organisations. Article 2 of the 
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations defines an 
international organisation as: 
 An organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by 
international law and possessing its own international legal 
personality.270   
In the absence of any international law rules on this, scholars have tried to fill the 
void by formulating their own definitions. After analysing different definitions by 
different scholars, Gautier defines an international organisation as: 
 An autonomous entity, set up by a constituent instrument, which 
expresses its independent will through common organs and has a 
capacity to act on an international plane.271 
The Reparations for Injuries case has succeeded in providing some guidance with 
regard to the international legal personality of the UN in international law. Scholars 
have used this decision to be the basis of international legal personality of 
international organisations.272  
The Reparations for Injuries arose from a request by the UN to the ICJ for an 
advisory opinion after one of its agents was killed. The question before the court 
was whether the UN as an organisation, could claim reparations from the 
responsible state. The legal question273 before the court was two-fold:  
I. In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the performance of 
his duties suffering injury in the circumstances involving the 
responsibility of a State, has the United Nations, as an Organisation, 
the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de 
jure or de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due 
in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, (b) to the 
victim or the persons entitled through him? 
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II. In the event of an affirmative reply on point I(b), how is action by the 
United Nations to be reconciled with such rights as may be possessed 
by the State of which the victim is a nation?274 
In addressing the first question, the court first explained what it understood to be 
an international claim. In the view of the court, an international claim is a claim 
against a state. In this context then, capacity to bring an international claim would 
refer to “the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognised by 
international law for the establishment, presentation and the settlement of claims”. 
This capacity, the court asserted, belongs to states.275 Having said this, the court 
was in essence not opposed to the UN bringing a claim, provided the organisation 
had capacity to. A determination of whether the organisation has capacity to bring 
such a claim was done with reference to the United Nations Charter. In this regard 
the ICJ stated that: 
The court must first enquire whether the Charter has given the 
Organisation such a position as that it possesses, in regard to its 
Members, rights which it is entitled to ask them to respect. In other 
words, does the Organisation possess international personality?276   
 
According to the court, to say that an entity is an international person means that 
it is a subject of international law and capable of possessing 
international rights and duties, and that it has capacity to maintain 
its rights by bringing international claims.277  
It has been correctly pointed out by Rama-Montaldo that the request by the UN for 
an opinion did not mention international personality and yet the court saw it fit to 
address this question in detail.278 There is no clear explanation as to why the court 
decided to take this approach. Gautier is of the view that this may have happened 
because the question of legal personality was indeed raised in submissions made 
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by governments to the court.279  Klabbers, on the other hand, assumes that it may 
have been raised presumably because of two points. Firstly, the Charter of the UN 
was silent on the possibility of the organisation bringing a claim. Secondly, even if 
the Charter had contained something on this point, the defendant state was not a 
member of the UN and therefore a right to bring such a claim would have been 
opposable.280 The court seems to suggest a two-stage approach to the question of 
international personality of an organisation. The first stage is to look at the 
provisions of the Charter to see if it has afforded the organisation such a status. If 
the Charter is silent on this, then the second stage of the enquiry focuses on the 
characteristics which the organisation was intended to have.281 In answer to the 
second stage, the court explored the various articles of the Charter and arrived at 
the conclusion that:  
In the view of the Court, the organisation was intended to exercise 
and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and enjoying, functions and 
rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession 
of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to 
operate upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme 
type of international organisation, and it could not carry out the 
intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international 
personality.282  
 
The court then concluded that the UN is an international person but hastened to 
add that, “that is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is 
not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a 
State”.283 It should be pointed out that there is nothing unique about a legal system 
differentiating between the different subjects. Even in municipal law, to say that a 
juristic entity is a person in that legal system does not necessarily mean that it 
becomes a natural person or vice versa. Legal personality is conferred for different 
purposes. As the ICJ stated: 
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The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily 
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their 
nature depends upon the needs of the community.284  
The Reparations for Injuries case has put the question of the legal personality of 
international organisations beyond doubt. What is however still unsettled, is how 
international organisations acquire such personality, and the same question can 
be asked of individuals and insurgents. Further, the court did not also address the 
question of the benefits that accrue to an organisation once it has been conferred 
with international personality. International law rules are also silent on both the 
sources of the legal personality of international organisations and the 
consequences or benefits of such personality. Drawing from the decision of the 
ICJ in the Reparations for Injuries case, four theories have emerged to explain the 
sources of the legal personality of international organisations.  
5.4.1.1 The will theory 
The will theory is premised on the positivistic conception of international law where 
state consent plays a major role.285 According to this theory, legal personality of 
international organisations is derived from the will of states.286 This theory argues 
that if states want an organisation to have international legal personality, their will 
should not be disregarded.287 The founders of the organisation will stipulate in the 
constitutive document that the organisation should have legal personality. This is 
the approach that was adopted by the ICJ in the Reparations for Injuries case.288 
However, it is not clear whether such a will should be express or implied. 
Paasivirta is of the view that the will of the founders should be “explicitly attributed 
to the organisation in a constitutive treaty”.289 Rama-Montaldo, on the other hand, 
seems to suggest that such a will can also be implied in the constitutive 
instrument.290  
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The first difficulty that the will theory runs into is that it is not always the case that 
the legal personality of the organisation is expressly mentioned in the founding 
document. For instance, the Charter of the UN, which was before the ICJ in the 
Reparations for Injuries case, did not explicitly confer legal personality to the 
organisation. 291  The constituent documents of, among others, the European 
Union 292  and the African Union, 293  for instance, do not explicitly confer legal 
personality to the organisations. In this regard, the objective theory becomes 
relevant. 
5.4.1.2 The objective theory 
The objective theory stands directly opposed to the will theory. This theory holds 
that legal personality of the organisation is acquired from the rules of international 
law upon the existence of certain factors. That is, as soon an entity exists as a 
matter of law, meaning as soon as it meets the requirements in international law, 
that entity possesses international legal personality.294 It should however be borne 
in mind that international law does not have set criteria against which to measure 
the legal existence of international organisations. In this regard the question raised 
by Klabbers becomes important: “What are the requirements of international law 
with respect to ‘organisationhood’?” 295  The main criterion advanced by the 
proponents of this approach is that an organisation should have a distinct will of its 
own.296 A closer inspection of some of the international organisations is that they 
have features that bear some resemblance to those of states. Though they may 
not have territory or population, most international organisations, as Ip points out, 
have their own constitutions and their own courts as it is the case with, for 
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example, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisations (WTO), the ICJ of 
the United Nations and the Andean Community’s Court of Justice.297  
Legal personality of the organisation, according to the objective theory, is 
determined by looking for specific elements in the structure of the organisation as 
set out in the constitutive document.298 An important guiding factor in this regard is 
the autonomy of the organisation. This autonomy relates to whether the 
organisation is not a subject of the jurisdiction of any of its members, and whether 
the organisation has its own organs to realise its objectives.299 Factors to consider 
are that the organisation must (1) be autonomous, in that it is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of any state and (2) have an organ, the function of which is to express 
the will of the organisation and not that of the founding state members.300 In most 
cases, the constitutive documents would make reference to the general structure 
of the organisation. The UN Charter, for instance, had envisaged an organisation 
with its organs and special tasks. The Charter further defined the relationship the 
organisation would have vis-a-vis its own state members.301  
The rapid increase of new non-state actors in international law requires a system 
that responds fast to international challenges. The will theory, with its emphasis on 
state consent is not able to accommodate the fast changing international order 
and its new actors. The objective theory, on the other hand, has the ability to 
accommodate the changes, but is criticised for its disregard of the will of states.302  
Both the will and the objective theories are thus not without their own limitations. 
As Klabbers points out, they seem to feed off each other in a symbiotic way in that 
“the will theory must include some more or less objective elements, while the 
objective theory cannot avoid accommodating the will of the founders”.303 Even 
more problematic is the basis upon which the two are constructed. The two 
theories assume that legal personality is the key through which international 
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organisations are able to act under international law.304 This view is of course not 
without its basis, as the court emphatically stated in the Reparations for Injuries 
case that international personality is indispensible.305 It should be pointed out that 
Klabbers does not deny the importance of legal personality in international law. 
What he however seems to be against is the use of legal personality as a 
normative concept.306 Legal personality in his view 
implies that some rights and duties rest upon that entity; it does not 
mean, however, that personality is a threshold requirement, without 
which such rights and duties simply cannot exist.307 
Having virtually discredited both the will and the objective theory, Klabbers comes 
to the conclusion that a careful reading of the Reparations for Injuries case would 
reveal that there is nothing in the advisory opinion to support either the will or 
objective theory. 308  Instead, he argues, that the court presumed the legal 
personality of the UN, which, in his view, is more pragmatic than the other two 
approaches.309 As it will be evident below, Klabber’s presumption theory, does not 
seem to be much different from the implied theory. 
5.4.1.3 The implied theory 
Though the constitutive document may be silent on the personality of an 
organisation, this theory argues that such personality can be implied from the 
functions and powers which the organisation is empowered to exercise on the 
international plane.310 On the face of it, this theory seems to adopt the same 
approach as that advocated for by the objective theory. The two theories are not 
the same though. The objective theory looks at the structural or institutional 
arrangement of the organisation in order to determine whether it has legal 
personality. The implied theory on the other hand, looks at the functions and 
powers of the organisation. Paasivirta 311  lists the requirements of international 
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personality as follows: (1) Legal personality must be indispensible for the 
performance of the objectives of the organisation; (2) The organisation must have 
its own organs and special tasks; and (3) The organisation must be distinct from 
its member states.  In the case of the UN in the Reparations for Injuries case, the 
ICJ looked at a variety of functions the organisation was empowered to do. The 
court noted, inter alia, that the organisation had legal capacity and privileges and 
immunity in the territory of member states; that the organisation could conclude 
agreements with member states; and that the UN organisation is charged with 
important tasks, such as, the maintenance of peace and security, the development 
of friendly relations among nations and the achievement of international 
cooperation.312  
5.4.1.4 Presumptive theory of personality 
The presumptive theory of personality is anchored in the notion that as soon as an 
organisation performs acts which can only be explained on the basis of 
personality, the legal personality of such an organisation will be presumed.313 In 
the Reparations for Injuries case, for instance, the court was of the view that 
[f]ifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the 
international community, had the power, in conformity with 
international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective 
international personality, and not merely personality recognised by 
them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims.314    
 
For Klabbers, the above text captures the essence of the presumptive theory. The 
basis of his argument is that while states had the power to create an entity 
possessing international personality, the court does not say whether states used 
that power. Instead, the court presumes that states have used that power.315 While 
the presumptive theory sounds potentially convincing, the difficulty which Klabbers 
himself runs into is that he cannot account for the basis of the presumptive theory 
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in the Reparations for Injuries case. 316  In his attempt to explain what the 
presumptive theory entails, he falls back to the discussion of the implied theory of 
personality. 
As it can be discerned from the discussion above, scholars make reference to 
different aspects of the decision of the ICJ in the Reparations for Injuries case to 
argue in favour of their own preferred theories of international legal personality. 
The choice of one theory over another does not have a bearing on what the 
organisation, which has been endowed with personality, can or cannot do. As 
Paasivita asserts, once an organisation has international legal personality, it is 
able to assert rights and accept correlative duties on the international plane.317   
Of importance to note though, is that the different theories point to how complex 
the question of legal personality of international organisations can be. In the case 
of the European Union for instance, the founders of the organisation chose not to 
confer legal personality on the organisation.318 Despite this, some scholars have 
convincingly argued that the Union has international personality. Klabbers for 
instance, is of the view that the activities of the European Union can only be 
understood by presuming that the organisation has legal personality.319  Wessel, 
on the other hand, bases his argument on the implied theory of personality to also 
arrive at the conclusion that the EU is an international person. 320  Wessel 321 
reaches this conclusion after having considered a number of factors that accord 
with the criteria, set out above, for the implied theory. Firstly, the EU as an 
institution is identifiable, as the founders sought to create an association called the 
European Union. Secondly, the EU is an institution which is distinct from its 
members. Thirdly, despite there not being any provision that endows the EU with 
personality, an argument can be put forward to say that such personality is 
implied.  
The position of the African Union (AU) is not any different from that of the 
European Union. Despite the fact that the Constitutive Act of the AU does not 
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explicitly endow the organisation with international personality; its personality in 
international law is not contested. As discussed above, the fact that a constitutive 
document is silent on the legal personality of an organisation does not in itself 
negate the fact that such an organisation has legal personality in international law. 
Legal personality of international organisations vacillates between issues of law 
and fact. To make a determination on the question of legal personality requires a 
consideration of a number of factors some of which may be legal, while others 
may be factual. Relying on the work of Brownlie, Udombana, lists the criteria of 
personality for international organisations as: (1) a permanent association of 
states, (2) with a lawful object, (3) equipped with organs, (4) with a clear distinction 
in terms of powers and purposes between the organisation and its members.322 
The provisions of the Constitutive Act of the AU are silent on the legal personality 
of the organisation. Using the criteria above, Udombana323 points out that the AU 
was, for instance, created to take up a myriad of challenges confronting the people 
on the African continent, to have an existence separate from that of the member 
states who created it, to have its own objectives independent from those of 
member states and to have organs through which it functions. According to 
Udombana, the totality of the factors above, read within the context of the 
statement of the ICJ in the Reparations for Injuries case that “[t]he Organisation 
must be deemed to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in 
the Charter [Act], are conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential 
to the performance of its duties”,324 point to the fact that the AU is indeed an 
international legal person. 
Given the distinction between primary and secondary subjects of international law, 
it follows, at least according to the will theory, that the international legal 
personality of secondary subjects is dependent on the will of the original subjects 
from whom their personality is derived. Should original subjects decide to withdraw 
their bestowal of status, secondary subjects will lose their international legal 
personality.325 This means that the concept of international personality is not rigid, 
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especially in as far as secondary subjects of international law is concerned.326  As 
was pointed out earlier, international law has developed in scope and content over 
the years. As one of the basic principles of international law, the concept of 
international legal personality has been part of the international law evolution. In 
lieu of this evolution, and given the fact that international law does not have a 
closed list of subjects it becomes important to constantly enquire on the 
possibilities of expanding the list of subjects of international particularly in the 
wake of the changing dynamics in international relations. NGOs constitute a 
category of influential international players whose status in international law is still 
in the process of evolution.  
6 TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF NGOs IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
International organisations are not the same as international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The former are bodies created by states and their 
membership consists mainly or entirely of states. 327  The latter are also 
international in operation and in certain instances perform functions traditionally 
reserved for states. Unlike international organisations, NGOs are private bodies 
not formed by states, but by private interest groups. Some NGOs even have states 
as their members, while others are composed of individuals who are themselves 
public officials.328   
The legal personality of NGOs in municipal law is not contested. In actual fact, 
NGOs are formed, operate and are even dissolved pursuant to the provisions of 
municipal laws. Broadly categorised, NGOs are of two kinds. First, there are those 
that are local in operation and scope, and therefore do not pose any challenge to 
the international legal system. These NGOs are only content to confine their 
activities within the territorial borders of the state under which they have legal 
personality. The only contact that these domestically-based NGOs have with 
international law is indirectly through the state under which they have been 
constituted. The challenge to the international legal system comes from the 
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second kind of NGOs, whose operations are international. Vested only with legal 
personality under municipal law, these NGOs operate beyond the territorial 
borders of the state of their origin. These international NGOs participate directly in 
international affairs without the mediation of their home states.329   
As a result of globalisation, the world has become so interconnected that it is 
increasingly becoming difficult to identify purely domestically-based issues. The 
divide between what is domestic and international is thus becoming increasingly 
blurred.  Even locally-based NGOs can rally international support that can result in 
a local issue being taken up by the international civil society. Conversely, the world 
has also become a global village to an extent that decisions that are reached at 
international fora, such as the World Trade Organisation, the UN and the World 
Economic Forum, now have an impact on policy decisions of states at a national 
level.  NGOs have adapted to these changes so as to continue having an 
influence on both domestic and international decision-making levels.330 Whether 
local or international in operation, the activities of NGOs are wide and varied. Of 
interest to note is that these NGOs have developed expertise in areas that 
traditionally used to fall within the competence of sovereign states. 
While the legal personality of NGOs in municipal law is not contested, it is under 
international law that the role of NGOs is contested and therefore a subject of 
great debate. 331  NGOs do not have international legal personality and are 
therefore not accountable under international law. Procedurally though, as it will be 
discussed below, NGOs have access to certain regional human rights bodies. This 
creates an anomalous situation in that under the international legal system, NGOs 
do have some rights but do not have duties under the same legal system. It is this 
lack of accountability that has raised concerns about the activities of NGOs on the 
international plane. While critics do not have a problem with NGOs exerting 
pressure within states, concerns have been raised about NGOs being allowed to 
exert pressure on the international plane. 332  Despite their lack of international 
                                                          
329  Spiro P “New Players on the international stage” 1997 (2) Hofstra Law and Policy 
Symposium 1.  
330  Nowrot K “Legal consequences of globalisation: The status of non-governmental 
organisations under international law” 1999 (6) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 587. 
331  Charnovitz  2006 American Journal of International Law 351.  
332  Kamminga MT “The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: A Threat to the Inter-
state System?” in Kreijen G (ed) State, Sovereignty and International Governance (Oxford 
214 
 
personality, NGOs have made a significant contribution in the development of 
international law. As Charnovits points out, they have contributed to the 
“development, interpretation, judicial application, and enforcement of international 
law”.333  
On its part, international law does not have a definition of NGOs. In the absence of 
international law definition, the work of scholars in this regard may be instructive. 
Charnovits defines NGOs as  
groups of persons or societies, freely created by private initiative, 
that pursue an interest in matters that cross or transcend national 
borders and are not profit seeking.334  
Nowrot similarly defines NGOs as 
privately founded organisations that pursue primarily non-profit-
oriented public interest objectives on a transnational basis in 
accordance with a general respect for the rule of law.335  
Kamminga, on the other hand, does not commit himself to a definition, but instead 
puts forward an approach that explains what NGOs are not vis-a-vis state 
entities.336 This is so, because to say that an organisation is an NGO is to describe 
what it is not in relation to a government organisation.  
It is apparent from the descriptions above that there is no exhaustive definition of 
the phenomenon, called NGOs. Common features can however be identified in 
that NGOs are private initiatives, not designed to make profit and aimed at 
pursuing a common initiative or purpose. The means employed to reach their goals 
vary from one NGO to another.  
Within the UN system NGOs have a consultative status. In this regard the UN 
Charter states that: 
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The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organisations which are concerned 
with matters within its competence.337   
As it has become apparent throughout this study, the concept of international legal 
personality serves as a dividing line between entities that are included in the 
international legal system and those that are not. The role of NGOs on the 
international scene is on the rise. In addition to having a consultative status within 
the UN system, NGOs have also played a pivotal role in setting the human rights 
agenda.338 Based on the active participation of NGOs within the UN system and 
the rights and duties they enjoy therein, some scholars are of the view that NGOs 
have already gained international legal personality. 339  In this regard, Nijman 
advocates for an approach to the concept of international legal personality that is 
inclusive of NGOs and MNCs. In her view, such an approach will make the 
international legal system to be legitimate and just.340  
The question of the international legal personality of NGOs is still not settled. 
Interesting views have emerged in this regard. On the one side of the spectrum 
there are those scholars who are of the view that NGOs should not be granted 
international legal personality. To these scholars, NGOs function better on the 
international scene without international personality and are therefore free to 
define their role unconstrained by law.341 On the other side of the spectrum, are 
those scholars who insist on the need to provide a global legal framework for 
creating mechanisms for accountability through which NGOs can be held 
accountable.342  
Attempts to grant NGOs international personality go as far back as 1910.343 To 
date there is still no coherently formulated international position on the 
international legal personality of NGOs. Within the human rights sphere, regional 
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bodies have formulated their own positions that grant NGOs procedural access to 
human rights bodies. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for 
instance, can receive communications from states as well as “other 
communications”.344 This means that in as far as the protection of human rights is 
concerned; NGOs are on the same level as states and individuals, albeit at the 
procedural level only.345 NGOs with observer status before the Commission may 
be granted direct access before the African Human Rights Court.346 The American 
Convention on Human Rights affords “any person or group of persons, or any 
nongovernmental” procedural access to petition the Commission.347 The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms may 
receive petitions from “any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals”.348  
What has become apparent from the foregoing discussion is that unlike in 
municipal law, there is no a priori claim to international legal personality in 
international law. International legal personality requires factual participation in the 
international system and some form of community acceptance.349 Recognition is 
the medium through which states express their acceptance of a new entity as 
having international legal personality, whether limited or not. It is axiomatic that 
factually, NGOs do participate in the international legal system. While it is fairly 
easy to determine the factual participation of NGOs in the international system, the 
situation is a bit different with determining community acceptance. States, on an 
individual and collective level, have not communicated a clear message in this 
regard either. It can therefore be concluded that the question of the international 
legal personality of NGOs cannot, at least for now, be answered with certainty. 
What is clear at this stage, though, is that international law does not have rules 
that proscribe the granting of international legal personality to NGOs.  
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In summary, despite the important role played by the concept of international legal 
personality, international law does not have generally set criteria to determine how 
this is acquired and under what circumstances. There seems to be some set 
criteria, but these apply only to entities seeking to become states. As discussed 
above, insurgents need to manifests state-like features so as to be afforded limited 
personality in international law. This chapter has however demonstrated that even 
in the case of primary subjects, states, the fact that an entity has met all the 
necessary requirements for statehood is itself not necessarily enough. In terms of 
the constitutive theory, such an entity will still need to be recognised first. 
Recognition revolves mainly around the will and consent of states. Recognition, as 
discussed, has proven to be too controversial a concept and has not in any 
meaningful way resolved the problem of legal personality in international law. The 
concept of recognition gets even more controversial and complex when it relates 
to insurgents.  This is so because states may not be readily willing to recognise 
entities that contest both their sovereignty and territorial integrity.  
Notwithstanding the controversies and debates, it has further been argued that 
international law does not have a closed list of subjects and its horizontal evolution 
to include a limited number of non-state actors bears credence to this fact. 
Instead, international law has a mix of subjects with limited international 
personality made up of insurgents, individuals and international organisations. The 
difficulty, however, is that given its decentralised nature, international law, unlike 
municipal law, does not have a central authority that determines who its subjects 
are. How each of these acquires its international legal personality varies from one 
entity to the other. In the absence of set rules, the theoretical basis on how the 
legal system has evolved to accommodate new subjects has to a large degree 
been driven by legal scholars assessing the needs of the international 
community.350 As lawmakers in international law, states have the discretion to 
decide how they want to respond to the challenges brought forth by international 
life.  Even in this regard, there is no indication of which factors must first prevail for 
states to decide as such. It is therefore not clear as to whether non-state entities 
should passively wait for states to confer personality on them, or whether they 
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must exert themselves and demand their personality against the state?351 State 
practice does not reveal any consistent approach with regard to the different 
subjects of international law. Furthermore, international law does not have set 
criteria against which to measure non-state entities seeking to acquire 
international legal personality. In the absence of such set criteria, international 
legal personality is discussed within a highly contested conceptual space.352   
Controversial and contested as it may be, the concept of international legal 
personality remains important for the legal existence of an entity within the 
international legal system. In light of the evolution of international law to include 
non-state actors, Clapham353 aptly asks:  
If individuals are to be deemed subjects of international with legal 
personality, why not non-governmental organisations? And if we add 
non-governmental organisations, why not transnational corporations? 
Drawing from the discussion in this chapter, the next sub-section seeks to 
conceptualise a theory of the international legal personality for MNCs in 
international law.  
7 CONCEPTUALISING THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY OF 
MNCS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The very idea of attributing international legal personality to non-state actors is 
itself conceptually problematic. For instance, it is not clear as to whether non-state 
actors have legal personality similar to that of states or personality which is 
different from that of states. What is clear though, is that there are varying degrees 
to the concept of legal personality in international law.354 In this regard, non-state 
actors have been referred to as ancillary subjects,355 as having a pseudo legal 
personality,356 and as secondary subjects of international law.357 What is not clear 
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though, is whether the different degrees of personality have a bearing on whether 
the legal personality of the different entities should be differentiated vis-à-vis that 
of the state. Those who argue for a differentiated approach base their argument on 
the unique role played by states in the legal system. Only states they argue “can 
enforce those laws that create other entities and they can delegate their law-
making authority and grant personhood to other bodies”.358 Scholars opposed to 
this view argue on the basis of the sameness of legal subjects in the legal system. 
For them, there is no basis for a differentiated approach. Acquaviva, for instance, 
holds the view that other than territory and population, no other differentiation is 
warranted with regard to states and other subjects of international law.359 Without 
disregarding Acquaviva’s concern, it is important to note that conceptually and 
practically, the primacy of the role of states in the legal system cannot be 
overlooked.  States determine the existence of other subjects of the legal system 
and also serve as a yardstick against which other entities are measured in order to 
participate within the legal system. Insurgents provide a good illustration of this 
point. With the exception of the individual, non-state entities that have been 
considered subjects of the legal system are those that have exhibited or performed 
state-like functions in international law.  
An equally contested question in international law is whether international law has 
evolved so as to confer legal personality on MNCs.360 A compounding factor for 
this is that the determination of whom the subjects of international law are and the 
content of legal personality so conferred can be done with reference to a broad 
range of factors. Such factors, as the foregoing discussion has illustrated, vary 
from one entity to another. For instance, factors that were considered for the 
international legal personality of a state are not the same as those for international 
organisations, the individual or insurgents. Conceptualising the concept of 
international personality in international law is conducted on shifting grounds and 
encompasses factors ranging from the sources of the legal system, legal theory 
and the needs of the international community. There is however no coherent 
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approach that consolidates these arguments. Precisely which of the factors are 
determinative of international personality is not yet resolved.  
Notwithstanding the debates and the challenges, the concept of the international 
legal personality holds a key towards addressing some of the challenges of 
holding MNCs accountable in international law. Hansen 361  enumerates three 
advantages that arise from granting international legal personality to MNCs as 
follows: Firstly, granting MNC international legal personality will enable them to 
enter the international legal system on a conceptual level and therefore create a 
potential for the legal system to regulate them. Secondly, it will enable the legal 
system to set a benchmark of non-optional conduct for MNCs that can be enforced 
by the state and public pressure. Granted, MNCs are not states and cannot have 
full international legal personality in international law.362 In this regard, this study is 
of the view that, conceptually, MNCs have international personality analogous to 
that of individuals under international law.363 The call to grant international legal 
personality to corporations under international law has been made before.364 What 
is different and controversial is the basis for granting such personality to 
corporations. Inevitably, not having full international legal personality limits the 
scope of activities that an entity can and cannot perform. In the case of 
international organisations, as Walters points out, their rights and duties are 
confined to what is outlined within the founding documents. 365  MNCs are not 
international organisations and international law has no bearing on their founding 
documents. 
7.1 The basis for the international personality of MNCs in international law 
7.1.1 Source-based analysis 
Legal personality may be conferred in a number of ways. It may be done through 
some discernible legal principle, a municipal law statute, an international 
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instrument, such as a treaty, or by acquiescence.366 Under municipal law the rights 
and duties of a corporation are set out in its constituent document and regulated 
by means of legislation. In the event that there are doubts about the legal 
personality of an entity, a certificate of incorporation can serve as evidence.  
The situation is not only different with regard to international legal personality, but 
is also more complex. A positivistic conception of international law teaches that 
state sovereignty and consent are the two pillars of international law.367 In this 
regard state action is important to confer legal personality.368 If we argue that 
MNCs have personality in international law, then theirs would be a state-granted 
international legal personality.369 A difficulty though is that states do not always 
make their consent explicit which then makes it very difficult to argue for a source-
based analysis of international personality. Further, there is little agreement 
among scholars on the essential elements of legal personality.370 In this case the 
approach of the court in the Reparations for the Injuries case becomes instructive. 
The Reparations for the Injuries case has made it clear that a subject of 
international law is an entity capable of possessing international rights and duties, 
and has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.371 Such an 
entity, the court said, has international legal personality in international law. Based 
on the Reparations for Injuries case, there seems to be an emerging consensus 
among scholars, that an entity that has international personality has both the 
substantive rights and duties as well as procedural rights and duties under the 
legal system.372 Though the ICJ was concerned with the advisory opinion before it, 
its exposition on the subject of international law with reference to the UN has 
influenced the subject-object debate. According to Okeke,373 to be a subject of a 
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system of law is dependent on the following essential elements: (1) a subject of 
law has duties, thereby incurring responsibilities for any behaviour which is at odds 
with what the legal system requires; (2) a subject can claim rights under the legal 
system; and (3) a subject of law possesses capacity to legally interact with other 
subjects of a given legal system.374 The extent of this legal interaction, as he 
points out, will vary depending on the nature of the entity concerned. What is not 
clear though is whether all three elements must simultaneously be present in order 
for an entity to have international legal personality.375 This study is of the view that 
in light of the definitions of the concept of international legal personality considered 
thus far, all three elements must be satisfied before an entity can be considered to 
be a subject of international law. Consequently, it becomes important to ascertain 
whether MNCs do meet the three requirements. 
7.1.2   Duties of MNCs under international law 
Part of the debate and the controversy around the notion of the international legal 
personality is conceptual. 376  As was pointed out earlier, according to the 
positivistic conception of international law, state consent plays an important role in 
international law. Despite the importance of consent, the rules of customary 
international law dictate that certain actions are prohibited and constitute violations 
of international law, even if a state has not consented to such rules. Though most 
of the agreements dealing with such rules are addressed to states, it is clear that 
such rules also apply to individuals and corporations alike.377 As indicated earlier, 
some authors argue that MNCs do have obligations under customary international 
law. One of the self-explanatory rights that corporations have an obligation to 
respect is the right to life. This is so because the right to life is recognized as a 
customary law right which as Kinley and Tadaki point out, has achieved the status 
of jus cogens.378 Customary international law further prohibits genocide, slavery 
and slave trade, torture, apartheid, piracy, crimes against humanity, among others. 
                                                          
374  See also Černic 2008 Willametter Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 152 
where the author points out that the definition of international personality consists of three 
elements: legal subjectivity, legal capacity, and locus standi. 
375  Černic 2008 Willametter Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution 152. 
376  Duruigbo 2008 Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights 252. 
377  Stephens B “The amorality of profit: Transnational corporations and human rights” 2002 (20) 
Berkeley Journal of International Law 71. 
378  Kinley and Tadaki  2004 Virginia Journal of International Law 970. 
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It may be argued that MNCs have an obligation to respect these. Like individuals 
under international law, corporations are thus prohibited from violating these rights 
that fall under jus cogens.379 Conceptually, this argument becomes easy to sustain 
only if one accepts that MNCs have some international legal personality under 
international law. 
7.1.3    Rights of MNCs under international law 
Under municipal laws, corporations are entities recognized by law and therefore 
have certain rights that flow from that. As discussed earlier, international law 
regards corporations as nationals of a state. As a national of a state, an MNC 
enjoys rights under international law. In light of the assertion by Henkin above, it 
follows that if MNCs have obligations under the UDHR, they should also enjoy 
rights under it. Under the UDHR, MNCs enjoy rights that are in as far as it is 
practically possible applicable to them. For instance, those rights that relate to life, 
freedom and security of a person and torture might not be applicable to a 
corporation.380 As for the rest, corporations enjoy the protection of all other rights 
enshrined in the UDHR. Some scholars have even argued that if corporations 
have rights, it therefore follows that they too can be victims of human rights 
violations.381  
The main drivers of globalisation are corporations.382  In a world which is fast 
globalising, MNCs have carved a niche for themselves particularly in areas such 
as trade and investment. In light of the global imperatives of privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization, states have given MNCs wide latitude within which 
they can pursue their business interest.383 The practical effect of privatization, 
deregulation and liberalization is that MNCs operate within an environment where 
there is very little state intervention in their affairs. In addition, states have 
                                                          
379  See the earlier discussion of the application of jus cogens norms to corporations in Chapter 
2 of this study. 
380  See Shaw International Law 283.  
381  Addo MK “The Corporation as a Victim of Human Rights Violations” in Addo MK (ed) Human 
Rights Standards and the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations (Kluwer Law 
International The Hague 1999) 187-200. 
382  Van den Herik L and Černič JL “Regulating Corporations under International Law: From 
human rights international criminal law and back again” 2010 (8) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 725-726; Černič 2008 Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute 
Resolution 132. 
383  The Social Responsibility of Transnational Corporations UNCTAD available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiitm21.en.pdf (accessed on 10 July 2012). 
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expressly given MNCs rights and duties which, to borrow from what the ICJ said in 
relation to the UN, can only be explained in terms of international legal 
personality.384 The latter is a major development within a state-centric international 
law. In this regard Hansen writes that:  
With little fanfare and scarce acknowledgement, a watershed change 
has occurred in public international law which has gained momentum 
especially during the past ten years. States have granted the 
capacity for international law rights to new global players, and such 
players have begun to exercise these rights in earnest. The majority 
of states have granted this capacity directly by signing and ratifying 
treaties to this effect. Others have silently acquiesced to the 
customary establishment of these new players’ capacity for 
international law rights and claims.385 
The legal rights of MNCs, particularly in relation to their activities in the area of 
investment and trade, have been on an increase in the recent past.386 Hansen387 
lists these rights as: the right to national treatment; the right to most favoured 
national treatment; the right to fair and equitable treatment; the right to full 
protection and security; the right for compensation for expropriation; the right to 
free transfer of payments; and the right to state observance of their assumed 
obligations. This increase of rights has however raised a concern among some 
scholars that international law seems to emphasize rights of MNCs, as opposed to 
obligations.388 
It is interesting to note that in as far as investment and trade is concerned, which is 
their domain, MNCs have asserted themselves and states have acceded to their 
demand by granting them rights that can only be explained in terms of 
international legal personality. In as far as their obligations for human rights is 
                                                          
384  Reparations for Injuries case at 179. 
385  Hansen 2012 Globalist 1. 
386  Commission on Human Rights, “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A framework for Business 
and Human Rights”, A/HRC/8/5 (7 April 2008) paragraph 12.   
387  Hansen 2012 Globalist 22-29. 
388  Kamminga MT “Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable for Human Rights Abuses: A 
Challenge for the EC” in Alston P, Bustelo M and Heenan J (eds) The EU and Human Rights 
(Oxford University Press Oxford 1999) 557; Jäger Legal Status of Multinational Corporations 
under International Law 264. 
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concerned, the situation is much different; MNCs have not asserted themselves in 
this regard with the same vigour.  
7.1.4   The capacity of MNCs to legally participate in international law 
Arguments around capacity are two-fold. The first part relates to the fact that for 
the element of capacity to be satisfied, the organization must factually exist and 
therefore be identifiable.389  In the case of MNCs, a cluster of corporate entities, 
albeit in a fragmented form at times, does exist either under one brand, a common 
seat of administration or a name. One of the consequences of legal personality 
under municipal law is that once incorporated, a corporation becomes a legal 
person and can, inter alia, sue or be sued and own property in its own name. This 
in effect means that, in as far as municipal law is concerned, such an entity exists. 
While a corporation does exist in municipal law, the clustered entity does not as 
yet have an identity in international law. A challenge for international law therefore 
is to conceptualise the clustered entity. The second aspect relates to procedural 
capacity to bring claims in appropriate institutions. The latter refers to “the capacity 
to have and to maintain certain rights, and being subject to perform certain 
duties”. 390  In recent times, there has been an establishment of various 
international dispute mechanisms internationally. 391  Some of which, as Jägers 
points out, have accorded MNCs with locus standi which, according to her, flows 
from international legal personality.392  
8  CONCLUSION 
Despite the important role played by the concept of international legal personality, 
international law does not have set criteria to determine how this is acquired and 
the circumstances under which it is acquired. There seems to be some criteria, but 
these apply only to entities seeking to become states. Even for states, the set 
criteria, as this chapter has illustrated, are not without their own challenges. It has 
further been argued that international law does not have a closed list of subjects 
and its horizontal evolution to include a limited number of non-state actors bears 
credence to this fact. The difficulty, however, is that given its decentralised nature, 
                                                          
389  Green 2008 Melbourne Journal of International Law 72. 
390  Shaw International Law 142. 
391  The institutional mechanisms will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this study. 
392  Jägers Legal Status of Multinational Corporation under International Law 266. 
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international law, unlike municipal law, does not have a central authority that 
determines who its subjects are. Furthermore, international law does not have set 
criteria against which to measure non-state entities seeking to acquire 
international legal personality. Even where there are some set criteria, as is the 
case with states, such criteria are challenged. From states, to non-state entities, 
the evolution of the concept of legal personality has been driven mainly by the 
vicissitudes of the international life, without following any set criteria. As 
lawmakers in international law, states have the discretion to decide how they want 
to respond to the challenges brought forth by the international life. Controversial 
and contested as it may be, the concept of international legal personality remains 
important for the legal existence of an entity within the international legal system. 
Culled from the Reparations for the Injuries case, scholars seem to be in 
agreement on what to look for in an entity that has legal personality in international 
law. An entity to be conferred with international legal personality must have 
capacity to act, and be able to have rights and duties under the international legal 
system. Measured against the three requirements above this study is of the view 
that MNCs do have some measure of international legal personality in international 
law. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM FOR MNC ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1  INTRODUCTION 
MNCs are a multifaceted phenomenon. Their different facets, particularly those 
that relate to their commercial activities such as tax, competition, trade and 
investments are regulated by a variety of national, regional and international 
instruments and institutions. A great concern for scholars though is the paucity of 
the regulatory framework for activities of MNCs in relation to human rights. 
Because of economic globalisation MNCs can move their capital, production 
plants, offices and personnel with relative ease across international borders. The 
very ability of MNCs to move across national borders exposes the weaknesses of 
the state-centric system of accountability which operates on the basis of territory 
and jurisdiction. Within the backdrop of this weakness, this study argues that 
conceptualising MNCs as having international legal personality has two 
advantages. Firstly, it creates prospects for narrowing the accountability gap that 
globalisation has created in relation to the extraterritorial activities of corporations. 
Secondly, it creates an opportunity for holding MNCs accountable in international 
law. For a state-centric legal system, the opening up of these possibilities 
inevitably requires a realignment of the existing rules and institutions. This then 
begs the question: In addition to domestic courts, should accountability of MNCs 
for human rights violations be located in any of the existing institutions, albeit with 
some readjustment, or does the international legal personality of MNCs in 
international law require a conceptualisation of a completely new institution? 
Further, what should the relationship of that institution be to the state which is the 
locus of accountability in international law? 
This chapter will be presented in five subsections including the introduction. It 
would be recalled that in the opening chapter to this study, globalisation was listed 
as one of the factors that contribute towards the accountability deficit of MNCs 
within the state-centric system. It was remarked then that though not a legal 
concept, globalisation has legal ramifications. The first part of this chapter will 
present an overview of the possible legal responses to the challenges posed by 
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globalisation. The second section will seek to construct a theory of accountability 
in international law. It will be argued that given the ubiquitous operations of MNCs, 
an effective mechanism of MNC accountability in international law must be 
multidimensional. The third section will be a conceptualisation of the institutional 
mechanism to hold MNCs accountable for their human rights violations under 
international law. In the fourth section the study will discuss and evaluate the 
proposed model of accountability. This will be followed by a conclusion to the 
chapter.  
2  LEGAL RESPONSES TO CHALLENGES BROUGHT BY 
GLOBALISATION  
In a strict sense, the human rights movement is a post Second World War 
phenomenon. This however does not mean that until then the international 
community was oblivious to international human rights issues. Like Shelton1 has 
argued, if we agree that the abolition of the abhorrent slave trade was itself part of 
attempts to respond to globalisation, then responses to globalisation can be traced 
back to the nineteenth century. 2  It should also be noted that the industrial 
revolution with its flurry of transboundary economic activities was also followed by 
international attempts to improve working conditions and people’s general 
standard of living.3 Perhaps the post Second World War era marked the highest 
point of the achievement of the human rights movement, which is why it has 
received much coverage than earlier attempts.  
Legal responses to the challenges posed by globalisation have followed mainly 
three trajectories, which Muchlinski4  has categorized as follows: The revisionist 
approach to state and legal sovereignty, the supra-territorial legal approach and 
the legal pluralism in globalisation approach. The responses proffered by each of 
the approaches are informed by their view or analysis of the impact of 
globalisation on the current international legal system. 
                                                          
1  Shelton D “Protecting human rights in a globalized world” 2002 (25) Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 280. 
2  For a detailed discussion of the slave trade and the fight against it see Pete M and du 
Plessis M “International law and reparations for the Atlantic Slave Trade: A case study in 
legal obfuscation” 2006 (31) South African Yearbook of International Law 243-262. 
3  Shelton 2002 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 280. 
4  Muchlinski PT “Globalisation and legal research” 2003 (37) The International Lawyer 221-
240. 
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The revisionist approach to state and legal sovereignty (the revisionists),5 is based 
on three assumptions of the impact of globalisation. Firstly, the revisionists see 
globalisation as having decentralised national law, thus unleashing two processes 
operating at the same time. Domestically, there has been an increased localisation 
of legal activity through principles of subsidiarity or devolution, and internationally 
there has been an increased delocalisation of legal activity through supranational 
regulation that has either direct or indirect bearing on legal rights and duties of 
national law.6 The decentralisation process has had an impact on the distribution 
of sovereign power of the nation state and its legal authority.7   
The second and third assumptions of the revisionists are based on the role of 
globalisation in the decentralisation of the nation-state. Historically the nation-state 
has been the locus of legitimacy and accountability and of democratic processes. 
Globalisation has, however, facilitated the rise to power of unaccountable and 
undemocratic entities such as NGOs, MNCs and international organisations. The 
rise in power of these non-state entities mean that human rights violations now 
emerge from an angle not originally contemplated by the human rights movement.8 
According to Muchlinski, privatisation of state functions, market liberalisation and 
deregulation have become the new economy. The revisionists are therefore 
concerned with holding these entities to account.9 In light of the foregoing, the 
revisionists see human rights as being central to their project, so much so that 
some see human rights as being capable of creating a new global constitutional 
law capable of holding both states and non-state entities accountable.10 If we 
attribute responsibilities to corporations in international law, then the basis upon 
which such responsibilities are attributed must be clearly articulated. 11  In this 
chapter it will be argued that human rights provide a point of convergence for 
                                                          
5  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 229-230. 
6  For more on the principle of subsidiarity see Meuwese A and Gomtsian S “Regulatory 
scrutiny and subsidiarity”  2015 (22) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
483-505; Marquardt PD “Subsidiarity and sovereignty in the European Union” 1994 (18) 
Fordham International Law Journal 616–640 and Mowbray A “Subsidiarity and the European 
Convention on Human Rights” 2015 (15) Human Rights Law Review 313-342. 
7  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 230. 
8  Shelton 2002 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 279. 
9  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 230. 
10 Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 230.  
11  Ruggie JG “Business and human rights: The evolving international agenda” 2007 (101) 
American Journal of International Law 824 and Bilchitz D “Corporate law and the 
Constitution: Towards binding human rights responsibilities for corporations” 2019 (125) 
South African Law Journal 779. 
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international concepts, and therefore a good basis upon which to construct a 
theory of accountability under international law.  
The second group advocates for the supra-territorial legal approach.12 The work of 
Phillip Jessup 13  has played a major role in setting the foundations for this 
approach. The thesis of this approach is that in the event of a dispute involving an 
international transaction, regard should be given to a combination of national, 
regional, and international law sources governing the transaction in question and 
not just to a single legal system related to the transaction.14 This approach has 
also been referred to as the new lex mercatoria, advocating for a system of settling 
disputes outside formal state laws.15  
The third group advocates for legal pluralism as a response to globalisation. This 
group puts an emphasis on the simultaneous operation of more than one legal 
order on cross border transactions.16 The approach proposes a variety of sites 
which would involve a “variety of institutions, norms and dispute resolution 
processes located and produced at different structured sites around the world”.17 It 
is envisaged that these structured sites would have a constant interaction with 
each other and other global economic networks in creating a regulatory 
framework.18 Kinley and Tadaki, for instance, having meticulously discussed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations, the World Bank, the World Trade 
Organisation and the International Labour Organisation as potential enforcers of 
human rights duties, conclude that “no single body can provide a comprehensive 
enforcement mechanism. Rather, the pursuit of enforcement must be targeted at 
the collective efforts of all institutions across their constituent fields, with each 
contributing their particular technical expertise and resources”. 19  Non-litigious 
approaches such as diplomacy, negotiations and sanctions would also add value 
                                                          
12  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 233-235. 
13  Jessup PC Transnational Law (Yale University Press New Haven 1956).  
14  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 233. 
15  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 234. 
16  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 236. 
17  Snyder F “Governing economic globalisation: Global legal pluralism and European law” 1999 
(5) European Law Journal 342. 
18  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 236-237. 
19  Kinley D and Tadaki J “From talk to walk: The emergence of human rights responsibilities for 
corporations at international law” 2004 (44) Virginia Journal of International Law 1019. 
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according to this view.20 Some aspects of this approach will be evident in the 
institutional mechanism proposed by this chapter.  
From the above discussion, what is evident is that the state-centric system of 
accountability still has its place within the legal system. What is of importance to 
note is that none of the approaches above advocate for the abandonment of the 
traditional approaches of accountability through the state. In fact, Muchlinski 
cautions that it would be unwise to abandon the view that law is essentially a 
territorial phenomenon.21 In this regard Kinley and Tadaki write that  
[W]e do not suggest that international regulation of TNCs [MNCs] 
should substitute for state responsibility in controlling non-state 
actors within each state’s jurisdiction. There is no doubt that 
governments have, and should have, primary responsibility for the 
protection of human rights. TNCs [MNCs] cannot, and ought not, 
replace governments in their roles as the chief guarantors of 
human rights.22 
Attempts to hold MNCs accountable directly under international law are not aimed 
at displacing the state, but seek to create an environment where there are multiple 
bearers of responsibility and the state is one of them, not the only one. 23  A 
corollary to this is that the multiple bearers of responsibility should also be held to 
account for their own actions under the law.24 The state continues to be the main 
role player in international law. Despite arguments that the state has been 
challenged as the centre of power, there is still evidence to indicate that the 
regulatory power of the state in certain matters is still strong.25 The hefty fine of 
$5.2 billion imposed by the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) on the 
South African company MTN in Nigeria illustrates this point.26  The fine came 
                                                          
20  Ratner SR “The International Criminal Court and the limits of global judicialization” 2003 (38) 
Texas International Law Journal 445. 
21  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 237. 
22  Kinley and Tadaki 2004 Virginia Journal of International Law 1021. 
23  Deva S “Human rights violations by multination corporations and international law: Where 
from here?” 2003 (19) Connecticut Journal of International Law 21. 
24  Ratner SR “Corporations and human rights: A theory of legal responsibility” 2001 (111) The 
Yale Law Journal 472. 
25  Muchlinski 2003 The International Lawyer 237. 
26  Mohammed O “Nigeria says its record $5.2 billion fine for MTN is about rule of law” available 
at: http://qz.com/552557/nigeria-says-its-record-5-2-billion-fine-for-mtn-is-about-rule-of-law/. 
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about as a result of the failure of MTN to cut off unregistered SIM cards, despite 
several warnings from the regulatory authority, the NCC. Of interest to note is that 
where there is a political will the state can assert its authority through its 
institutions, even against a company of the stature of MTN. The fine was 
subsequently reduced to $3.4 billion.27 
None of the international initiatives over the last four decades, including the now 
discarded Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (the Draft Norms)28 has 
ever proposed departing from the state as the locus of accountability. Generally, 
almost all of the approaches have followed the same state-centric paradigm and 
then proceeded to construct a theory of accountability. In this regard the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises states that  
 
Obeying domestic laws is the first obligation of enterprises. The 
Guidelines are not a substitute for nor should they be considered 
to override domestic law and regulation. While the Guidelines 
extend beyond the law in many cases, they should not and are not 
intended to place an enterprise in situations where it faces 
conflicting requirements.29  
 
In this regard, the Ruggie mandate was very clear that its contribution “lies not in 
the creation of new international law obligations but in elaborating the implications 
of existing standards and practices for States and business”.30 This is not to say 
that these various initiatives are oblivious to the limitations of the state-centric 
nature of accountability. On the contrary, most of them depart from the basis that 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(accessed on 09 December 2016). 
27  Osuagwu P “Why we reduced MTN’s N1.04trn fine—NCC” available at: 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/12/why-we-reduced-mtns-n1-04trn-fine-ncc-2/. (accessed 
on 09 December 2015). 
28  Commission on Human Rights, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations 
and Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights”, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 
(26 August 2003).  
29  “The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” available at: 
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/2011Concepts&Principles.pdf (accesses 28 December 2015). 
30  Human Rights Council, “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing 
the United Nations ‘Respect, Protect and Remedy’ Framework” A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 
2011) at para 14 (Introduction to the Guiding Principles). 
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the state-centric legal system in its current form has its own limitations.31 For 
instance, having acknowledged the existence of the possible multiple avenues to 
respond to the globalisation challenge, Shelton 32  puts forward two proposals: 
Firstly, she argues for an approach that would strengthen the state and insist on its 
responsibility to ensure that non-state actors do not commit human rights 
violations. In the alternative, she argues for an approach that would strengthen the 
weak states so that they can be in a position to protect human rights, while, at the 
same time, increasing the obligations of non-state actors through multilateral 
mechanisms.  
 
By definition the conferment of MNCs with international legal personality inevitably 
means that corporations will have both rights and duties under the legal system.  
In any legal system, rights are of value if they can be claimed and enforced. 
Obligations too have meaning if they can be enforced following the rules of a legal 
system. One of the weaknesses of the state-centric system of accountability is 
what some scholars have called “the enforcement gap”.33 The weak capacity to 
enforce its own decisions is one of the inherent limitations of the state-centric 
model of accountability under international law. About this limitation, Donoho 
writes:  
 
The international system heavily relies upon the dubious promise 
that governments will faithfully implement international human rights 
standards within their own domestic systems and provide adequate 
domestic remedies to redress the violations. This reliance on 
voluntary compliance is theoretically bolstered by a network of 
international mechanisms and institutions that are, in reality anemic 
at best. Although not without exceptions, most international human 
rights institutions are generally limited to monitoring state compliance 
and promoting adherence to underdeveloped international standards 
through dialogue, condemnation, and moral suasion. Most of these 
                                                          
31  See Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 21. 
32  Shelton 2002 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 321-322. 
33  Van den Herik L and Černič JL “Regulating corporations under international law: From 
human rights to international criminal law and back again (2010) 8 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 726. 
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institutions suffer from limited or ambiguous decision-making 
authority and lack effective, independent enforcement 
mechanisms.34 
 
Donoho further laments the fact that the state-centric system of accountability 
“leaves compliance largely within the discretion of the perpetrators”.35 Interesting 
theories have been put forward on how to bridge the enforcement gap in 
international law generally, including the adoption of the criminal law enforcement 
model to enforce the rules of international law.36 This proposal to adopt criminal 
law was dismissed by Lehman as demonstrating basic misconceptions of the 
nature of international relations and the nature of international law itself. 37  As 
discussed earlier, the voluntary codes of conduct of MNCs only work when 
corporations want them to work.38 In the event that the state is unable or unwilling 
to act and the corporation in the same state disregards its own voluntary codes, 
victims of human rights violations are left with nowhere else to go.  To this end 
Duruigbo writes that, “there is something wrong with a system that closes its eyes 
to obvious misbehaviour as states shirk their responsibility and corporations 
escape accountability”.39 In this regard there is a need for the international legal 
system to conceptualise an institutional mechanism to directly hold MNCs 
accountability for their international operations.  
The conceptualisation of MNCs as having international legal personality under 
international law provides an answer to only one aspect of the challenge to holding 
MNCs directly accountable under international law for human rights violations. By 
conceptualising MNCs as having international legal personality, the legal system is 
able to consider MNCs as one of its actors and therefore narrow the accountability 
gap. The fact that the legal system has a grip on MNCs though is only the first step 
                                                          
34  Donoho D “Human rights enforcement in the twenty-first century” 2006 (35) Georgia Journal 
of International and Comparative Law 5. 
35  Donoho 2006 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 23.  
36  See Koh HH “Why do nations obey international law? 1997 (106) The Yale Law Journal 
2615 where reference is made to Clark G and Sohn LB World Peace Through World Law 
(Harvard University Press Cambridge 1958) who advocate for this view. 
37  Lehman D “World Peace Through World Law, by G. Clark and L. B. Sohn. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1958. $7.50” 1958 (19) Louisiana Law Review 239. 
38  See Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 17.  
39  Duruigbo E “Corporate accountability and liability for international human rights abuses: 
Recent changes and recurring challenges” 2008 (6) Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights 521. 
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in holding them accountable under international law, the next hurdle relates to the 
construction of a theoretical basis for imposing direct human rights accountability 
for MNCs under international law. Inevitably a theory of accountability for human 
rights violations by MNCs under international law will have to make an attempt at 
bridging the conceptual gap that separates human rights related issues from 
issues that deal with economic policy and regulation.40 Predictably, not all scholars 
agree on bridging this divide.41  
3  TOWARDS A THEORY OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The structure of MNCs and their ability to operate beyond the reach of both the 
domestic and international legal systems make it difficult to develop a 
comprehensive theory of accountability that covers all their different facets. Ratner 
is of the view that the route towards building a theory of accountability should take 
cognisance of decades of practice and doctrine about state and individual 
responsibility. Such a theory, he opines, would be able to recognise where 
decision-makers can apply principles of corporate responsibility and where they 
cannot.42 In his view, such a theory would “turn on the similarity or differences 
between corporate behaviour in the area of human rights and individual or state 
behaviour”.43 In a similar manner, this study is anchored on the similarities that 
have emerged over the years, particularly in relation to the terminology of 
accountability in international law. Despite the dissimilarities between states and 
non-state actors in international law, it is argued that the language of 
accountability in international law for both entities has a point at which it 
converges. The point of convergence provides a basis for constructing a theory of 
accountability. In the last fifty years, human rights have proven to be a good point 
of convergence to start from.  
The state-centric model of international law has had an impact on the international 
protection of human rights. The concept of international human rights law arose in 
a context within which state power was at its zenith. As Charney recounts, nation-
                                                          
40  Shelton 2002 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 280. 
41  See Deva 2003 Connecticut Journal of International Law 1-19. 
42  Ratner 2001 The Yale Law Journal 496. 
43  Ratner 2001 The Yale Law Journal 496. 
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states held most of the political, economic, and military power.44 It was an era in 
which the nation state “had the monopoly over violence and instruments of 
coercion”. 45  Despite this amassed power, there were no international law 
mechanisms to hold a state accountable for how it treated its own nationals within 
its territorial borders.46 Other states could only intervene when the recalcitrant 
state had breached one of its international obligations as outlined by the rules of 
international law or violated peremptory norms. An obvious challenge with this 
approach was that, though equally worthy of protection, not all human rights 
violations fell within the ambit of state obligations as prescribed by the rules of the 
legal system. There was therefore a need to bridge the gap in as far as the 
protection of human rights was concerned.  
The post Second World War developments, particularly the internationalisation of 
human rights through the adoption of the United Nations Charter 47  and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,48 brought about a shift to the human rights 
discourse. 49  Since the adoption of the UDHR, the relationship between a 
sovereign state and its nationals within its own borders became of interest to the 
international community.  Despite being a milestone in the protection of human 
rights, even this latter development still had its own limitation in that it was state-
centric. One major weakness was that the system did not have mechanisms to 
deal effectively with human rights violations that emanated from entities other than 
states. The extraterritorial operations of MNCs, discussed earlier, provide a good 
illustration of this point.  
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3.1  The universality and primacy of human rights 
On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations set the 
international community on a human rights path when it proclaimed the UDHR 
Declaration. In a paper delivered to mark the fiftieth anniversary of this historic 
moment, Henkin refers to the UDHR as the “birth certificate” of the human rights 
movement. On the universality of the UDHR he writes, that “it is not a treaty 
among governments, it is a declaration; and it is universal, not international”.50 
This, in his view, means that human rights everywhere are the responsibility of 
everyone.51 Though itself not a binding instrument, most of its provisions form part 
of customary international law.52 It is beyond contest that the UDHR serves as an 
important point of reference in the international normative order.53  
As the movement of goods, capital and people under the banner of globalisation 
increased, so did the need to ensure the promotion and protection of human 
rights, particularly by all international actors. 54  The understanding is that 
regardless of the context within which they operate, corporations too would play 
their role to promote the universal human rights standards.55 In the Commentary to 
Principle One of the Global Compact, corporations are encouraged to “support the 
promotion of human rights within their sphere of influence”.56 Since corporations 
can have an impact on a wide variety of rights, the rights they are expected to 
support and promote are the internationally recognised rights outlined in the 
international instruments.57  
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A point of concern raised by scholars though, is that human rights instruments like 
the UNDHR do not give guidance as to who of the different actors is obligated to 
ensure the enforcement and implementation of the rights promulgated by the 
instruments.58 Bilchitz however, does not seem to be perturbed by this. In his view, 
it is the very nature and logic of human rights to allow for some flexibility in 
determining the obligations that flow from such instruments.59 Nickel is of the view 
that for the human rights system to function optimally there has to be a division of 
labour as to who is responsible for what. 60  How this division of responsibility 
should take place and what the basis for such a division should be has been at the 
heart of the debate on business and human rights.  
Historically, the division of responsibility was allocated in a predictable fashion that 
followed the international divide between the private and the public spheres.61 
According to this division, human rights became of great concern in the public 
sphere and thus did not get much attention in the private sphere, particularly in 
relation to the activities of corporations. In relation to MNCs, as Muchlinski points 
out, the argument was that corporations are in business and therefore have a 
responsibility to make profit for their shareholders.62 To the dismay of Deva, the 
profit motif has even been put forward as the reason why corporations should 
respect human rights so that they can have a competitive edge over their 
competitors.63 The second argument was that MNCs do not have positive duties to 
observe human rights.64  In this regard, the Draft Norms sought to bridge this 
historic divide by transposing the same human rights obligations of states and 
imposing them on corporations. Inevitably, this led to a divisive debate that 
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resulted in the abandonment of the Draft Norms.65 The much debated Ruggie 
mandate was successful partly because it continued to allocate duties in line with 
the historic divisions alluded to above.66 For this, the mandate has been criticised 
for perpetuating “an unhelpful competitive conception of the respective 
responsibilities of business and the state, rather than a collaborative one that is 
more likely to lead to the successful realisation of human rights”.67  
Inherently, corporations and states are not the same. Each is designed and 
intended to serve a different societal purpose and function.68 This, however, does 
not mean that the two cannot collaborate where there is a need to.69 A conundrum 
emerges, however, in that in the era of globalisation a theory of accountability that 
does not allocate human rights obligations to corporations will always be inherently 
inadequate. Equally, a theory that transfers state obligations to corporations will 
not be acceptable. Striking a balance between the two becomes crucial.  
The human rights theory provides a good point of convergence from which to 
construct a theory of accountability. This is so because the international 
community has set a threshold of human rights which both states and non-states 
alike cannot violate. These encompass gross violations of human rights. It is 
axiomatic that human rights are rights which human beings are entitled to simply 
because they are human.70 The universality of human rights in this regard stems 
from the fact that the rights are held universally by human beings simply because 
they are human.71 As Tasioulas writes, “human rights are moral rights, possessed 
by all human beings, simply in virtue of their humanity”.72 The very notion that 
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human rights are universal is itself contested.73 Donnely makes a good delineation 
of what is contested and what is not.74 One of the points he raises is that the 
notion that human rights are universally held by human beings because they are 
human is not contested. What is contested is the notion of the universal 
enforcement of such universally held rights. A salient point he raises, which also 
underscores the point made in this study, is that enforcement of internationally 
held human rights is left to nation states. In this regard he writes that, “the 
implementation and enforcement of universally held human rights thus is 
extremely relative, largely a function of where one has the (good or bad) fortune to 
live”.75 The argument advanced in this study is that in the era of globalisation, 
there is a need to have universal and binding standards against which MNCs can 
measure their conduct. If we agree with the proposition put forward by Henkin that 
human rights everywhere are the responsibility of everyone, then violators of 
human rights anywhere should be held to account. How they should account is 
what will be addressed below. 
3.2 The obligatory nature of human rights 
The various international efforts to sensitise corporations to issues of human rights 
suffer from two inherent weaknesses, namely, they are voluntary and are not 
measured against any universally agreed to standards. Having acknowledged the 
role voluntary mechanisms have played in the debate over business and human 
rights, Bilchitz advances three arguments against the non-binding codes of 
conduct.76 Firstly, he finds the notion that human rights protection can be assumed 
voluntarily to be “fundamentally flawed”. The core of his argument is that the logic 
of human rights implies that others have a duty not to violate those rights. The very 
language of duties implies obligations, not choice. His second concern relates to 
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the vagueness of the content of the norms imposed on corporations. This is a view 
shared by Deva who writes that there is no consensus on the applicable human 
rights standards to apply to MNCs, and where there is some agreement, such 
standards are either vague or generic.77 In this regard, Bilchitz is of the view that 
there is an urgent need for the clarification of the norms applicable to corporations. 
His third concern relates to the monitoring and enforcement of the voluntary codes 
of conduct. The very notion that companies are left to monitor their own activities 
raises questions of credibility and objectivity. Bilchitz then goes on to state that: “If 
corporations have responsibilities for human rights protection, then effective 
mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that they comply with their duties”.78 
In this regard, Duke is of the view that there is a need for an independent body to 
ensure adherence to standards and regulations.79 
In the absence of consensus on applicable standards, various versions and 
sometimes even contradictory approaches have been put forward. The discussion 
on the status of the now discarded Draft Norms in international law provides a 
good illustration of contradictory views among scholars.80 Important as the Ruggie 
mandate is to the debate, it too did not take the debate any further in this regard. 
Instead, to the dismay of many human rights activists,81 the second leg of the 
mandate revolves around the “corporate responsibility to respect human rights 
because it is the basic expectation society has of business”. 82  To pin the 
responsibility of business to respect human rights on social expectations does not 
provide a clear guidance as to whether corporations also do have positive 
obligations to respect human rights.83 There is therefore a dire need to properly 
conceptualise the obligations of corporations in relation to human rights. In this 
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regard, this study is of the view that accepting the international legal personality of 
MNCs and prioritising the primacy of human rights make the need to consider 
outlining business human rights a necessary imperative. Given the omnipresence 
of MNCs, such human rights standards should be binding on corporations and 
must be articulated in international law. If such standards are binding, then there 
will be a need to reconceptualise the rules so that the international legal system 
can be able to directly enforce them against corporations. As the preceding 
chapters have pointed out, conceptually, philosophical, theoretically and legally 
there is nothing that prevents states from extending the rules of international law to 
cover corporations. 
4 TOWARDS AN INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
4.1  An overview of the status quo and the debates 
International law is replete with institutions of accountability. 84  Given the 
decentralised nature of the legal system, the different institutions of accountability 
vary according to their mandate and area of specialisation. For instance, the early 
international law institutional mechanisms of accountability were created at the 
time when state sovereignty was at its prime. In this regard, the institutions were 
mainly empowered to adjudicate matters to which states had consented and 
therefore the decisions of such institutions could not be legally enforced. As the 
scope of international law continued to widen, so did the various international law 
mechanisms of accountability. The one feature that has not been in tandem with 
the evolution though is the state-centric feature of the institutional mechanisms.  
Given the multitudes of institutional mechanisms that have mushroomed over the 
years, the distinction made by Born becomes important. He differentiates between 
the first generation and the second generation adjudication mechanisms.85 The 
first generation institutional mechanisms are those that were created by the 
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international community pursuant to multilateral treaties such as the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and 
the International Court of Justice (IJC). Other institutions of a similar hew were 
later created, such as, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) and  regional courts and tribunals.86 In line 
with the characteristic feature of international law at the time, these first generation 
adjudication mechanisms did not have compulsory jurisdiction and could not 
deliver enforceable decisions.87 Driven by the high political and religious ideals, 
these first generation adjudication mechanisms aspired to have compulsory 
universal jurisdiction.88 Having acknowledged the contribution made by the first 
generation mechanisms to international law, Born notes that, “none of these 
tribunals have enjoyed significant usage by states or have commanded particularly 
impressive compliance with their decisions”.89  
Unlike the first generation adjudication mechanisms, the second generation 
mechanisms arose from a different political context inspired by “pragmatic 
commercial considerations”. 90  This category consists of treaty based arbitral 
tribunals such as the North American Free Treaty Agreement (NAFTA), 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) Convention, 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the UN Claims Commission, and the WTO.91 These 
second generation adjudication mechanisms exhibit characteristic features which 
the first generation mechanisms do not have in that, though having a limited 
jurisdiction, their decisions can be enforced against states.92 In this regard Bilateral 
Treaty (BITs) Investments play a major role.  About this Born writes that  
[s]tates that have concluded international commercial-arbitration 
agreements virtually always participate in arbitration proceedings 
and frequently voluntarily satisfy awards that are made against 
them. In the rare cases in which awards are not voluntarily 
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complied with, enforcement proceedings have been instituted and 
frequently have succeeded.93  
Most of the second generation institutional mechanisms were created after the 
Second World War as an attempt to guard against prospects of war resurfacing 
again. These institutions were put in place to create rules to mitigate against 
political and economic conflicts.94 At the same time that these institutions were 
being created, the international human rights movement was also gaining 
momentum. Despite having emerged at the same time, the human rights 
movement did not succeed in placing human rights at the centre of these 
institutions. These institutions had a defined mandate and human rights was not 
one of them. As Koh 95  writes, the United Nations together with the Security 
Council and the ICJ ensured the enforcement of the Charter particularly in relation 
to the maintenance of peace among nations. In this regard, the Charter sought to 
inter alia “establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained”.96 
The Bretton Woods institutions, that is, the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Bank (IMF) were entrusted with mitigating against economic conflict. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)97 was to facilitate rules of 
trade. The division of responsibility was such that the World Bank would oversee 
issues of international development, the IMF would take care of issues of balance 
of payment and the GATT would take care of economic liberalism and market 
capitalism. 98  In executing their different mandates, the three institutions are 
expected to co-operate with each other in an effort to create a coherent global 
economic framework.99  
Each of the three institutions was to later develop its own institutional mechanisms 
of accountability. The World Bank created the Inspection Panel, the IMF the 
Independent Evaluation Office and the WTO the Dispute Resolution mechanism. 
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According to the 2014 Operating Procedures, the mandate of the Inspection Panel 
of the World Bank is two-fold: 100 Firstly, it serves as a forum to provide recourse to 
people who have suffered harm as a result of the activities of projects supported 
by the Bank. Secondly, the Panel seeks to provide an independent and impartial 
assessment of claims brought against the Bank. The Independent Evaluation 
Office (IEO) of the IMF, on the other hand, “seeks to serve as a means to enhance 
the learning culture within the Fund, strengthen the Fund's external credibility, and 
support the Executive Board's institutional governance and oversight 
responsibilities”.101 The obvious limitation of the work of the Inspection Panel of 
the World Bank is that its work is confined to claims related to activities financed 
by the Bank. The IEO on the other hand is inward looking in that its mandate is 
aimed at enhancing the credibility of the institution. The limited scope of the work 
of the two institutions renders them inadequate to deal with issues of 
accountability of MNCs in international law. 
In light of the inherent limitations of the two institutions of the Bretton Wood 
institutional mechanism, the WTO provides an interesting case for analysis. The 
mandate of the WTO is to oversee and facilitate international trade among states.  
In this regard, the WTO describes itself as “a place where member governments 
go, to try to sort out the trade problems they face with each other.”102 Trade related 
disputes among member states are dealt with through the Dispute Settlement 
Body and its Appellate Body. The two bodies apply international law and function 
in a way similar to that of an international court.103 While the main role players 
within the WTO are nation-states, the beneficiaries of the various trading 
agreements are mainly corporations.104 It is on this basis that most scholars have 
found the WTO to be a potential tool to hold MNCs accountable for their human 
rights violations under international law.105 Deva puts forward a compelling case of 
                                                          
100  The Inspection Panel at the World Bank: Operating Procedures APRIL 2014 available at: 
http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/PanelMandateDocuments/2014%20Updated%20Ope
rating%20Procedures.pdf (accessed on 31 December 2015).  
101  IEO Terms of reference available at: http://www.ieo-
imf.org/ieo/pages/TermsofReference.aspx (accessed 31 on December 2016). 
102  Understanding the WTO available at: 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (accessed 31 on December 
2015).  
103  See Booysen Principles of International Trade Law 136-137.  
104  Kinley and Tadaki 2004 Virginia Journal of International Law 1006. 
105  Kinley and Tadaki 2004 Virginia Journal of International Law 1006; Deva 2003 Connecticut 
246 
 
why the WTO is an ideal institution to hold MNCs accountable for their human 
rights violations. His assertion is premised on the view that “violation of human 
rights by MNCs is related directly, or indirectly” to their trading activities, a domain 
which falls under the auspices of the WTO.106 Given the fact that the human rights 
movement and the different post Second World War institutions have evolved in 
different directions, attempts to extend the mandate of these institutions to cover 
human rights issues have provoked interesting debates on both sides of the 
spectrum.107 The one side of the spectrum argues in favour of keeping human 
rights and trade issues separate, while the other argues for merging the two. To 
bridge the conceptual divide, Deva proposes an institutional mechanism consisting 
of a partnership between the UN and the WTO in promoting human rights in a 
globalised world. 108  One of the five objections which Deva anticipates in the 
proposed model, is that the model may be unworkable, especially keeping in mind 
the mandate of the UN and the WTO. 109   
In addition to the two generations of adjudicatory mechanisms, other international 
law institutions were created that deal directly with the activities of corporate 
activity. These, include inter alia, labour tribunals, National Human Rights 
Institutions, National Contact Points under the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
offices of the Ombudsperson and government-run complaints offices.110 Each of 
these institutions is constrained by the fact that they operate within a state-centric 
system of accountability. The force of their reports, findings and recommendations, 
rely on the goodwill of the individual state to implement or enforce them.111 What 
has become manifestly clear is that the conventional state-centric system of 
human rights protection, with its many available options, is not coping with the 
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challenges brought about by globalisation. The inability to cope is not because the 
challenges are insurmountable, but is mainly because the state-centric paradigm, 
though still relevant, is in some respects outdated to operate on its own. That the 
challenges posed by globalisation are multifaceted, multidimensional and 
overarching is now beyond contest. In a similar vein, it is axiomatic that the 
responses to these challenges should not be one-dimensional either.112 Shelton, 
for instance, argues that the international community “should make concerted 
multilateral efforts to enhance its ability to respond to human rights violations, 
rather than unleashing each state to control what it views as the sins of the private 
sector”.113 
Under domestic laws, individuals are empowered to lay a claim against any person 
or entity that poses a threat to the enjoyment of their guaranteed rights.114 This is 
in accord with the state-centric approach to the protection of rights, because 
traditionally states bear the obligation to ensure that there are domestic structures 
to provide remedies for such violations. The inherent limitations of the state-centric 
system of accountability in dealing with extraterritorial activities of MNCs, 
necessitates a need to reconceptualise the rules and institutions of the legal 
system. In this regard, Kinley and Tadaki argue that international efforts should be 
directed to the “effective protection of human rights, rather than on the entities 
from which human rights have to be protected”.115 This study advocates for a view 
that allocates human rights responsibilities to both states and MNCs within a 
bilateral context. The rationale is that where human rights have been violated, 
there is a need for a remedy.116 To this end the Ruggie mandate states that, 
“[u]nless states take appropriate steps to investigate, punish and redress 
business-related human rights abuses when they do occur, the state duty to 
protect can be rendered weak or even meaningless”.117 As the preceding chapters 
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have illustrated, states may be unable or unwilling to provide remedies. Further, 
the international legal system does not have institutions and processes to hold 
non-state actors accountable for the harm caused. 118  In light of this inherent 
weakness within the state-centric system of accountability, a call has been made 
for the reconceptualisation of the legal system so as to accommodate MNCs.119 
Such a reconceptualisation may include the readjustment of the rules and 
institutions of the international legal system.  
Inevitably, states would still play a pivotal role even in the reconceptualisation of 
the international legal system. It is therefore important that any proposal in this 
regard should be one that will be acceptable to the main role players in the legal 
system- states. States, it is argued, are more likely to heed to a call for 
reconceptualisation if the call does not bring about a radical paradigm shift to the 
existing model. Donoho is of the view that states are more likely to be amenable to 
creating an institutional mechanism if the powers for such a body are 
“jurisdictionally constrained to enforce rights for which true international consensus 
exists”.120 Perhaps the relative success in establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) may to some degree be attributed to the fact that the crimes it covers 
are those for which there is some relative international consensus. Where there 
seems to be a disagreement is in terms of how the ICC should go about executing 
its mandate.121 
In the discussion of business and human rights, the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) is often mooted as offering some prospects for holding MNCs accountable 
for their human rights violations under international law.122 And there is some merit 
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in this view. Despite the international legal system insisting on a conceptual divide 
between criminal and civil matters, in as far as gross violation of human rights is 
concerned, the distinction is gradually becoming blurred. Granted, not all human 
rights violations by MNCs are or will be criminal. To a large degree there may be 
an overlap between civil and criminal matters arising out of corporate violations of 
human rights. For instance, in its report on the Corporate Complicity in 
International Crimes, the International Commission of Jurists stated that “conduct 
that gives rise to a gross human rights abuse will also often involve breaches of 
international criminal law, and therefore will often constitute a crime under 
international law”. 123  For practical reasons, victims of corporate human rights 
violations generally pursue civil litigation in search of compensation. The 
intersection between human rights and international criminal law has therefore 
become a subject of research.124  
Because of the convergence between gross human rights violations and criminal 
liability, the ICC stands out as a possible effective enforcement institution for the 
international operations of MNCs under international law. 125  The reasons 
advanced for considering the ICC reflect the multifaceted nature of MNCs and 
their operations. The ICC has some features that make it a potential tool to hold 
MNCs to account. For instance, Deva argues that there may be situations where a 
need may arise to criminally prosecute gross violations of human rights by MNCs. 
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In this regard it may be suitable to invoke the provisions of the ICC.126 Given the 
fact that the ICC has jurisdiction only over natural persons, Pak and Nussbaumer 
explore the possibility of invoking individual criminal responsibility to pursue 
corporate executives and employees as a tool to promote corporate accountability. 
In addition, they argue for the proposal to consider extending the ICC jurisdiction 
to cover legal persons in addition to natural persons.127 Van den Herik and Černič, 
in turn, explore the possibility of having human rights law as the normative 
framework and international criminal law as the enforcement mechanism for 
corporate accountability. 128  Ruggie has however warned that care should be 
exercised “when analogizing standards from individuals to companies”.129 While 
corporate criminal liability is beyond the scope of this research, the foregoing 
discussion has made it clear that the distinction between gross human rights 
violations and criminal liability, particularly in the activities of corporations, can no 
longer be sustained.  
A theory of accountability in international law, if it is to be effective, must be able to 
navigate the divide between national and international institutions. One of the 
features of the ICC which made the institution to be appealing to states is the 
principle of complimentarity. Ordinarily, prosecution of offenders lies with national 
jurisdictions, and the preamble to the ICC Statute takes cognisance of this fact.130 
Supposing that all the statutory requirements have been met in terms of 
jurisdiction and the referral of the case, the question then becomes: When must 
the court act?  The ICC Statute emphasizes the fact that the ICC shall be 
complimentary to national criminal jurisdictions. 131  This means that the court 
should only assume jurisdiction where the national system is unable to prosecute 
transgressors. 132  The court will only intervene where a state is “unwilling or 
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unable” to carry out the investigations or prosecutions. 133  Complimentarity, as 
Gutto points out, also means that the ICC can assume jurisdiction, without having 
to wait for the national system to fail.134 Inevitably, complimentarity puts the ICC on 
a collision course with state sovereignty.135 This is so because ordinarily states 
would argue that the duty to investigate and prosecute is part of their national 
sovereignty, unless as Ellis points out, there is self-interest on the part of the state 
to refer the matter to the ICC.136 Under the principle of complimentarity, the ICC 
must undertake an investigation into the affairs of a state before it can arrive at a 
decision that the state in question is unwilling or unable to prosecute.137  
Determining whether a state is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute can 
be controversial as it impacts on issues of sovereignty. The determination goes 
beyond issues of law and ventures into politics.138  As such it is not easy to 
separate issues of law from politics when assessing the role of the ICC, especially 
in Africa.139 It is important that an institution conducting these operations should be 
seen as legitimate by all the role players. In relation to the African continent, the 
legitimacy of the ICC has been dented. Makau Mutua 140  points out some 
similarities between the countries that are before the ICC. The first point he 
highlights is that all the countries are post-colonial states that have been wrecked 
by civil conflict for years. The second point he raises is that Kenya, Uganda, and 
Sudan are rated “critical” on the 2010 list of the Failed States Index, 141  with 
Uganda appearing as number twenty one and therefore on the list of the states “in 
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danger”. The third point and the most important for the purpose of this study, is 
that the judiciary in these countries is dictated to by the executive. In this regard, 
Makau Mutua writes: “The judiciaries are captive to the executive. Judges are 
corrupt and incompetent or lack capacity while the infrastructure of the legal 
system is threadbare. In a word, state structures are on life support”.142 These 
points are not unique to the listed countries or criminal cases; they are at the core 
of states where the rule of law is non-existent. Amending the mandate of the ICC 
to accommodate activities of MNCs may therefore go a long way towards 
addressing the culture of corporate impunity under the auspices of international 
law.  
When natural persons are tried and found guilty, they are arrested and then 
deprived of certain freedoms. Given the intricacies of the corporate form, this may 
not be easily achievable in relation to corporations. An amendment of the Statute 
to include corporate crimes should also look at a fitting punishment for 
corporations. Such a punishment may include awarding pecuniary fines against 
the corporations found guilty for violating jus cogens norms, for instance. 
Individuals cherish freedom and corporations value profit. A punishment that 
impacts on their profit margins will perhaps act as a deterrent. In this way even 
victims and/or their relatives will have some money to help them rebuild their lives.   
While having a place as international institutional mechanisms of accountability, 
both the ICC and the WTO are hamstrung by the unidimensional nature of their 
mandate. The ICC, as discussed above, is mandated to deal with international 
crimes in relation to natural persons. The WTO, on the other hand, is mainly 
concerned with issues of international trade.143 Whether the mandate of the WTO 
should be extended to cover issues of human rights or not, has been a subject of 
great debates over the years.144 
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4.2  Introducing the institutional model of accountability 
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, in the over forty years that the 
international community has been searching for a solution to the perennial debate 
on the relationship between business and human rights, an array of proposals 
have been put forward.145 Consensus among scholars on what the architecture of 
the institutional mechanism of accountability should be, is still elusive. While the 
search is still on, the state-centric system of accountability continues to be riddled 
with gaps, asymmetries and inconsistencies that render it inadequate to singularly 
address the challenges brought about by the international operations of MNCs. In 
this regard the comment by Stephens becomes apt that “as corporate power 
becomes increasingly international and increasingly dissociated from the nation-
state, regulation becomes more difficult”.146 The situation is further compounded 
by the fact that at an international level there is paucity of policy direction for the 
international operations of MNCs. 
Like individuals who have limited international personality in the realm of 
international human rights law, corporations have limited international legal 
personality in the realm of international investments. It is argued that an effective 
theory of accountability should take cognisance of this fact. In this regard, this 
study proposes arbitration as a model to hold MCNs to account. International 
investment law is one area which is dominated by corporations. It was discussed 
earlier that treaty and custom are two of the sources of international law. As 
Schlemmer points out:  
[I]nternational rule-making on investment issues has developed 
extensively and now operates in bilateral, regional, interregional 
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and multilateral levels. These rule-making instruments have taken 
the form of either binding treaties or voluntary instruments setting 
out the numerous commitments of the relevant parties.147  
The Ruggie mandate, as discussed in chapter two of this study, has used the 
concept of the sphere of influence as “a spatial metaphor” to conceptualise the 
space where corporations dominate. 148  State practice, and therefore custom, 
confirms the dominance of corporations in this area as more than 173 states have 
entered into more than 2600 bilateral investment treaties.149 The prevalence of 
treaties in this area of law, are an indication of the fact that there has been a shift 
in how states adjudicate matters internationally. Arbitration has now become the 
preferred mode of settling disputes.150 Commenting on this shift, Born writes that:  
The total number of PCA, ICJ, and ITLOS cases has remained 
largely stagnant since the late twentieth century. In contrast, the 
number of international investment and commercial arbitrations 
and litigations involving state entities has increased materially, 
both since 1990 and in more recent years. Put simply, usage of 
second-generation adjudicatory bodies is high and robustly 
increasing, whereas usage of the ICJ, ITLOS, and PCA is 
relatively low and stagnant.151 
The rise of arbitration as a means to settle disputes means that the second 
generation adjudicatory mechanisms have become important, especially in the 
application and development of international law. 152  In this regard, this study 
argues that if a mechanism for accountability is to be effective at all, it must be 
constructed around institutions that are effective and not those that are in the 
process of becoming moribund. Arbitration seems to provide some hope in 
conceptualising a mechanism for holding MNCs to account for their human rights 
violations in international law.  
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Because of the historical divide between issues of business and human rights, the 
use of commercial arbitration as a potential tool to enforce human rights will not be 
universally accepted.153 The subtext underlying this resistance is that human rights 
and commercial arbitration are not compatible.154 Further, the flexibilities afforded 
by arbitration agreements have opened them up for criticisms. It has been argued 
that international agreements lack legitimacy and accountability, are not 
transparent, and do not have standard for appeals process. 155  An even more 
pointed argument is that investors use arbitrations so as to bypass national courts 
which are entities empowered to protect human rights. 156  In this regard, Fry 
cautions that care should be exercised “not to shift the burden entirely onto the 
shoulders of the international arbitration regime, thus relieving states of their 
responsibilities”.157 
International investment agreements, as Tzevelekos158 points out, unfold within a 
triangular relationship consisting of the host state, the investor and investor’s 
home state. International allocation of responsibilities within this relationship is 
skewed. The responsibilities of both the home state and the host states under 
international law can be established with relative ease. What is difficult to establish 
is the international responsibility of the investor and this, according to Tzevelekos, 
is because the international responsibility of the investor in international law is still 
underdeveloped.159 The fact that the international responsibility under international 
law is underdeveloped is itself symptomatic of the struggle of the international 
legal system to conceptualise responsibilities for non-state actors. As discussed in 
the preceding chapter, there is nothing in international law that prohibits states 
from conferring rights on an individual or non-state actor by treaty.160 A corollary to 
this is that nothing in international law prevents states from imposing obligations 
by treaty on an individual or non-state actor. The absence of such an international 
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instrument may be an indication that states prefer to impose obligations under 
national law and not under international law. 
The proposed model will be driven by a triangular partnership consisting of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),161 as well as the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States.162 UNCTAD boasts a membership of 194 states.163 For 
a greater part of its more than half a century of existence, UNCTAD has been at 
the cutting edge on issues of trade, investment and development. Inevitably issues 
of trade, investment and development are at the core of the activities of MNCs, 
particularly in developing countries. 164  As indicated throughout this study, 
challenges related to the extraterritorial activities of MNCs are mainly experienced 
in developing countries. In this regard the objectives of UNCTAD become 
important. UNCTAD aims to  
assist developing countries, especially the least developed 
countries, and countries with economies in transition, to integrate 
beneficially into the global economy. It also seeks to help the 
international community promote a global partnership for 
development, increase coherence in global economic 
policymaking, and assure development gains for all from trade.165  
This study is of the view that at a policy level, human rights should form part of the 
coherence that UNCTAD should seek to promote. 
Because of its mandate, UNCITRAL is also best suited to be part of this 
mechanism. The mandate of UNCITRAL is to formulate “modern, fair, and 
harmonized rules on commercial transactions”. 166  In line with the state-centric 
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feature of international law, its main constituency is member states. UNCITRAL is 
made up of sixty member states elected by the General Assembly of the UN to a 
fixed term of office. The composition of membership is designed to be a 
representative sample of the “geographic regions and its principal economic and 
legal systems”. 167   Non-member states and international organisations are 
however invited to participate. The tasks of UNCITRAL include formulating the 
following: 
 Conventions, model laws and rules which are acceptable worldwide; 
 Legal and legislative guides and recommendations of great practical 
value; 
 Updated information on case law and enactments of uniform 
commercial law; 
 Technical assistance in law reform projects; 
 Regional and national seminars on uniform commercial law.168 
 
UNCITRAL runs workshops on a wide variety of topics such as insolvency law, 
arbitration and conciliation, small and medium enterprises and electronic 
commerce.169 It is argued that the activities of MNCs and human rights can also be 
added to this list of what UNCITRAL can cover. In this way, UNCITRAL will keep 
nation-states up to speed with the ever changing MNCs. 
The ICSID Convention is charged with resolving investor-state and state-state 
international disputes. This it does by conciliation, arbitration or fact finding.170 A 
combination of the three institutions brings to the fore a point of convergence for 
the two sub-categories of international law, namely: international investment law 
and international trade law. Article 1(2) of the ICSID Convention states that “the 
purpose of the Centre shall be to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of 
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investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
Contracting States in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”171 The 
ICSID Convention, seems to have succeeded in bridging the accountability gaps 
that exist in international law, particularly in relation to corporations. Firstly, under 
the ICSID Convention MNCs have limited international personality and therefore 
have rights and duties flowing from the international law. The jurisdiction of the 
ICSID Convention covers both natural and juridical persons. 172  Secondly, the 
mechanism has played into the strength of international law in that it is based on 
consent of the parties. Parties to the dispute must consent in writing that they 
submit the dispute to the centre, and once they have submitted their consent, no 
party may withdraw its consent unilaterally. 173  Thirdly, the award is not only 
binding in law but leaves enforcement to the state concerned. Article 54(1) of the 
ICSID Convention states that, “each Contracting State shall recognize an award 
rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary 
obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment 
of a court in that State.”  
Given the fact that both the international trading arena and the international 
investment space are a bastion of corporate activity, UNCTAD, UNCITRAL and 
the ICSID Convention will; according to the proposed model, cooperate in 
ensuring that they infuse human rights into the business activities of corporations. 
UNCTAD will serve as the international policy formulation hub where guiding 
international standards are formulated and agreed upon. UNCITRAL will be tasked 
with drafting documents that incorporate universal standards for corporations and 
the ICSID Convention will operationalise the standards for both the state and the 
corporation. In this regard, UNCITRAL will design templates that will be used by 
both states and corporations as they enter into their treaty agreements on trade 
and investment. Of course such templates will not dictate to the parties on what to 
do, but will guide them on the central features that a human rights friendly 
agreement should have. By way of example, one principle that applies to both 
states and corporations, albeit with modifications, is the principle of due diligence. 
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State responsibility under the due diligence principle requires states, “to fight 
breaches of international law by implementing preventative and punishment 
measures”.174 According to the Ruggie mandate, the responsibility of corporations 
to respect human rights requires due diligence.175 In this regard a company should 
consider the following three factors: 176  A corporation should make a proper 
assessment of the country where it seeks to do business. Secondly, a company 
should assess the impact of its own activities on producers, service providers, 
employers and neighbours. Thirdly, a corporation must assess whether its own 
activities would contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their 
activities. In the template, for instance, UNCITRAL could incorporate a clause that 
includes this important commitment and the consequences that flow from failure to 
adhere to the due diligence principle. The due diligence principle will therefore 
assist both the state and the corporation to reflect on the possible human rights 
challenges that may arise from their relationship and jointly reflect on the remedial 
steps. Each of the parties will of course draw from what their responsibilities 
require of them.  
As discussed earlier, the ICSID Convention serves as an investor-state and state-
state international dispute resolution mechanism. An even more important aspect 
to its mandate is that it offers fact finding proceedings to examine and report on 
facts before a dispute arises.177 This important provision may be extended so that 
it can empower the ICSID to go on a human rights related fact finding mission. In 
certain situations this may have the effect of pre-empting human rights violations 
before they happen.  
4.3 The proposed model and its possible pitfalls 
The proposed model will inevitably attract a number of criticisms. The first likely 
argument may be that the model is located in the private international law sphere 
as opposed to one of the typical public international law mechanisms. Four 
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arguments which have already been raised in the course of this study counter this 
point. Firstly, the activities of MNCs straddle the international law divides with ease 
to an extent that in relation to their international operations these finer distinctions 
can no longer be maintained. Secondly, state practice reveals the fact that 
arbitration has become the hub of constant interaction between states and 
corporations. Thirdly, as the research by Born has pointed out, the use of 
arbitration as opposed to traditional international courts or tribunals has risen 
significantly in the recent past. In this regard, there is an international movement 
that insists that all institutions of power should ensure that their activities have a 
human rights focus. At the Addis Ababa Action of the Third International 
Conference on Financing for Development, for instance, member states affirmed  
the need to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for achieving 
sustainable development, and to build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels. Good governance, rule of law, 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, equal access to fair justice 
systems, and measures to combat corruption and curb illicit 
financial flows will be integral to our efforts.178  
The business component of this meeting had more than 800 registered 
participants and was billed as “the largest ever global gathering of high-level 
business leaders in the development context”. 179  Granted that arbitration is 
traditionally commercially oriented, in this regard the proposed model will afford 
both the state and the corporation with a platform where they can practically 
articulate their different enforceable responsibilities particularly in relation to 
human rights. 
The second likely argument may relate to the fact that arbitration is narrow and 
has a limited jurisdiction. Human rights, the argument may continue, require an 
instrument with a universal reach as opposed to one limited to the issues the 
parties have agreed to. In response to this argument, it should be pointed out that 
                                                          
178  “Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 13-16 July 2015, Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, at para 18. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf (accessed 16 January 2016). 
179  “International Business Forum, Third International Conference on Financing for 
Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 14 July 2015” available at: 
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261 
 
operationalising universal jurisdiction in international law will always be 
controversial. As Donnely has pointed out in the discussion above, that human 
rights are universal is not controversial, what is controversial is how such rights 
are enforced. Whether universality is entrenched in a statute, such as the ATCA 
(as is the case in the United States of America) or arises from a multilateral 
context such as the Rome Statute, there will always be challenges. This is where 
the strength of the proposed model becomes evident. States bear the 
responsibility to translate their international obligations at a national level. In line 
with the principle of due diligence, states have an opportunity to reflect on their 
obligations as they prepare to engage in each international commitment. Drawing 
from the many non-binding codes and the emerging language of corporate 
responsibility under the same principle of due diligence, corporations too have an 
opportunity to reflect on their own responsibilities in this regard. At an international 
policy level, UCTAD will outline what the international norms and standards are or 
should be. In line with the template that UNCITRAL would have prepared in this 
regard, both the state and the corporation will agree on what the possible 
remedies are in an event of a breach. Recognising the roles played by home 
institutions, Article 54 becomes helpful in this regard. As discussed earlier, the 
award arising from such arbitration have the effect of the court of a final instance in 
the court of the home state. The awards of the international commercial 
arbitrations are published on the website of the ICSID Convention and are 
therefore transparent to the public. Civil society, NGOs and interest groups will 
have an opportunity to scrutinise these awards.  
The third argument may relate to the fact that human rights cannot be left to an 
agreement between two parties. The answer to this argument is three-fold: 
Throughout the years, most international law challenges have been overcome by 
agreements among nations. Even with jus cogens the international community 
came to an agreement that there are certain atrocities that simply cannot be 
allowed to be committed against human beings regardless of the entity involved. 
The importance of consent in international law can therefore not just be discarded. 
Secondly, both private and public international laws are premised on the principle 
of pacta sunt servanda.180 The principle provides that all international agreements 
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must be honoured and implemented.181 So the fact that the parties have agreed 
should not be seen as a point of weakness, but strength. As discussed above, 
compliance levels by states in this regard is impressive particularly when 
compared to compliance levels with the first generation adjudication 
mechanisms.182 Thirdly, the proposed model plays into the strength of international 
law in that states are given an opportunity to outline their obligations and even 
design what the consequences are in relation to the breach. It is assumed that no 
state will deliberately aim low in outlining its obligations. With the passing of time, 
the proposed model may in essence have the effect of states competing to raise 
the human rights bar as opposed to the “race to the bottom” approach referred to 
in the earlier discussion. Corporations will also be afforded an opportunity to 
operationalise the non-binding codes by making them part of the agreements, and 
even more importantly by making such commitments enforceable in the event of a 
breach.  
5 CONCLUSION 
That human rights apply universally to all human beings is beyond contest, what is 
contested is how to enforce those universally held rights. This means that human 
rights must be protected wherever and whenever there is a violation. This chapter 
has illustrated that the state-centric mode of accountability, which relies on state 
institutions, has its place in the system of accountability, but the system also has 
its own limitations. The limitations of the system become exposed when dealing 
with the extraterritorial operations of MNCs. The universality of human rights 
provides a good point of convergence upon which a theory of accountability of 
MNCs can be constructed in international law. This point of convergence, it was 
argued, provides a good basis to infuse human rights into the activities of MNCs. 
The chapter has in addition explored a number of institutional mechanisms and 
their potential weaknesses in holding MNCs to account in international law. Having 
done this, the chapter has proposed the arbitration model as an effective means to 
hold MNC accountable for their human rights violations. The reasons advanced for 
this are mainly that arbitration is the popular and effective mode of adjudication 
that is used by both states and MNCs in settling their commercial disputes. The 
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chapter has further outlined how the proposed mechanism will function in relation 
to both the state and MNCs.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Public international law is an evolving discipline. For over three hundred years the 
legal system has remained relevant to the challenges of the time, partly because 
of its ability to adapt and adjust to new challenges. Because of the events that led 
to the signing of the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, the main focus of international 
law was the maintenance of peace among nation states. The legal system has 
since evolved from being concerned exclusively with matters pertinent to states 
and has accommodated non-state entities such as the individual and international 
organisations. Theoretically and conceptually, it is not clear as to what the basis of 
the evolution has been. At different stages of the evolution though, human rights 
seem to have featured prominently. What is also true though is that as the legal 
system evolved, its scope and coverage has widened to cover inter alia, issues 
such as human rights, development, democracy and international financial 
systems. Because of its wide scope and coverage, international law has become a 
point of reference against which international standards for the international 
community are set and measured. To this end, a myriad of international institutions 
with varying mandates, among which are the United Nations and its agencies, the 
international tribunals and the international courts have been created to oversee 
issues of accountability and compliance at an international level.  Because of the 
primacy of human rights, the different international law institutions have had to 
ensure that they too incorporate human rights into their activities. 
Notwithstanding its evolution, the one aspect of international law that has 
remained unchanged, albeit with variations, is its state-centric nature. Throughout 
the years, statehood has remained the coordinating principle of international law. 
The primary rules of the legal system are designed by and are aimed at states. 
How one understands the nature of international law and its scope has been a 
subject of polarised philosophical debates between the positivists and the natural 
law lawyers. To positivist scholars the nation-state is both the primary subject and 
duty bearer to which all the rules of international law are addressed.  In this regard 
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state consent constitutes the very foundation of international law in that states are 
only bound by those agreements and decisions to which they have freely 
consented. The natural law inspired obligations erga omnes and jus cogens, 
however, constitute an exception to this view. The underlying assumption to 
obligations erga omnes and jus cogens is that there are certain norms and 
standards which should prevail regardless of whether states have consented to 
these rules or not. Obligations erga omnes and jus cogens revolve mainly around 
human rights issues and thus constitute an exception to a positivistic conception of 
international law that puts primacy on state consent. Notwithstanding these 
peremptory norms of international law, the rules-based positivistic conception of 
international law has dominated the discourse over the years. International 
institutional mechanisms of accountability reflect the dominance of positivism. 
Since states were for a considerable time the only subjects of international law, it 
was argued by positivist scholars that only states had obligations under 
international law. This, according to a positivistic conception of international law, 
meant that only states could be held accountable under the legal system. But this 
view too has lost its ground as the international legal system has evolved to 
accommodate individuals and international organisations as its subjects, albeit for 
specific purposes. The state-centred conceptualisation of international law has had 
a great influence on the nature of a core component of international law: 
international human rights law. The concept of international human rights law 
arose within a context whereby state power had no rival. So powerful was the 
state that its own internal affairs were beyond the reach of other states. Other 
states could only intervene when the recalcitrant state had breached one of its 
international obligations as outlined by the rules of international law. The adoption 
of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the 
UDHR), brought about a shift to the human rights discourse. Since the adoption of 
these two instruments, the relationship between a sovereign state and its nationals 
within its own borders became of interest to the international community. Human 
rights were universalised and under certain conditions became the concern of the 
international community regardless of where the violations took place. The 
internationalisation of human rights has had an impact on state power, and how 
that power is used.  
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Despite the above milestone, the protection of human rights had its own limitation 
in that it was state-centric. In this regard, to talk of human rights was to invoke the 
relationship between the individual and the state.  Arising from its obligations in 
international law, states had a duty to promote and protect the rights of individuals, 
while individuals were empowered to defend their rights against the same state. 
Thus understood, the focus of international human rights law was to constrain the 
state in the use of its amassed power against the vulnerable individual. That is, the 
international human rights discourse became mainly concerned with the vertical 
relationship between the individual and the state, while the horizontal 
relationships, those that operate within the private sphere are regulated within the 
different jurisdictions of the municipal legal systems of state. The private sphere, 
as illustrated in this study, has become the locus of potent unregulated power. No 
matter how powerful, non-state entities do not have any direct relationship with 
international law. Under international law, non-state actors are indirectly regulated 
through the state. 
Economic globalisation has facilitated the emergence of powerful non-state 
entities like MNCs whose power and stature rivals that of nation states. The 
emergence of MNCs challenges the traditional notion that political and economic 
power resides exclusively within the state. The atrocities of the Second World War 
have brought home the reality that entities other than states also have the ability to 
engage in gross violations of human rights of individuals, communities and 
minorities.  Through these atrocities, a system designed to deal with the abuse of 
power by the nation state and its agents is confronted with power that emerges 
from private non-state entities such as MNCs. Internationally, the demand for 
accountability has gained momentum in that institutions that wield power are 
expected to be accountable to people impacted upon by their decisions. It is in this 
context that the rise in power of MNCs on the international scene over the last half 
a century has become a point of great concern – mainly because the rise has not 
been matched by a corresponding system of accountability. The asymmetry 
between the rising power and the paucity of accountability mechanisms has led to 
an accountability deficit in that MNCs are only held accountable under domestic 
laws even for their international operations. The difficulty with this approach is that 
some of the international operations of MNCs operate beyond the territory and 
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jurisdiction of the nation-state. There is a need to bridge this deficit. Because of 
globalisation, the traditional institutions and systems of accountability have been 
rendered inadequate to respond to the new challenges. On its own, the nation-
state does not seem to cope with the ubiquitous activities of MNCs. There is a 
need to conceptualise new institutions or reconceptualise old ones so as to adjust 
to the new challenges.   
The foregoing sets the context for the study of the accountability of MNCs for 
human rights violations under international law. The underlying assumption to this 
study is that international law is not static - just like it has done in history, the legal 
system is capable of adjusting its rules and institutions so as to respond to new 
challenges.   
2 THE CORPORATE FORM AND THE LIMITS OF DOMESTIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY  
The traditional locus of accountability in international law is through the nation-
state and its domestic institutions. Generally, corporations are creations of national 
statutes and are therefore held accountable under domestic laws of nation-states. 
Corporate law teaches that once a company is incorporated, it becomes a legal 
person with the capacity to bear rights and duties under the municipal legal system 
concerned. As a juristic person, it can incur debts, sue and be sued and incur 
liabilities in its name, that is, it becomes subject to the rules of the municipal law 
concerned in its own right. For business purposes, corporations can cluster 
together to form a bigger entity – a MNC. By definition, business operations of 
MNCs straddle multiple jurisdictions. Choosing a place of business by MNCs for 
their subsidiaries is often dictated to by the benefits that may be derived from the 
legal or political system of the host state. As illustrated in this study, human rights 
violations by corporations are often prevalent in low income countries with weak 
political systems and poor adherence to the rule of law. Admittedly, such countries 
will on their own struggle to effectively hold MNCs to account.  
The very nature of a corporation and how it relates to its own shareholders and 
subsidiaries is legally complex. In the event that there are violations of rights, the 
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corporate façade shields the individuals behind a corporation from being held fully 
accountable. The shield provided by the façade of the corporate form potentially 
has some benefits for those involved in illicit activities. In a situation where a 
parent company decides to have a subsidiary, corporate law makes provision for 
the concept of limited liability. Legally, each of the subsidiaries of a corporation is a 
separate entity with its own liabilities separate and distinct from its parent 
corporation. To impose liability on the parent company is not entirely impossible, 
but is an onerous process. Such vicarious liability can be imposed by either 
piercing the corporate veil, or proving that there was an agency relationship 
between the subsidiary and the parent company. As this study has illustrated, to 
pierce the corporate veil or prove that there was an agency relationship, is a steep 
challenge for plaintiffs to overcome.  
The fact that the international operations of MNCs straddle multiple jurisdictions 
poses a challenge to plaintiffs seeking to litigate against such corporations. Ideally, 
plaintiffs seeking to hold MNCs to account have an option to pursue such 
corporations either in their home state of incorporation or in the host state where 
they ply their trade. The divide between the home state of incorporation and the 
host state provides a lacuna which has the potential to serve as a haven for MNCs 
which are not too keen to be regulated. In addition, litigating against MNCs raises 
both procedural and doctrinal issues which may be frustrating to plaintiffs. Suing 
MNCs in a foreign country depends on a number of political, economic and legal 
variables. Home states’ judicial systems may adopt a lenient approach to forum 
non conveniens, in which case the goodwill of the home state may play a role in 
facilitating access to justice for the plaintiffs. Conversely, because of the economic 
advantages that arise from hosting an MNC, some host states may be opposed to 
their own citizens litigating against corporations in a foreign land. If a plaintiff 
chooses to litigate in the host country, it may be difficult to enforce such a 
judgment against the subsidiary, which may threaten to discontinue business with 
the host county. In light of the fierce competition among developing states to 
attract business, the host state may opt to have the MNCs continue business, 
rather than assisting the individual to litigate against the MNCs. In the event that 
the defendant successfully raises the plea of forum non conveniens at all levels of 
the appeal process, the plaintiff who is still interested in pursuing the matter further 
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would have to institute the claim in an alternative forum. As this study has 
illustrated, often a stay of proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens 
marks the end of the litigation, and therefore an end to the quest for justice. 
3 GLOBALISATION AND THE SHIFTING PATTERNS OF POWER 
In international law accountability is based on territory and jurisdiction of nation-
states. International operations of MNCs operate beyond the territorial and 
jurisdictional boundaries. The doctrine of state responsibility arises only when 
certain conditions are met. For private conduct to give rise to state responsibility 
there must be a connection between the breach complained of and the state in 
question. If no nexus exists, then the law of state responsibility will not arise. By 
their very nature, MNCs are private entities with very minimal interaction with the 
state. It is therefore only in very limited cases that state responsibility will arise in 
relation to the activities of MNCs. An example may be where the state is a 
shareholder in a corporation, or where an argument can be advanced that the 
state violated the due diligence principle.  
Notwithstanding the pivotal regulatory role played by states, the involvement of 
states in the affairs of corporations has its own limits. According to liberal theory, 
economic globalisation thrives where there is little state involvement in the affairs 
of the economy. In addition, in the era of globalisation states have outsourced, 
privatised and contracted out some of the services, that ordinarily fall within their 
scope of competence, to private actors. Corporations have become powerful 
global players of great political and economic significance. More and more 
services such as social security, law and order and air traffic control are now 
delivered by corporations. Services which were traditionally of a public nature such 
as health, education and the running of prisons have now become privatised. As a 
result of globalisation, the traditional powers of the state have been severely 
affected. At the policy level, the nation-state has to comply with international 
demands and imperatives, some of which may even go against its national 
priorities such as trade policies. For accountability purposes, an asymmetry is 
created in that even though corporations have taken over state functions, such 
corporations are not held to account to the same standards that states are 
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expected to account to in international law. As discussed earlier, the greatest 
accountability hurdle of MNCs under international law is the division between the 
private and the public spheres. Because of the historical context within which it 
arose, the language of human rights protection has traditionally been concerned 
with the protection of human rights vis-à-vis the state in the public sphere. 
The traditional notion of the state as the sole provider of services to the public is 
no longer applicable. The shifting of power from the state to the market has meant 
that the authority of the state is less felt where powerful entities such as MNCs 
operate. Because of the traditional divide between the two spheres, state 
involvement in the private sphere is very minimal. The inadequacy of the state-
centric model of accountability becomes exposed in that the state is expected to 
be accountable even for activities where its power and authority is only minimally 
felt. Just as international human rights law is premised on the need to protect the 
individual against state power, scholars concerned with the impact of activities of 
corporations on human rights protection, have argued that the power of 
corporations must also be effectively regulated. For almost half a century, the 
international community has struggled to construct a mechanism to hold MNCs 
accountable for their international operations. The limitation with the various 
international mechanisms which have been adopted is that they are all voluntary 
and therefore cannot be enforced in law.  
There is a general consensus among scholars that the rising power of MNCs 
should be matched by stronger measures of accountability. Whether such 
measures reside in municipal law or international law or both, is a subject of great 
debate among scholars. This study has presented a view that seeks to locate 
MNC accountability in international law. In this regard a two-fold argument that 
draws on two existing principles of international law, that is, the doctrine of state 
responsibility and the concept of international legal personality was presented. As 
it was discussed earlier, in the era of globalisation the ordering of the international 
community is undergoing multiple processes, all unfolding at the same time. These 
processes are simultaneously moving towards and away from the state. The 
argument presented is that for those processes that evolve towards the state, the 
traditional system of state responsibility must be strengthened to be able to hold 
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MNCs to account effectively. On the other hand, for those processes that evolve 
away from the state and therefore render state responsibility inadequate, the 
concept of international legal personality provides a handle through which to have 
a hold on activities of MNCs in international law. As demonstrated throughout this 
study, philosophically, theoretically and conceptually there is nothing in 
international law that prohibits the legal system from imposing direct obligations on 
MNCs under international law. Though not yet recognised as subjects of 
international law, state practice in the realm of international investment and trade 
seems to suggest that states view corporations as subjects of international law for 
specific purposes. In this regard, corporations can contract with states, enter into 
treaties and even enforce such agreements where states renege on their 
commitments. A growing trend in this regard, especially for agreements that fall 
under international investment law is that both states and corporations have opted 
to settle their disputes by means of arbitration, as opposed to litigation.  
4 TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
State consent constitutes one of the defining features of international law that has 
remained a constant throughout the years. If any international law model of 
accountability is to survive or function optimally, it has to take cognisance of this 
fact. In the private sphere, the activities of MNCs straddle the divide between 
private international law, international investment law, international trade law and 
even international criminal law. This study has argued that the notion of the 
primacy of human rights provides a point of convergence around which a 
conceptual model of accountability can be constructed. Internationally, institutions 
of power at all levels are exploring ways of incorporating human rights as part of 
their core functions. In this regard, this study proposes arbitration as a potential 
mechanism to hold MNCs to account under international law. Arbitration is based 
on consent of the parties, and in this way provides a point of converges for 
responsibilities emanating from the different sides of the private-public divide. An 
even more important feature is that in this proposed model, both the state and 
MNC will outline responsibilities in accordance to their different spheres of 
influence. And such responsibilities will be enforceable in law. This as it was 
argued earlier, may in essence result in both states and corporations raising the 
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standard of human rights. In addition, it may eliminate difficulties attended to 
issues of jurisdiction as both parties will agree on which issues will be adjudicated 
where and by whom. 
For this model to function optimally it is proposed that it be driven by a partnership 
consisting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) and the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention). UNCTAD 
being the reputable UN body responsible for trade, investment and development 
will be responsible for setting international standards that both states and 
corporations must comply with. Drawing from the strength of its mandate, 
UNCITRAL will assist in formulating human rights friendly templates that states 
may use. The proposed arbitration will be modelled after the ICSID Convention 
one. In this way, states will be relieved from the burden of having to decide on 
their own and sometimes at their own economic peril as they incorporate their 
international law commitments into their agreements with MNCs. This model will 
afford corporations with an opportunity to translate their non-binding 
responsibilities into legally enforceable obligations under international law, albeit 
through arbitration.  
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